Crime and the Mythology of Police by Baughman, Shima
SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah 
Utah Law Digital Commons 
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship Utah Law Scholarship 
2021 
Crime and the Mythology of Police 
Shima Baughman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
 1 
CRIME AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF POLICE 
      
 
Shima Baradaran Baughman* 
 
The legal policing literature has espoused one theory of policing after another in an 
effort to address the frayed relationship between police and the communities they 
serve. All have aimed to diagnose chronic policing problems in working towards 
structural police reform. The core principles emanating from these theoretical 
critiques is that the mistrust of police among communities of color results from 
maltreatment, illegitimacy and marginalization from the law and its enforcers. 
Remedies have included police training to encourage treating people with dignity, 
investing in body cameras and other technology, providing legal avenues to 
encourage constitutional action by police, and creating a voice for community 
members to express their needs. These preeminent policing theories do not fully 
address a core cause of police mistrust and disaffection of communities of color and 
the poor. To address these symptoms of policing failure requires a consideration of 
the purpose and function of police. Though at the core of police function is a 
misunderstanding of policing that this Article terms “the police myth.”  
The police myth is the two-fold belief that a primary function of police is crime 
control and that police solve crimes with regularity. Reliance on the police myth may 
provide societal comfort but has made it difficult to address rudimentary policing 
failure. Without understanding what police actually do and their relationship with 
crime, it is impossible to reimagine policing. This Article seeks to understand the myth 
that in large part contributes to the anomie between police and communities of color, 
but also creates a structural dissonance regarding the nature and function of police 
and their role in a community. Dispelling this myth recasts the policing function and 
the underlying expectations of public security, while pointing towards a new 
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There is a critical conversation afoot about the future of police in America. All 
options are on the table as states and the federal government are considering 
defunding,1 restructuring,2 reducing the role of,3 or otherwise reimagining police in 
 
1 See, e.g., FY 2020–21 Adopted Budget Dashboard, CITY BUDGET OFF., THE CITY OF 
PORTLAND (defunding the police bureau budget by $15 million); see also FY2021 Revenue 
Summary, BUDGETS, CITY OF NORTHAMPTON, 
https://www.northamptonma.gov/DocumentCenter/View/15588/FY2021-Budget-
Approved-on-June-18-2021---updated-documents (last visited Dec. 12, 2020) (defunding 
the police budget by 10%); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1635 (2019) (providing an example of a participatory city-budgeting 
project where “the public is empowered to defund the police and reinvest recourses by 
‘setting a living wage and by fully funding healthcare, social services, public schools, and 
sustainable economic development projects’”); James Rainey et al., Growing the LAPD Was 
Gospel at City Hall, George Floyd Changed That, L.A. TIMES (June 5, 2020, 5:00 AM) 
(reducing the Los Angeles Police Department budget by up to $150 million). 
2 See, e.g., CITY OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, CODE OF ORDINANCES, ART. I, § 
103.06 (banning the purchase of surplus U.S. military equipment and weapons); see also id. 
§116.02A (requiring police officers to step in and stop other officers from using illegal or 
unnecessary force); KATE HAMAJI ET AL., CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., FREEDOM 
TO THRIVE: REIMAGINING SAFETY & SECURITY IN OUR COMMUNITIES 4 (2017) (examining 
budgets across 12 jurisdictions highlighting “invest/divest campaigns, which advocate for 
investments in supportive services and divestment from punitive institutions”); ENHANCE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEGRITY, S.B. 217, 2020 Sess. (Colo. 2020) (requiring data collection 
on interactions with the public and use of force, requiring that body cameras be activated, 
allowing lawsuits against officers in their individual capacities, and increasing transparency 
of prosecutorial and grand jury decisions); PRESS RELEASE, GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO, 
GOVERNOR CUOMO SIGNS ‘SAY THEIR NAME’ REFORM AGENDA PACKAGE (June 12, 2020) 
(increasing transparency of disciplinary records); S.B. 5024, 2020 Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020) 
(authorizing investigations of patterns of police misconduct); SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL 
REPORT, CREATION OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITION (July 1, 2020) (creating an 
inspector general to investigate police misconduct); PRESS RELEASE, NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AG GREWAL ISSUES STATEWIDE ORDER REQUIRING LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO IDENTIFY OFFICERS WHO COMMIT SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY 
VIOLATIONS (June 15, 2020) (ordering police departments to identify officers disciplined for 
misconduct); Kabir Bhatia, Akron Voters Approve New Policies for Police Body Camera 
Footage, City Hiring Practices, WKSU (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:47 AM) (requiring release of body 
and dashboard camera footage of police use of force); Adhiti Bandlamudi, San Jose Voted 
to Expand Police Oversight. What Happens Next?, KQED (Nov. 20, 2020) (approving 
independent review of officer use of force); PRESS RELEASE, MAYOR’S OFFICE, MAYOR 
KEISHA LANCE BOTTOMS ISSUES NEW ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS RELATED TO 
TRANSFORMING THE CITY OF ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT: MAYOR CHANGES USE OF 
FORCE POLICIES AND CALLS FOR COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT HOW WE POLICE IN ATLANTA 
(June 16, 2020), https://www.atlantaga.gov/Home/Components/News/News/13380/672 
(requiring reporting of deadly force use to a citizen review board). 
3 See, e.g., Sam Levin, California City Moves to Replace Police with Unarmed 
Civilians for Traffic Stops, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2020, 9:48 PM) (approving proposal that 
Berkeley City police no longer issue traffic citations, instead giving those duties to unarmed 
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modern society.4 There have been strong feelings expressed by grassroots 
movements pushing to abolish police,5 and on the other side opposition based in fear 
that reducing policing will threaten public safety and increase crime.6 At the crux of 
these debates is what role police should play in modern society. Policing scholars 
have recently commented that if we want to determine how to fix American policing, 
we must determine the purposes of police.7 While the role of police may seem 
evident, it may not be so simple. The media, average citizens, and even some 
scholars have assumed that the role of police is to fight crime and “make people 
safe.”8 Maybe because it has assumed the obvious, the legal policing literature on 
 
city workers); see also Austin R. Ramsey & Maryl Kornfield, Amid Calls to Defund Police, 
Albuquerque Creates an Alternative Department, WASH. POST (June 15, 2020, 1:32 PM) 
(announcing the creation of a civilian public safety branch which will dispatch trained 
professionals to nonviolent emergency calls rather than police officers). 
4 See, e.g., Joshua Hoyos & Christina Carrega, Minneapolis City Council Votes to 
Replace the Police Department with a New Organization, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2020, 1:11 
PM) (voting unanimously, the city council voted in favor of a proposal that would replace 
the city’s police department). 
5 See, e.g., Abolition for the People: The Movement for a Future Without Policing & 
Prisons, LEVEL (Oct. 6, 2020) (containing a collection of 30 pro-abolitionist Articles from 
community organizers, political prisoners, scholars, and advocates); see also ALEX S. 
VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 47 (2017) (arguing that policing is a tool of social control 
that facilitates the exploitation of people of color); Alec Karakatsanis, Why Crime Isn’t the 
Question and Police are not the Answer, CURRENT AFFAIRS (Aug. 10, 2020); Derecka 
Purnell, How I Became a Police Abolitionist, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2020) (discussing the roles 
that other people can do better than police). 
6 See, e.g., Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277, 
277, 285, 318 (2020) (arguing that defunding the police could have “unintended 
consequences” such as increased crime rates, hampered efforts to control officer misconduct, 
reduced officer safety, and over ticketing, among other things). 
7 See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. __ 
(forthcoming 2021) (“[Policing] goals are relatively consistent throughout the literature on 
law enforcement, even if particular scholars do not embrace all of them: that policing 
practices should reduce crime, make people feel safe, and promote trust between police 
officers and communities so that they can work together to coproduce safety—all while 
limiting the harms of policing, such as police violence, as much as possible.”); Monica C. 
Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2061 
(2017) (noting the dual purposes of the criminal justice system: “crime response and 
reduction” and “the management and control of disfavored groups”); Tracey L. Meares & 
Tom R. Tyler, The First Step Is Figuring Out What Police Are For, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2020) 
(“As a starting point, citizens of the United States need to come to a consensus about the 
meaning of public safety that includes the perspective of those most affected by both the 
problems that the state deploys police to solve and the way that the state responds to those 
problems.”). 
8 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Mays, Who Opposes Defunding the N.Y.P.D.? These Black 
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020) (noting that council members in communities 
across New York are against defunding the police because various communities “are not safe 
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policing has largely neglected to engage in a meaningful discussion of the purpose 
and function of police.  
The veins of policing scholarship have historically included both 
instrumentalist and legitimacy approaches; the former focused on improving police 
crime control and the latter focused on improving police and community 
relationships.9 Early 1960s instrumentalist approaches in policing literature relied 
on patrol policing and community policing which aimed to improve police ability to 
solve crime and address community concerns. As reported crime rates rose in the 
1970s, instrumentalist policing adapted to new technology and approaches with 
 
yet”); see also W.G. SKOGAN, POLICE AND PUBLIC IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A BRITISH 
CRIME SURVEY REPORT (1990) (proffering that people have favorable views of police unless 
they need police to solve a crime). There is a “mythology” around criminal investigation that 
can be understood not only in the “glamour” of “catching criminals” that created a “good 
living for thousands of authors, filmmakers and television directors, but also in terms of both 
the real and the symbolic importance of successful criminal investigation in delivering one 
of the key promises of the modern centralized state, on which a significant portion of its 
legitimacy has rested: the promise of providing effective security of the state.” See TIM 
NEWBURN, HANDBOOK OF POLICING 433 (2d. ed. 2008). Solving crime is related to crime 
control and prevention, as well as addressing disorder, though the concepts are not identical. 
See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 870, 901 (2015) (“Most local policing seeks to facilitate criminal justice and prevent 
crime and disorder in order to make a community safer[.]”). 
9 I owe this categorization of policing scholarship to Jocelyn Simonson, see Simonson, 
supra note 7.  
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broken windows policing,10 hot spots policing,11 and predictive policing,12 which all 
purportedly aimed to reduce crime and delinquency in communities. More recently, 
legitimacy theories have rejected instrumentalist approaches—focusing not on goals 
of reducing crime or improving police function—but concentrating on community 
lack of trust in police.13 These varied, and sometimes diametrically opposed, 
 
10 See generally George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (March 1982) (establishing the theory of “broken 
window policing” and arguing that police should focus on responding to minor crimes); 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception 
of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York 
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 302 (1998) (recognizing the implementation of “order-
maintenance policing,” based on the broken windows theory and noting that the idea is “one 
of the principal policy recommendations emerging along the new path of deterrence”). 
11 Hot spots policing is a proactive policing method that focuses “patrol resources on 
places and times that have the most crime.” David Weisburd, Does Hot Spots Policing 
Inevitably Lead to Unfair and Abusive Police Practices, or Can We Maximize Both Fairness 
and Effectiveness in the New Proactive Policing?, 2016 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 661, 664 
(2016). Hot spots policing developed in the late 1980s out of empirical observations from 
Lawrence Sherman and David Weisburd. Lawrence W. Sherman & David Weisburd, 
General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled 
Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625, 630, 645 (Dec. 1995) (“We defined hot spots operationally as small 
clusters of addresses” where “substantial increases in police” create deterrence effects). Hot 
spots are “cluster[s] of crime problems [in] geographically defined” areas. David Weisburd 
& Lorraine Green, Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis 
Experiment, 12 JUST. Q. 711, 713 (Dec. 1995). The logic underlying hot spots policing is 
that if crime is “highly concentrated on specific streets in the city, the police should focus 
their interventions at those places.”  
See also David Weisburd & Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Crime and Disorder in Drug 
Hot Spots: Implications for Theory and Practice in Policing, 3 POLICE Q. 331, 331 (Sept. 
2000) (examining hot spot policing response in Jersey City, New Jersey); Anthony A. Braga 
et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 634 (2014) (presenting “findings of a . . . systematic review of the 
effects of hot spots policing on crime”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and 
Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 273 (2012) (“Sometimes up to 50% of crime was 
concentrated in 3% of the city.”). 
12 See generally ANDREW FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING (2017) 
(discussing the use of technology and artificial intelligence by police); Elizabeth Joh, 
Automated Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559 (2018) (discussing the challenges of 
artificial intelligence used by police); John E. Eck & D. Kim Rossmo, The New Detective: 
Rethinking Criminal Investigations, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 601, 603 (2019) (“Over 
time, as police have employed increasingly sophisticated technology—DNA analysis, 
automated fingerprint identification, multiple linked computer databases, closed-circuit 
television recordings, and more—we would expect to see greater success at solving crimes 
and a rise in solution rates.”). 
13 See WILLIAM H. WEBSTER & HUBERT WILLIAMS, THE CITY IN CRISIS: A REPORT BY 
THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS ON THE CIVIL DISORDER 
IN LOS ANGELES 4 (1992) (discussing the need for “a profound change in the relationship 
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theories, promulgated by Tracey Meares, Tom Tyler, Monica Bell, Jocelyn 
Simonson and others include procedural justice,14 democratic and power lens 
policing,15 and legal estrangement.16 Tom Tyler and Tracey Meares focus on training 
of police to improve legitimacy,17 Monica Bell encourages constitutional action to 
reduce public marginalization,18 and Simonson considers democratization or 
wholesale shifts of power in policing structures.19 To the extent that these theories 
 
between the police department and the communities” and arguing for police to have a 
“working partnership” with the community). 
14 Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in 
Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003); Tracey Meares, 
Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to Increase Democratic 
Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525 (2017). 
15 See Simonson, supra note 7 (“[T]he power lens opens up discussions of reform to 
first-order questions about how the state should go about providing safety and security in our 
time, with or without the police as we know it.”); see also Anthony A. Braga, Better Policing 
Can Improve Legitimacy and Reduce Mass Incarceration, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 233, 238–
39 (2016) (“Developing close relationships with community members would help the police 
gather information about crime and disorder problems, understand the nature of these 
problems, and solve specific crimes.”); Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) 
Reform, 108 CAL. L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 123–24) (promoting a 
“democracy reforms” approach to improving police function). 
16 Bell, supra note 7, at 2066–67 (introducing “legal estrangement” as a way to clarify 
the relationship between police and the public). 
17 Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Community-Police 
Relationships to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 
1365 (2017) (stating that trust and legitimacy were the most important areas in need of 
improvement); Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining 
the Goals of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1537, 
1555 (2017) (“Training officers in procedural fairness is an important way to build 
legitimacy in the community because it changes the way officers think about how to 
police.”); Meares, supra note 14 (“Positive changes in procedural justice may encourage 
more democratic participation in government.”); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective 
Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1539 (2002) (discussing new 
community police initiatives to improve public and police relationships). 
18 Bell, supra note 7, at 2139–43 (proffering that judges should avoid “giving too much 
leeway to the police,” particularly when the issue is a question of reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
19 Simonson, supra note 7 (examining “the movement focus on power-shifting in the 
governance of the police”); Akbar, supra note 15, at 123–26 (arguing that more democracy 
is not sufficient to address systemic policing issues because it “fails to account for the anti-
democratic nature of the carceral state”); see also Tyler, supra note 17, at 1539–40) 
(“rethink[ing] the vision of what policing in our democratic society should be about”); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. UNIV. 
L. REV. 1597, 1598–99 (2017) (“The problem is not black communities’ alienation from law 
enforcement because criminal law is not democratic enough; the problem is that criminal law 
excludes black people from democratic participation in the political economy.”); Bell, supra 
note 7, at 2143 (advocating for “a deep, meaningful approach to democratizing police 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945
8 Draft forthcoming in 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. __ (2021))  
have examined policing, they often focus on symptoms of policing failure—
including racial discrimination,20 excessive force,21 corruption,22 police 
misconduct,23 and marginalization.24 The last thirty years, legal scholars have largely 
lost sight of overall police function, goals or police crime control metrics,25 with 
 
governance”); Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 
UTAH L. REV. 543, 610 (2014) (promoting “a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law 
and procedure”). 
20 See Julian R. Murphy, Is It Recording? – Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the 
Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments 
in the USA, 9 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 141, 148–49 (2018) (discussing police materials that 
may increase racial profiling of minority defendants for drug crimes); Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & 
David L. Rosenthal, Flight, Race, and Terry Stops: Commonwealth v. Warren, 16 GEO. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 163, 205–06 (2018) (“Discrimination . . . exacerbates any police-citizen 
tensions that already exist within a community and dissuades the victims of crime in those 
neighborhoods from cooperating with the police.”); Elias R. Feldman, Strict Tort Liability 
for Police Misconduct, 53 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 89, 100–01(2019) (“[i]t is also fair 
to assume policing’s risk of wrongful harm falls disproportionately upon racial minorities 
given what is known about how unconscious racial biases affect police decision-making”). 
21 Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1119, 
1150, 1156 (2008) (“[P]olice officers continue to rely on justification defenses, including 
self-defense . . . to justify their uses of force in state criminal and civil suits challenging their 
behavior.”); Aaron Goldstein, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule of Law, 17 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1189, 1195–96 (2003) (asserting that the “most politically polarizing types of cases 
involves police who claim self-defense in shooting an African American victim”). 
22 See, e.g., Chapter One Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1735–36 (2015) 
(noting that “attempts to monetize law enforcement . . . not only . . . discriminate against the 
poor, [but] allowing these programs to generate revenue also tends to corrupt whatever value 
they might otherwise provide” by moving policing from a focus of “identifying culpability 
and gathering evidence” to a focus on “aggressively managing poor communities”). 
23 Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (arguing that in addition to the more traditional institutions that help 
shape and define police practices and misconduct, police unions have an increasingly more 
important role in monitoring and critiquing police misconduct); John Rappaport, How 
Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1547 (2017) (asserting 
that “an understanding of how insurers manage police risk is essential to any persuasive 
theory of civil deterrence”); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391 (2016) 
(discussing how the “reasonableness standard” of the Fourth Amendment fails to hold police 
accountable” for misconduct); Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body 
Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 927 (2017) (noting how the use of body 
cameras may also protect police officers from allegations of misconduct). See generally 
MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT AND LITIGATION (3d ed. 2014). 
24 Bell, supra note 7, at 2068 (“[I]n order to dismantle . . . legal estrangement, multiple 
levels of government must engage in policy reform aimed not only at procedural injustice, 
but also at vicarious marginalization and structural exclusion.”). 
25 For broader research on police function and police abolition, see, e.g., KRISTIAN 
WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA (2004) (examining the 
history of policing); STUART SCHRADER, BADGES WITHOUT BORDERS (2019) (considering 
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some exception.26 The theoretical framework of police investigation and more 
broadly, instrumentalist approaches to police reform, have remained largely without 
progress.27 Legal academia has largely neglected to pursue any rigorous inquiry into 
the function and purpose of police.28 With theory ignoring the issues with 
investigation and crime solving function of police, the lofty goals of ending 
marginalization and democratizing police remain unfulfilled.   
To begin examining the purpose of police, two (so-far) uncontroversial 
assumptions at the foundation of the public view of police must be addressed. The 
first is that policing’s core function is crime.29 This involves preventing, 
investigating, and solving crimes. And second, that crimes are solved by police.30 
These assumptions together are what this Article terms the police myth. The public 
recognizes that there are unsolved mysteries and that police are not perfect—
especially when it comes to abuse and misconduct—but it also assumes largely that 
police fulfill their core function.  
A brief historical review confirms that from the founding of American police, 
the state has charged police to investigate and solve crimes.31 Indeed, police hold a 
monopoly in their duty to solve crime—they are the only actors who can arrest and 
turn individuals over for prosecution.32 While the charge of police has always been 
crime fighting, the function of police has been much broader. A closer examination 
 
how the U.S. involvement in the Cold War shaped domestic policing function); VITALE, 
supra note 5. 
26 See e.g., RACHEL HARMON, THE LAW OF THE POLICE (2021) (dedicating a section to 
“The Pathological Myth of Police as Crime Fighters” and a discussion of “Do Detectives 
Solve Crimes?”); Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, __ UNIV. PA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020–21). 
27 Nina J. Westera et al., Towards a More Effective Detective, POLICING & SOC’Y 1, 1 
(2014) (“Despite the recognised importance of detective work, to date, few empirical studies 
examine the less tangible skills, abilities, and other characteristics that differentiate between 
those detectives who perform the role effectively and those who do not.”); JEAN-PAUL 
BRODEUR, THE POLICING WEB 185 (2010) (“According to a report written under the auspices 
of the U.S. National Research Council, the topics that were the least researched in the field 
of police studies . . . [included] criminal investigation[.]” and taking note of the lack of 
research focused on criminal investigation); Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 605 (“Despite 
significant technological advances in forensics and information systems, there has been little 
experimentation or innovation in the investigation process itself. Detective work is typically 
reactive, initiated by the report of the commission of a crime. Most arrests are made by patrol 
officers on the basis of information from the community[.]”). But see Friedman, 
Disaggregating the Policing Function, supra note 26. 
28 But see HARMON, supra note 26. 
29 See Harmon, supra note 8. 
30 See infra Part II and note 36. By ‘police’ I also include detectives who are a subset 
of police that can operate somewhat independently within in police department. PETER W. 
GREENWOOD ET AL., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, VOLUME III: OBSERVATIONS 
AND ANALYSIS 8 (1975) (noting the separation between police and detectives). 
31 See infra Part II. 
32 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE 
FUNCTION 1–2.2 (1997) (articulating the classic responsibilities of police). 
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reveals that the police function is one limited expression of a broader constitutional 
“police power” that includes state power over health, safety, and transportation.33 
This “police power” covers much more than criminal policing and is a power used 
by states to enact laws, including criminal laws. The constitutional “police power” 
is also used to delegate power for enforcement of laws to police. Although the 
authority of police comes from this state “police power,” the two are distinct 
concepts. It also reveals that police have always dealt with public order issues—
examples over the years range from resolving interpersonal disputes and clearing 
sheep from city streets to managing sewer issues and traffic.34 So while the core 
function of police may have been crime control—this has only ever been in name 
only, as police have been involved with health, safety and transportation issues 
throughout their history.35  
The second part of the police myth is the inherent assumption that crimes are 
regularly solved by police. In that sense, the police myth implicates both the core 
function of police and the performance of police. Indeed, underlying many legal 
discussions of policing policy is a widely accepted, though false, assumption that 
police are solving serious crimes.36 The serious crimes considered here include 
 
33 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway 
Com., 294 U.S. 613, 622 (1935) (“[The authority to establish police] springs from the 
obligation of the State to protect its citizens and provide for the safety and good order of 
society . . . . It is the governmental power of self-protection and permits reasonable regulation 
of rights and property in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from 
injury.”). 
34 HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 24–25 (1990) (noting that studies 
of police time pre-1990 found a “large number of [police] hours [were] devoted to . . . traffic 
accidents,” and other “tasks unrelated to crime”); ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 
231 (1977) (stating that officers in the 1960s spent time responding to “domestic disputes, . 
. . accidents, . . . noisy parties, . . . and respond[ing] to all sorts of calls that were generated 
by something other than a violation of the criminal law”); Jordan Blair Woods, Traffic 
Without the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2, 4) (noting that 
“traffics stops are the most common interaction between police and civilians today” and 
“challeng[ing] the conventional wisdom that traffic enforcement is impossible without the 
police”); William E. Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis 
of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina, 69 DUKE L.J. 1585, 1586 (2020) 
(“find[ing] that black and Latinx people are overrepresented relative to the population” when 
it comes to driver’s license suspensions). 
35 For broader discussion of “crime control” see Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the 
Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964) (examining the Due Process and Crime 
Control Models). 
36 The public assumes that police solve crimes. Rick Muir, Great Expectations: What 
Do the Public Want from the Police, POLICE FOUND. (Sept. 23, 2016) (noting that the public 
expects that police will “investigate offen[s]es” and “catch criminals”); GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 34, at 57 (acknowledging “[t]he myth that detectives are capable of solving all crimes”); 
P. Greenwood et al., The Investigative Function, in POLICING: KEY READINGS 247 (Tim 
Newburn ed., 2005) (citing the media image of the police investigator as “the resourceful, 
streetwise cop, who always gets his man”). 
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classic felonies of murder, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, arson, and 
motor vehicle theft.37 What this Article means by solving crime refers to a crime that 
is reported, then investigated and resolved through arrest and clearance.38 The public 
perception of “crime solving” is a police officer determining the perpetrator 
responsible for a particular offense and holding that person accountable for their 
crime. By either definition however, crimes are not being solved as might be 
anticipated.  
 
Some policing literature recognizes and discusses the “police crime myth.” But see 
Egon Bitter, Florence Nightingale in the Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police 
(1974) where he argues that fighting crime is not the basic function of police and 
recognizes that police do not spend most of their time on fighting crime and even further 
that police rarely invoke criminal law in their work. See also RICHARD ERICSON, 
REPRODUCING ORDER: A STUDY OF POLICE PATROL WORK; NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL. 2004. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE. WASHINGTON, 
DC: THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS; see RACHEL HARMON, THE LAW OF THE POLICE 
(2021) (dedicating a section to “The Pathological Myth of Police as Crime Fighters”). 
37 See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, infra note 39. Murder also includes nonnegligent 
manslaughter. 
38 I acknowledge here that some of the problem is that police are resolving crimes by 
alternative means and this is not being accounted for. For instance, when an officer chooses 
to mediate an aggravated assault case rather than turn it to prosecutors, the case is considered 
resolved. 
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Police have never successfully solved crimes with any regularity,39 as arrest and 
clearance rates are consistently low throughout history.40 Indeed while the public 
overwhelmingly assumes that police are solving crimes,41 they have never solved 
the majority of serious crimes. However, the police myth has persisted over time. 
Based on this myth, the public has regularly reported crimes to police with an 
 
39 Clearance rates (or police making an arrest and turning over to prosecution) and arrest 
rates have remained below 30% in the 1940s and dropped until the 1970s to the present when 
they have been reported at around 20% in 2019. See 12 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS 20 (1941) (In 1940, 28.1% of offenses were cleared 
by arrest, however, the UCR makes several changes in its reporting over the course of the 
years sampled including the introduction or removal of metrics, making comparisons across 
time difficult. For example, in 1940 total offenses included: rape, robbery aggravated assault, 
burglary, larceny-theft, auto theft, and criminal homicide. Criminal homicide included 
“manslaughter by negligence” and “murder and non-negligent manslaughter.”); 22 UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS 42 (1951) (in 1950, for total 
offenses, 28% were cleared by arrest); 78 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AND ITS POSSESSIONS 103 (1960) (26.1% of crimes were cleared in 1960); 99 UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS 118 (1970) (1970 saw only 
20.1% cleared). However, beginning in 1965, the UCR began including a “Crime Index 
Total” in addition to a “Grand Total” for reporting the total number of offenses cleared by 
arrest. The “Crime Index Total” focuses only on those crimes deemed most serious—either 
by their nature or the disproportionate amount of time law enforcement must dedicate to 
them. The Crime Index Total includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny greater than $50 and auto-theft and is the 
number cited here. See 91 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS 
POSSESSIONS 106 (1965); 180 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS 
POSSESSIONS 188 (1980) (by 1980, only 19.2% of crimes were cleared); Shima Baradaran 
Baughman, How Effective Are Police? The Problem of Clearance Rates and Criminal 
Accountability, 72 ALA. L. REV. 47, 113 tbl.1 (2020) (in 1990 21.25% of crimes were 
cleared); 205 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS 207 
(2000) (20.5% of crimes were cleared in 2000). In 2003, the FBI began only calculating an 
overall clearance rate for violent or property crimes, rather than an overall clearance rate that 
included both types of crime. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF THE 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) PROGRAM 5–6, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2003/03sec1.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2020); Baughman, supra note 39, at 116 tbl.3 
(21.64% of crimes were cleared in 2018); FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2019 tbl.25 
[hereinafter FBI, 2019], https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2019/tables (21.52% of crimes were cleared in 2019). See Baughman, supra note 39, at 113 
n.16 (articulating how to calculate percentages of cleared crimes). 
40 A better way to measure police effectiveness actually requires measuring reporting 
to police and conviction rates (to determine whether arrests were based on good evidence in 
the first place). See Baughman, supra note 39, at 85. 
41 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. A 2016 CATO Institute survey focused 
on policing in America found that respondents thought the top three priorities of law 
enforcement should include (1) “[i]nvestigating murder, assaults, and domestic violence” 
(78% of respondents); (2) “[p]rotecting [Americans] from being a victim of crime” (64% of 
respondents); and (3) “[i]nvestigating property crime and robbery” (58% of respondents). 
CATO INSTITUTE/YOUGOV, CATO INST. POLICING IN AMERICA SURVEY 1 (2016). 
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expectation that they are addressed. These crimes typically are not addressed as the 
police myth disproportionately impacts poor communities of color. The results of 
this failure are most profound in these communities as deeper issues of legitimacy 
and disaffection result with the realization that police are not available when they 
are needed. While this Article makes no attempt to determine why police are not 
solving more crimes, it does recognize the consequences of the police myth. Three 
in particular are identified here. 
First, the police myth leads to an obfuscation of police role and a lack of 
accountability for crime solving. Police are charged with solving crimes, but their 
actual function is much broader and more diffuse, and most of their focus is not on 
crime. Though because the expectation is there, particularly among police 
themselves, the police myth leads police to hide the rate at which they are solving 
crimes. There is also a lack of transparency in what police typically do, how often 
they actually solve crimes, and little oversight from the public on the lack of training 
they receive for the functions they perform. The problem may not lie simply with 
police, since the public relies on police for many functions both criminal and non-
criminal, but yet expect them to solve serious crimes. This incongruity and dual 
function have not been reconciled by policing scholars or the public. Perhaps there 
is an unrecognized tradeoff here: when police focus arrests on minor crimes and 
spend most of their time on public service functions, they are unable to focus on and 
solve serious crimes. 
A second result of the police myth is police disaffection.42 Some common 
justifications for disaffection with police include racial profiling, police misconduct, 
gang violence, procedural injustice and minor crime arrests.43 This Article identifies 
another potentially major cause of police disaffection. Members of many 
communities with high crime rates are disaffected with police because they have 
grown used to police failing to address crime and because they often receive poor 
 
42 Bell calls this concept “marginalization” and blames this on police abuse, witnessing 
police abuse and other causes. Bell, supra note 7, at 2113 (marginalization may be direct or 
vicarious; “pathways of vicarious marginalization” include “stories from family members, 
witnessing friends’ interactions, and watching videos and media coverage of strangers’ 
experiences of police-related violence and injustice”). 
43 Tracey Meares, Broken Windows, Neighborhoods, and the Legitimacy of Law 
Enforcement or Why I Fell in and Out of Love with Zimbardo, 52(4) J. RSCH. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 609, 621 (2015) (“Poor, urban-dwelling people of color bear the brunt, not only of 
privacy and autonomy intrusions, but also of the constant stream of official messaging they 
could easily interpret—and appear to interpret—as insulting[.]”); Bell, supra note 7, at 2100 
(arguing “that experiences in which individuals feel treated unfairly by the police are one 
key provocateur of legal estrangement”); Tyler, supra note 17, at 1539, 1547 (“[W]idespread 
stops . . . not only engender anger and resentment but also promote cynicism . . . 
undermin[ing] police legitimacy and contribut[ing] to the issues of distrust that suggest the 
need to change policing policies and practices.”). 
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levels of police protection, which encourages self-help and in turn can increase 
crime.44 This is very much connected with the third result. 
Third, and finally, the police myth creates what this Article terms a punishment-
protection paradox. Individuals sometimes fail to report crime because of the threat 
of “punishment” from different avenues.45 First, reporting crime poses a threat to 
individuals, both from community members, and from incarceration and potential 
police mistreatment. But then the punishment-protection paradox also prevents 
reporting of crimes. People in communities of color understand the police myth all 
too well. They know from experience of years of ineffective policing that police do 
not typically solve crimes. Also, in some cases, solving of a crime may result in 
more negative interactions and a lack of “protection” felt by communities, which 
might make people even less likely to approach police. Even when police do arrest 
and sometimes incarcerate members of a community, this can cause disaffection for 
all who are involved and an encouragement by others not to turn in a member of the 
community to the police.46 Though on the other side, the lack of police intervention 
when a community member is a victim of crime is perceived as a problem of police 
refusing to keep the community safe or being unable to do so. And because the vast 
majority of serious crimes are solved by the public, not police, a refusal to report 
crime or cooperate with police perpetuates the failure of police to solve crimes and 
 
44 Bell, supra note 7, at 2116 (“In response to police abandonment, marginalized people 
seeking protection or redress for grievances have generally turned to ‘self-help[.]’”); Meares, 
supra note 17, at 1359 (“The fact that people would decline to call the police to report crime 
after a serious incident of police brutality is, to put it mildly, concerning. It means that some 
people are making decisions not to call on public servants who have sworn to protect and 
help them even after they have been seriously victimized.”); Tom Tyler, Police Discretion 
in the 21st Century Surveillance State, 2016 UNIV. OF CHI, LEGAL F. 579, 587 (2016) 
(suggesting “that the degree to which people feel that they receive fairness from the police 
shapes whether people respond to the police deferentially, as opposed to with hostility and 
defiance”). 
45 See Robert F. Kidd & Ellen F. Chayet, Why Do Victims Fail to Report? The 
Psychology of Criminal Victimization, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 39, 39 (1984) (“[N]onreporting is 
the result of three factors acting singly or in concert: (a) victim fear, (b) feelings of 
helplessness and the perceived powerlessness of police, and (c) the threat of further 
victimization from authorities.”); Heike Goudriaan et al., Reporting to the Police in Western 
Nations: A Theoretical Analysis of the Effects of Social Context, 21 JUST. Q. 933, 933–69 
(2004) (finding that the perceived competence of the police results in whether property 
crimes are reported); Heike Goudriaan et al., Neighbourhood Characteristics and Reporting 
Crime, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 719, 719 (2006) (“Approximately 25 per cent of the people 
in the Western world are crime victims every year and about one in five of them is victimized 
more than once[]. Many of these crimes are never reported to the police.”); MARTIN 
GREENBERG & BARRY RUBACK, AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION MAKING (1992) 
(discussing findings of 20 studies involving more than 5,000 people and exploring the 
decision to report and the immediate aftermath of a victimization); Stephen M. Schnebly, 
The Influence of Community-Oriented Policing on Crime-Reporting Behavior, 25 JUST. Q. 
223, 224 (2008) (studying “empirically . . . whether police involvement in community-
oriented policing influences whether—or to whom—citizens report crime.”). 
46 See Bell, supra note 7, at 2104–14. 
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furthers the negative feedback loop.47 This results in a serious paradox that 
perpetuates the police myth. 
There is a latent fear about disincentivizing policing,48 and a burgeoning fear in 
the criminal literature about the effects of decreased policing due to recent protests 
and reform efforts.49 More recently as police departments reduce police budgets, 
there is a concern that there will be a dramatic loss of public safety. To understand 
this anticipated loss, there must be an understanding of the public function that 
police serve today. If, for instance, police serve mostly a social or transportation 
function rather than a crime control function, that has implications for what sort of 
risk the public absorbs with fewer police, and what costs might ensue from over- or 
under-deterrence of policing. The theoretical legal police literature has recognized 
the importance of understanding the relationship of police with the communities 
they serve.50 However, it has primarily focused on the root causes (and solutions) 
for the misconduct and distrust of police.51 Much of this important prior work has 
 
47 See W.T. SINGLETON, SOCIAL SKILLS 153 (1983) (identifying the public solving 
crimes as a “myth” of policing). 
48 See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 762 
(noting the importance of striking the proper balance between regulating policing to protect 
communities and ensuring that police functions—“reduc[ing] fear, promo[ing] civil order, 
and pursu[ing] criminal justice”—are not diminished); Paul David Stern, Tort Justice 
Reform, 52 UNIV. MICH. J. L. REFORM 649, 652 (2019) (arguing that public tort law reform, 
like the doctrine of qualified immunity, should not “be so burdensome that it creates a 
disincentive for officers to properly perform their difficult, and often dangerous, duties”). 
49 Paul G. Cassell, Explaining the Recent Homicide Spikes in U.S. Cities: The 
“Minneapolis Effect” and the Decline in Proactive Policing, FED. SENT’G REP. 1 
(forthcoming 2020), (positing that “a reduction in proactive policing” due to the protests 
following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis caused “spikes in homicides”). 
50 See, e.g., Jamelia Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 17–32) (examining the impact of policing disorderly conduct 
on communities); Tyler, supra note 17, at 1539 (arguing that police “could potentially play 
a role in building not only trust in themselves but also trust in government and among the 
people in the community”); Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and 
Laypeople Perceive Good Policing, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 297, 302 (2015) (examining 
the disconnect between community definitions of police misconduct and police definitions 
of misconduct); Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful 
or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing —and Why it Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1865, 1883 (2013) (noting the alienation of citizens that results from differing police and 
citizen understanding of law governing police).  
51 See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 50, at 38–45 (arguing that criminalization of disorderly 
conduct gives broad discretion to law enforcement that can marginalize public spaces); 
Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 655, 658 (2020) (arguing 
“that policing is one of many mechanisms that reinforce segregation” and that “the police 
reform agenda should directly contend with racial residential segregation”; Meares, supra 
note 17, at 1365 (recognizing the potential for police to play a role as “community builders,” 
but recognizing the potential for “mission creep” inherent in reforms); see also Tyler supra 
note 44, at 579 (identifying potential reforms “that could help build popular legitimacy, i.e. 
public trust and confidence in the police”).  
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neglected that at the core of public mistrust of police, and the low rates of 
cooperation with police could be the neglected issue of police function. The majority 
of discussions in theoretical legal police literature also assume, at a minimum, that 
solving crime is the primary function of police.52 Little prior work has really 
grappled with the empirics that demonstrate that police are generally not solving 
crimes, and explored the potential affects the police myth has for policing theory and 
function.  
This Article, first and foremost, attempts to identify and define the police myth 
and its impacts, particularly on communities of color. To introduce this discussion, 
in Part I, this Article attempts to trace a brief, superficial history of policing, 
articulating the key functions of police over time. It demonstrates that the 
constitutionally animated police power delegated by states to law enforcement has 
always been broad—including crime but also including health, transportation, and 
public order functions. Part II defines the police myth and provides its empirical 
backing by briefly reviewing thirty years of independent data on American crime to 
consider the rate at which police solve serious felony crimes. It determines that 
overall, in the last thirty years, no more than 20% of serious crimes have been solved 
by police through arrest or clearance. Then finally in Part III, this Article discusses 
the impacts of police mythology and the consequences of police failure to solve 
crimes, particularly where it is most damaging, among communities of color.53 It 
provides a path forward inclusive of the groundbreaking work of policing and 
abolitionist circles, as well as police investigation literature. The existence of the 
police myth prevents a precise understanding of policing function, and certainly, the 
reexamining of policing, making meaningful police reform impossible.  
 
I.  BRIEF HISTORY OF POLICE FUNCTION 
 
Police officers have historically served as public officials, but with a broader, 
more opaque public function than firefighters, teachers or doctors. While police—
 
52 See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 7 (identifying crime reduction as a “relatively 
consistent” goal of police “throughout the literature on law enforcement”). Others focus on 
functions related to solving crime, such as crime prevention and response. See Bell, supra 
note 7, at 2061 (noting “crime response and reduction” as a primary purpose of policing); 
Harmon, supra note 8, at 901 (stating the goal of “most local policing” involves 
“facilitate[ing] criminal justice and prevent[ing] crime and disorder”). The shift toward 
community policing was an extension of this focus on crime. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE 
WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 269 (4th ed. 2011); Rinat 
Kitai-Sangero, Extending Miranda: Prohibition on Police Lies Regarding the Incriminating 
Evidence, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 611, 614 (2017) (“The main role of the police is 
to solve crimes.”). This assumption is not unique to academia. See supra note 36. 
53 Over twenty years ago, Paul Robinson notes the low rate of crime solving. This is 
one of the few discussions in the legal academic literature of the failure of police to solve 
crimes, though in passing. See Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. 
U. L. REV. 453, 458–61 (1997) (considering the ways an offender can escape punishment for 
an offense by discussing deterrence and punishment). 
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from early on—were expected to prevent crimes and create safe communities, they 
have also always served the public through such varied activities as dealing with 
unruly sheep, inspecting vegetable markets and breaking up neighborhood spats. 
The history of policing in the United States is heavily intertwined with racial 
discrimination. Policing is deeply tied to a legacy of slave patrols in the American 
South, the exercise of control over free blacks, forceful responses to civil rights 
protests, and control of other unpopular immigrant groups.54 While the police 
function included solving of crimes from early on, police were never formally 
trained in this role. As police function became more defined with departments 
becoming more professional, the public increased their expectation that police solve 
crime. Today, according to police and the public—the core police function is 
preventing and solve crimes. Though, in actuality, police are still expected to 
perform many other public service functions and may never receive formal training 
on solving crimes even after earning the title of detective. While it is impossible to 
do justice to a history of policing in a brief Article, this high-level review 
demonstrates how policing functions have developed from early America. 
Part A briefly defines “police” at their origin. Then it reviews a cursory history 
of police in America and how their role and function has developed over time. Police 
largely started as informal public servants and developed a greater focus on the 
professional crime-solving function. While crime solving was always part of the job 
description, this is one that has been cemented over time, though commensurate 
training in this area has not followed suit. Police have historically always been 
charged with public order including resolving noncriminal disputes, health issues, 
transportation as well as the first official response to poverty and racial tension.55  
 
A.  Defining Police 
 
“Police” comes from the Latin word politia which means civil administration 
or government.56 From the 16th century onward, “police” was used in English as a 
synonym for “policy” as it pertains to an organized state, civil organization, and 
civilization.57 Over the next few hundred years, “police” started to mean regulation, 
 
54 WILLIAMS, supra note 25. 
55 Bell, supra note 7, at 2147 (“Police . . . have become the primary vehicle through 
which the state responds to social deprivation.”); see also Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Myth of 
Police Reform, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2015) (“Vexing social problems—homelessness, drug 
use, the inability to support one’s children, mental illness—are presently solved by sending 
in men and women who specialize in inspiring fear and ensuring compliance.”). 
56 J. LEONARD PEIRCE & HARRY CLAYTON COOK, MANUAL TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED 52 (1938). Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background 
of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 757–58 (2007). 
57 DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 812–13 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988); Legarre, supra 
note 56 (addressing the connection between police and the public domain stating that “police 
is synonymous with civil administration or . . . domestic administration”). 
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discipline, and control of a community.58 To control and discipline a community 
began to mean managing crime and punishment. Under the common law, the 
definition of policing was always connected with crime,59 as well as general public 
order.60 In 1769, William Blackstone, argued that the king, as “pater-familias of the 
nation,” directs “the public police,” exercising the means by which “the individuals 
of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their 
general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good 
manners[.]”61 Blackstone used the term “police” to describe the power of the King 
to address public wrongs.62 Blackstone broke up offenses administered by police 
into five categories—offences against public justice, the public peace, public trade, 
public health and the public order.63 Adam Smith seemed to also believe that police 
function included the regulation of the inferior parts of government like cleanliness 
and security.64 Indeed, historically, the definition of police included regulating crime 
in society as well as managing health, trade and public order. Police began as a 
public servant that helped society function more smoothly in many aspects, not one 
singularly focused on crime. 
 
B.  Early American Policing 
 
Early American police filled a role in society that was very much a manifestation 
of the broad constitutional “police power” that states rely on in granting authority 
 
58 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 22 (2d ed. 1989); Legarre, supra note 56, at 761–
62 (articulating this concept and asserting that “this meaning survives today in the vocabulary 
of American constitutional law—especially in the context of the ‘police power’”). 
59 LORD HENRY H. KAMES, STATUTE LAW OF SCOTLAND ABRIDGED: 
WITH HISTORICAL NOTES 271 (1757). The term “police” was used in 1773 by Erskine who 
broadly categorized crimes in three classes: crimes against god, crimes against laws enacted 
for the police or good government of a country, and other minor crimes. JOHN ERSKINE, AN 
INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND ¶ 16, at 705, 714–15 (1773). The second class includes 
laws restraining idleness, punishing beggars, and preserving game. See also PATRICK 
COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS (1797) (distinguishing peace 
kept in the streets from justice administered by the courts and indicating that police were 
responsible for the regulation and correction of behavior and “the prevention and detection 
of crimes”). 
60 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, n.3 (1776). 
61 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162 (11th ed. 
1791). 
62 Legarre, supra note 56; see, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at 128 (dividing 
crimes into “offenses against public justice, against the public peace, against public trade, 
against the public health, and against the public policy or economy”). 
63 See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at 128, 162 (discussing offenses against 
“police” as public order offenses). 
64 See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 at 486 (R. L. Meek et al. eds., 
1978) (1896) (The Greek root of “police” “properly signified the policey of civil government, 
but now it only means the regulation of the inferior parts of government” including 
“cleanliness, security, and cheapness or plenty”).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945
 CRIME AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF POLICE 19 
to law enforcement—including health, transportation and social welfare. In Early 
America, the power to establish a police force derived from the U.S. Constitution 
“police power.” The state “police power” reserves to the states “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the States.”65 This “police 
power” is not merely the power to establish police and law enforcement. Rather, it 
is a much larger concept leaving to the states broad authority to take all manner of 
actions, including to legislate and regulate and enforce health and safety through 
law enforcement. Through this “police power,” state governments passed many 
regulations, including regulations targeting health, public order and criminal 
affairs. Some of this state power was delegated to localities and to their agents, 
including the police. Though throughout this Article I discuss the “police power” 
as it relates to police, I recognize that this is a broad constitutional power delegated 
to states that has been allocated, as relates to this Article, from states to localities 
and their agents, police.66 However, the point remains that the portion of “police 
power” exercised by police—like that allocated to states—involves broad 
functions beyond the criminal realm—including health, transportation and public 
order. This may partially explain the broad and diffuse role police have always 
played in society. 
The early authority of police was similar to that of the common law where 
police had wide-ranging public service duties. In the 1600s, New York and Boston 
started the first private police systems with officers employed part time.67 From 
establishment, one of the early police’s core functions was solving crime.68 When 
the Constitution was drafted, the “police power” was seen as a vital state power and 
one that was integral to the functioning of a modern state.69 In 1844, the statute 
 
65 U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,” including the states’ 
ability to create criminal laws and to delegate law enforcement responsibilities to police). 
66 I appreciate Rachel Harmon helping me to clarify this point to avoid confusion. 
67 BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 17–18, 73–74, 
86–87 (2017); DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 3–4 (2007); Olivia 
B. Waxman, How the U.S. Got Its Police Force, TIME (May 18, 2017) (discussing the 
privately-funded police systems of Boston in 1636 and New York in 1658). 
68 BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606–1660, 96–97 
(1983) (noting that American constables’ duties in the 1650s included, among other things, 
“apprehend[ing] all minor offenders and suspicious persons”); DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING 
THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN 
POLICE, 1800–1887, 8–9 (noting that public concern around crime spurred some citizens to 
urge for policing to address the issue and focus on crime prevention); David A. Sklansky, 
The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1207, 1207 n.231 (1999) (explaining that in 
the U.S, “the new police explicitly emphasized crime prevention as their principal objective; 
the manuals for most of the new departments contained language echoing Peel’s instruction 
that the officers’ ‘every effort’ should be directed toward ‘this end’”).  
69 ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
(1904); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
429, 429–31 (2004) (evaluating the differing views on the proper scope of the Constitutional 
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establishing the first contemporary police department is passed, setting forth the role 
of police to detect and report offenders to the courts, recover property and prevent 
crimes.70 By the mid-1800s,71 police became a branch of government that focused 
on promoting public health, safety, and morality.72 In the latter-1800s, police 
officially became responsible for solving crime in Boston,73 New York, and 
Chicago.74 Indeed crime solving and investigation were emphasized as important for 
a professional police force.75 Policing during this period was heavily influenced by 
Sir Robert Peel, whose principles impacted the development of American policing.76 
 
police power; some argue it is broad, some argue it is narrow and limited, but all 
acknowledge that the power comes from the Constitution). 
70 HARMON, supra note 36. 
71 FOGELSON, supra note 34, at 13 (noting that authorities “organize[d] the first police 
departments in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s”); JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 15 (“In the years 
from 1830 to the 1850s each American city evolved its own police department[.]”). 
72 See e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“It belongs to that department 
to exert what are known as the police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what 
measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, 
or the public safety.”); see also Legarre, supra note 56, at 787 (stating that the promotion of 
“public health, public safety, and public morals” were “essential to the police power of the 
states”). The mid-1800s is generally accepted as the period when “police forces throughout 
the United States converged into a single type.” WILLIAMS, supra note 25 at 29. 
73 The first small detective department was formed by the London Metropolitan Police 
in 1842 after concerns of street crime. NEWBURN, supra note 8, at 423; see also T.A. 
CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 900–1966 160 (1967). Boston 
followed suit, establishing a detective unit in 1846. Matthew Pearl, The Incredible Untold 
Story of America’s First Police Detectives, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 28, 2016, 11:33 AM) 
(examining the introduction of detectives in 1840s’ Boston); Gerald F. Uelmen, Fighting 
Fire With Fire: A Reflection on the Ethics of Clarence Darrow, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543, 
1547 (2003) (“Boston created the first municipal detective bureau in 1846, and New York 
followed suit in 1857 . . . .”); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L. J. 
857, 977 (2000) (noting that the “Boston Police Department appointed its first detectives in 
1846”). 
74 JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 65 (“Boston . . . organized the first detective force in 
1846. New York followed suit in 1857, Philadelphia in 1859, and Chicago in 1861.”). The 
first New York police manual contained the following exhortation: “‘The prevention of 
crime being the most important object in view, your exertions must be constantly used to 
accomplish that end.”’). See SIR ROBERT PEEL’S PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (1829). 
75 Sklansky, supra note 68, at 1204 (“It was not until 1877, and the creation of the 
Criminal Investigations Division, that detection became a major part of the work of the 
Metropolitan Police, and even then it remained clearly secondary to patrol.”); CAROL A. 
ARCHBOLD, POLICING: A TEXT/READER 31 (2013) (“Inevitably police departments were 
involved in crime prevention and control, and order maintenance . . . .”); JOHNSON, supra 
note 68, at 16 (noting that Philadelphia in particular shifted police emphasis to “three distinct 
duties: collection of information regarding crime, investigation of all details necessary to 
prepare a legal case, and arrest of culprits” and that similar responses occurred in Boston and 
New York); cf. FOGELSON, supra note 34, at 16–17 (stating that “[F]ew Americans were sure 
whether the police forces . . . should be authorized to deal with crime”). 
76 For an overview of Peel’s model of policing, see WILLIAMS, supra note 25 at 35–36. 
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Peel made clear in his first and last principle that the key purpose of police was crime 
control: the “basic mission for which police exist is to prevent crime and disorder” 
and “the value of police is shown by the absence of crime and disorder[.]”77 Most of 
his other principles focus on police having a trust-based relationship with the 
community, and limiting physical force in fulfilling their duties.78 With a public 
police force, it was clear that crime solving as well as a trusting community 
partnership were critical to policing. However, like their predecessors, nineteenth 
century police officers spent their time on public order functions like cleaning 
streets, inspecting boilers, distributing supplies to the poor and homeless, 
investigating vegetable markets and operating emergency health services.79 
At the turn of the twentieth century, police became even more focused on arrest 
and crime solving than other public service functions.80 After Reconstruction and 
into the Twentieth Century, American police targeted blacks in their criminal efforts, 
patrolling black neighborhoods most often.81 This was dramatic in the twentieth 
century as the proportion of blacks arrested for crimes vis-à-vis whites shot up 
dramatically.82  
Starting in the late 1800s until the 1930s, the public became aware that police 
practices routinely involved violent interrogation to obtain confessions.83 
 
77 SIR ROBERT PEEL’S PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (1829) 
[https://perma.cc/4CUS-7KMP]. The final principle of policing also emphasizes the 
importance of crime solving as the value of police is measured by the “absence of crime and 
disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them. Id. 
78 Id. (emphasizing principles 2–8). 
79 FOGELSON, supra note 34, at 16.  
80 Sklansky, supra note 68, at 1205 (stating that in England “the police acted not just as 
patrolmen but also as “poor law relieving officers, inspectors of nuisances, market 
commissioners, impounders of stray cattle, and inspectors of weights and measures.” “As 
the nineteenth century drew to a close, however, the police shed most of these functions and 
concentrated increasingly on crime control: patrol, detection, and arrest”).  
81 Akbar, supra note 15, at 133 (noting that policing in the twentieth century was shaped 
by “the longer arc of enslavement, Jim Crow, and settler colonialism”); KHALIL GIBRAN 
MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN URBAN AMERICA 53–54 (2010) (discussing the “writing” of crime into race over 
American history starting from the 1890s). 
82 Jill Lepore, The Invention of the Police, NEW YORKER (July 13, 2020) (“[I]n 1911, 
about eleven per cent of people arrested were African-American; under Robinson, that 
number rose to 14.6 percent in 1917. By the nineteen-twenties, a quarter of those arrested 
were African-Americans, who, at the time, represented just 7.4 percent of the population.”). 
Progressive Era, Vollmer-style policing criminalized Blackness. MUHAMMAD, supra note 
81, at 266–71 (noting that “Blackness. . . stood as the singular mark of a criminal” as a result 
of the oversimplification of crime data in the 1930s). Police patrolled Black neighborhoods 
and arrested Black people disproportionately. The “frontline soldiers” in Johnson’s war on 
crime . . . spent a disproportionate amount of time patrolling Black neighborhoods and 
arresting Black people. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON 
CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 12–15 (1983). 
83 GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE 
TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND 112 (2012). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945
22 Draft forthcoming in 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. __ (2021))  
Widespread frustration with police abuse and a desire to improve police 
effectiveness lead to the Wickersham Commission in 1929.84 This Commission 
criticized police in several areas, including “general failure” in solving a variety of 
violent crimes resulting in a significant “loss of public confidence.”85 The 
Wickersham Commission’s aim was not only to root out abuse, but to consider 
police’s failure in solving crimes.86 This secondary Wickersham charge never gained 
much traction however, or attention by scholars while after the Wickersham Report 
in 1931 violent police tactics became less frequent.87 The Wickersham reforms were 
successful by some measures, the first public recognition that police were not 
solving crimes failed to result in any meaningful change.  
 
C.  Mid-Century American Policing 
 
Mid-Century policing focused on instrumentalist aims of addressing 
skyrocketing crime rates by focusing on arrests for minor crimes. In the 1950s and 
‘60s, police focused more on crime control through apprehension rather than 
prevention.88 The rationale and purposes behind this federal investment into crime 
 
84 NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 2 iii, 1, 89 (1931) 
(explaining President Hoover’s formation of the Wickersham commission and to determine 
the nature and extent of police abuse and causes, and to “suggest definite and constructive 
remedies”); Ronald F. Wright, The Wickersham Commission and Local Control of Criminal 
Prosecution, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2013) (“The Wickersham Commission was 
skeptical of Prohibition, documenting many of the unanticipated costs that resulted from the 
sudden criminalization of a widespread activity.”). 
85 NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE NO. 14 1 
(June 26, 1931) (“The general failure of the police to detect and arrest criminals guilty of the 
many murders, spectacular bank, pay-roll, and other hold-ups, and sensational robberies with 
guns, frequently resulting in the death of the robbed victim, has caused a loss of public 
confidence in the police of our country.”); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History 
of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 514 (2010) (noting that the 
Wickersham Commission was created “to look into the state of lawlessness that had 
accompanied Prohibition, including the abuses perpetrated by police”); Barry Friedman & 
Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1827, 1858–59 (summarizing 
the general opinion of the nation’s police as “ill-trained, ill-supervised, and badly 
outmatched,” that “[c]orruption was rampant,” and conducted in a manner demonstrating 
“incivility, ignorance, brutality, and graft”).  
86 NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, supra note 84, at 1 (stating 
that the purpose of the Commission was to inquire into “the problem of the enforcement of 
prohibition . . . together with the enforcement of other laws”). 
87 Tracey Maclin, Comprehensive Analysis of the History of Interrogation Law, with 
Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1387, 1391 (2015). 
88 ARCHBOLD, supra note 75, at 10–11 (noting that police in the 1950s and 1960s placed 
“a heavy emphasis on crime control” and that police reforms in the 1960s “were based 
heavily on a traditional model of policing” that focuses on responding to serious crime); 
Richard Adams, Implementing Community-Oriented Policing: Organizational Change and 
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control have received significant scrutiny and the topic is a subject of much debate. 
For instance, according to Elizabeth Hinton, in the 1960s, the federal government 
invested massively into the carceral state to enforce law-and order as a reaction 
against the civil rights movement.89 And whatever the rationale, it became clear even 
with research at this time, that police only spent about 1/5 of their time on fighting 
crime,90 as opposed to public order and public safety duties they always had.91 It was 
clear in studies in the 1960s and 1970s that police were still not solving most major 
crimes.92 
 
Street Officer Attitudes, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 399, 401 (2002) (“Traditional policing tends 
to stress the role of police officers in controlling crime and views citizens’ role in the 
apprehension of criminals as minor players at best and as part of the problem at worst.”); 
JAMES J. CHRISS, BEYOND COMMUNITY POLICING: FROM EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS TO 
THE 21ST CENTURY 35 (2016) (noting police emphasis on clearance rates and crime rates 
during the 1950s and into the 1960s); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the 
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L. J. 
4, 557–58 (1960) (describing the role that police were believed to provide as stated in police 
manuals was to be responsible “so far as in [their] power, for the prevention and detection of 
crime and the enforcement of all criminal laws and ordinances”); Sklansky, supra note 68, 
at 1226 (“In the mid-twentieth century, police departments changed their principal claim of 
expertise - if not their principal area of practice - from prevention to apprehension[.]”). 
89 ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING 
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 333 (2016) (discussing the increased growth of 
criminalization from the Johnson administration forward); see also “Amidst movements 
and rebellions, the federal wars on crime and poverty jointly contributed to the exponential 
growth of policing and incarceration.” Akbar, supra note 15, at 133–34. 
90 FOGELSON, supra note 34, at 230–31 (noting that, in the mid-1960s “perhaps as much 
as 80 percent” of officers’ time was spent “dealing with . . . noncriminal matters”). 
91 Id. at 231 (stating that officers “resolved domestic disputes, helped out at accidents, 
broke up noisy parties, headed off potential rumbles, looked for stray children, handed out 
traffic directions, and responded to all sorts of calls that were generated by something other 
than a violation of the criminal law”); Sklansky, supra note 68, at 1208–09 (noting that 
American police “were called upon to perform tasks that had less to do with crime control 
per se than with the general control of urban disorder . . . [including providing] the homeless 
with temporary lodging, and sometimes with food”). 
92 George L. Kelling et al., The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, POLICE 
FOUND. 34 (1974) (finding “the overwhelming evidence is that decreasing or increasing 
routine preventive patrol within the range tested in this experiment had no effect on crime, 
citizen fear of crime, community attitudes toward the police on the delivery of police service, 
police response time or traffic accidents” in a year-long experiment of policing effectiveness 
in Kansas City, Missouri); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in 
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 569 
(1997) (describing the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment as “a landmark social 
scientific study conducted in 1972 and 1973, concluded that the study's experimental 
variations in the level of random, motorized police patrol in Kansas City, Missouri, had no 
significant effect on crime statistics, citizen fears, or the response time of police to calls for 
service”); Anthony L. Guenther, A Study of the Detective Role in a Metropolitan Police 
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During this same period was the birth of community policing with the Kerner 
Commission.93 The Commission advocated that police should be part of the 
community and help address social problems, including with a “more cooperative 
police-community relationship” which later became known as community 
policing.94 Around the same time, James Wilson suggested in a groundbreaking 
book that police should be removed from social functions like helping with stray 
animals and that they should focus on arrest for minor crimes that will lead to arrests 
for more serious crimes.95 Wilson also suggested that there was a shift among police 
in the 1970s that moved them away from the principal role as crime fighters, even 
though the public still perceived that this was their role.96  
Some might argue that the idea of community policing was lost as police 
ramped up to deal with the crime waves of the 1970s and 1980s,97 but others would 
argue that community policing was part and parcel of this targeted ramp up and 
 
System 4-16–4-17, (“One of the pervasive beliefs in the Department is that if enough 
manpower, time and resources could be mobilized, virtually every reported crime could be 
solved. Since that state of affairs is unlikely, detectives systematically evaluate the closure 
prospects for each assignment and invest their energies and talents in the most promising. 
Knowing that this policy will eventuate in a perfunctory follow-up of many larcenies, 
burglaries, and robberies, detectives obtain residual satisfaction from those cases which do 
close.”).  
Professors Paul Cassell and Richard Fowles have argued that the Supreme Court’s 1966 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona caused a substantial drop in violent crime clearance rates in 
1966–68.  See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year 
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN L. REV. 1055 
(1998); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty 
Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 BOST. 
U.L. REV. 685 (2017). See also Amos N. Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda 
and Counterterrorism, 71 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2011) (analyzing Miranda exceptions); 
Paul G. Cassell & Amos N. Guiora, Point/Counterpoint on the Miranda Decision: Should It 
Be Replaced or Retained?, 31(5) UTAH BAR J. 18 (2018) (arguing for and against the 
Miranda decision). 
93 Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, The Battle for the Constitution: The First Step Is 
Figuring Out What Police Are For, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2020). 
94 Id. 
95 JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW 
AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 4–5, 284 (1978) (noting that such “service functions” 
are only ancillary to true “law enforcement functions,” that they could easily be privatized, 
and arguing that “benevolent” disregard of “minor misdeeds” undermines justice and that 
such behavior increases discrimination because “what is benevolence to the beneficiary 
becomes malevolence to the neglected”); But see James Baldwin, A Report from Occupied 
Territory, THE NATION (July 11, 1966) (“[P]olice are simply the hired enemies of this 
population. . . . This is why those pious calls to ‘respect the law,’ always to be heard from 
prominent citizens each time the ghetto explodes, are so obscene.”). 
96 WILSON, supra note 95, at x (noting that police were publicly stating in 1977 that 
they could do little about crime and focused more on service functions). 
97 Meares & Tyler, supra note 93. 
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increased minor crime arrests in poor black neighborhoods.98 Either way, the 
community policing period—and increased crime rates—dramatically increased 
arrests throughout the United States. Community policing was intended to have 
police seeking counsel and support from community organizations and citizens to 
help solve the “problems of crime, drugs and violence,”99 however many police 
stations continued to operate like traditional patrol departments.100 Though the new 
community police focus on minor crimes increased arrests dramatically. This 
increase of arrests between the 1960s and 1980s cannot be understated. Arrest rates 
in this twenty-year period matched arrest rates for the entire hundred preceding 
years.101 In the 1970s, studies confirmed that police patrols did not effectively reduce 
crime or fear of crime,102 or improve crime solving.103 By the 1980s, many police 
departments claimed their focus was community policing, seemingly moving away 
 
98 Akbar, supra note 15, at 125 (“Many accounts . . . frame community policing as 
central to government attempts to re-legitimate police amidst the rebellions of the 1960s.”). 
99 SKOLNICK, supra note 52. Practical steps involve organizing community-based crime 
prevention activities, like Neighborhood Watch, informational newsletters, and groups that 
remove graffiti. 
100 Id. at 270, 272–73 (community policing was widespread but did not change policing 
practices as some hoped it would). 
101 HINTON, supra note 82, at 5 (There were fewer individuals incarcerated in the 
century from 1865 to Johnson’s War on Crime than from that time to Reagan’s War on 
Drugs); see also Lepore, supra note 82 (“More Americans went to prison between 1964 and 
1982 than between 1865 and 1964[.]”). 
102 Kelling et al., supra note 82, at vii (finding that changes in levels of preventive patrol 
did not result in “significant differences in the level of crime, citizens’ attitudes toward police 
services, citizens’ fear of crime, police response time, or citizens’ satisfaction with police 
response time”); Livingston, supra note 92, at 569. But see WILLIAM G. GAY ET AL., 
NEIGHBORHOOD TEAM POLICING: NATIONAL EVALUATION PROGRAM PHASE I SUMMARY 
REPORT 35–36 (1977) (citing improved community attitudes in Albany and Los Angeles, 
including “consistently more positive” attitudes towards “police fairness, dependability and 
trustworthiness” and improved “citizen perceptions of police fairness and impartiality,” but 
“no impact” in Cincinnati, Holyoke, and New York); LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., TEAM 
POLICING: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 107 (1973) (noting some evidence “that team policing had 
certain consequences for . . . community relations” but cautioning that “[t]he data are far too 
scant . . . to make such conclusions final”). 
103 David I. Sheppard & Antony M. Pate, Operation Homestead in Newark Final Report 
(Draft), POLICE FOUNDATION 1, 44–45, (Nov. 13, 1991) (finding no “substantial reductions 
in reported crimes” but “demonstrated measurable effects on citizen attitudes” and that 
“resident perceptions of the conditions in the target neighborhood improved significantly” in 
a study evaluating a team and community policing strategy in Newark, New Jersey). 
 This study did not focus on police solving crimes, however; See also POLICE 
FOUNDATION, THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT 118 (1981) (noting that street 
patrols were effective at making citizens “feel safe,” even when there was no clear impact 
on levels of crime). 
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from an institutional focus on solving major crimes.104 While serious crime rates,105 
and arrests increased during this period,106 the proportion of serious crimes solved 
by police remained the same.107 
Police continued to focus on increased arrests for minor crimes from the 1980s 
to the 2000s. The practice of arresting for minor crimes was influenced by the 
“broken windows” theory, and became even more prevalent than when it initially 
gained theoretical traction in the 1970s.108 Misdemeanor arrests rose dramatically in 
major cities between 1980s and 2000s, even though there was a decrease in violent—
and other major crime.109 Ruth Gilmore describes a 500x increase in the California 
 
104 HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 21–27, 35–36 (1990) (arguing 
that “a community must police itself” with police in a supporting role and raising concerns 
of police effectiveness); Kelling & Wilson, supra note 10 (detailing community policing 
programs in Newark, New Jersey and Washington, D.C. and noting that community disorder 
leads to community fear of violent crime); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1771, 1779 (2005) (describing “community policing” as “the new 
orthodoxy of law enforcement” in the 1980s); Livingston, supra note 92 at 556 (portraying 
community policing “as a result of perceived inadequacies in the ideas associated with what 
they term the "reform era" in American policing” starting around the turn of the century and 
proceeding into the 1970s). 
105 Between 1960 and 1995 violent crime and serious property crime rates went up 
dramatically. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1975 49 tbl.2 (the percentage change 
in the rate of violent crimes per 100,000 from 1960-1975 was +199.3 and for property crimes 
was +178.1. In 1960 there were an estimated 288,460 violent crimes in the U.S. (a rate of 
160.9 per 100,000) and 3,095,700 property crimes (a rate of 1,726.3 per 100,000). By 1975 
there were 1,026,280 violent crimes (481.5 per 100,000) and 10,280,300 property crimes 
(4,800.2 per 100,000). In 1985 there were 1,328,800 violent crimes (a rate of 556.6 per 
100,000 inhabitants) and 11,102,600 property crimes (4,650.5 per 100,000) while in 1995 
there were 1,798,790 violent crimes (a rate of 684.6 per 100,000) and 12,068, property 
crimes (a rate of 4,593 per 100,000) See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995: SECTION 
II, CRIME INDEX OFFENSES REPORTED 58, tbl.1. 
106 See supra note 101.  
107 See supra note 39 (clearance rates have hovered around 20% since 1960 and were 
at 21.52% in 2019).  
108 The first mention of this as a concept was by James Wilson in 1968. WILSON, supra 
note 95, at 7–8, 284 (examining the issues raised when police discretion is used to determine 
whether and how to intervene in response to minor crimes; noting that when an officer 
chooses to “ignore[] minor misdeeds” it implies some degree of unfairness); GEORGE L. 
KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND 
REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 242 (1997) (supporting that “order-maintenance 
activities will have a major impact on index crime, as well as low-level disorder”); see 
Kelling & Wilson, supra note 10; Harcourt, supra note 10, at 302. 
109 PREETI CHAUHAN, ET AL., TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS IN NEW YORK, JOHN 
JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUST. (OCT. 28, 2014), 
http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/files/web_images/10_28_14_TOCFINAL.pdf at 8–11. 
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prison population in these twenty years, without any increase in crime.110 Police 
increased apprehension rates for minor crimes, but were unable to improve the rates 
at which they solved major crimes.  
Police claimed to be focused on high crime rates in the early 1990s, which 
dropped by the end of the decade.111 There was a renewed instrumentalist focus by 
police nationally to improve crime solving—now with the help of technology. The 
1990s brought an increasing focus on technology like COMPSTAT,112 and “hot 
spots policing,”113 which led police to focus their efforts in smaller areas given that 
crime was concentrated in small areas of the city.114 Hot spots policing utilized 
historical crime data to predict future crime hot spots.115 Though crime fell, police 
 
110 RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND 
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 7, 109–10 (Earl Lewis, George Lipsitz, Peggy 
Pascoe, George Sánchez & Dana Takagi eds., 2007) (“California state prisoner population 
grew nearly 500 percent between 1982 and 2000” and “Police forces throughout the state, 
from tiny rural sheriffs’ offices to the highly capitalized LAPD, systemically fulfilled their 
mandates through enhanced surveillance of neighborhoods and individuals suspected of 
extralegal activity. . . . [N]ew laws widened and deepened the capacity of police, prosecutors, 
and judges to identify, arrest, charge, and convict people and remand them to [the California 
Department of Corrections] custody. Indeed, the legislature embarked on a criminal-law 
production frenzy . . . .”). 
111 Gary Lafree, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 269 
(2000) (“The crime bust period, from 1991 to 1999, is marked by steep declines in crime.”). 
112 Simultaneously, the police increased technology to fight crime. The police were 
early adopters of computer database technology. COMPSTAT: Its Origins, Evolution, and 
Future in Law Enforcement Agencies, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE POLICE EXECUTIVE 
RSCH. F., 2–3, 6 (2013) (describing how Bill Bratton and a command staff developed 
Compstat for the NYPD as it shifted to focus on crime prevention and data-driven 
performance in the 1990s; explaining Compstat’s purpose as a performance management 
system that “emphasizes information-sharing, responsibility and accountability, and 
improving effectiveness. . .” outlining the adoption of Compstat from the NYPD to other 
police agencies “large and small” and now to non-law enforcement agencies as well); see 
also Vincent E. Henry, CompStat The Emerging Model of Police Management, in CRITICAL 
ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUST. 117, 119 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2d ed. 2003). The U.S. had 
been using technology to solve crime since at least 1967. See National Crime Information 
Center Celebrates 40th Birthday, GOV’T TECH. (Jan. 22, 2007) (stating that the National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC) “became operational on January 27, 1967”). 
113 Hot spots policing is a proactive policing method that focuses patrol resources on 
places and times that have the most crime. See supra note 11.  
114 Henry, supra note 112, at 117, 119 (noting that Compstat technology helped finetune 
policing and target it toward critical areas); Ferguson, supra note 11, at 265, 271–72, 273 
(“[R]esearchers in Minneapolis, Minnesota found that 3.3% of street addresses and 
intersections in Minneapolis generated 50.4% of all dispatched police calls for service.”). 
115 See Renata M. O’Donnell, Challenging Racist Predictive Policing Algorithms 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 544 (2019) (predictive policing 
perpetuates racial bias); but see United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 344 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(Thacker, S., concurring) (“[P]reventive policing . . . has revealed itself to be tarnished with 
racial bias. predictive policing is merely a covert effort to attempt to justify racial profiling.”). 
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did not improve in the proportion of serious crimes solved in this period, as with 
earlier periods of policing. As the mid-century period of policing closed, 
instrumentalist aims moved from solving major crime to arrests for minor crimes 
through community policing and technology. 
 
D.  Modern American Policing 
 
The last thirty years of policing have witnessed reduced numbers of arrests, 
with legitimacy and democratic aims prevailing in policing theory. The current 
system of American policing includes over 440,000 officers.116 Serious crime rates 
have fallen dramatically,117 yet police arrest rates have not improved, and arrest 
numbers have actually fallen.118 The prevailing policing theories focus on legitimacy 
and procedural justice aims of reducing racial profiling and improving community 
distrust that has resulted from decades of mistreatment by police.119 Another 
prevailing legitimacy theory is democratic policing.120 Though similar in aim to 
 
116 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FULL-TIME LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, BY 
REGION AND GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION BY POPULATION GROUP, NUMBER AND RATE PER 1,000 
INHABITANTS, 2019 tbl.71 (2019); DUREN BANKS ET AL., NATIONAL SOURCE OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2016), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf (approximating 18,000 total agencies). 
117 Compare supra note 105, with FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009 tbl.1, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2009 (in 1990 the FBI estimated that the violent crime 
rate was 729.6 per 100,000 and the property crime rate was 5,073.1 per 100,000); See FBI, 
2019 supra note 39, at tbl.1 (in 2019 the violent crime rate was 366.7 per 100,000 and the 
property crime rate was 2,109.9 per 100,000). 
118 The number of arrests have gone down pretty consistently since 1995 (with a slight 
blip in 2009). Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors and Mass 
Incarceration, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5 n.9) (“The number 
of arrests nationally have decreased since 2006.”). Over the last thirty years, the number of 
people arrested has decreased. In 1995 there were 2.9 million arrests, by 2006 arrests reduced 
to 2.1 million and in 2019 there were 1.6 million arrests for the selected serious crimes 
discussed here. Baughman, supra note 39, at 114 tbl.2&3 (for 2006); FBI, 2019, supra note 
39, at tbl.29; Id. (selected crimes include murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 
rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny-theft, burglary, motor vehicle theft).  
119 See Tracey Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men, 
92 MARQ. L. REV. 651 (2009) (examining procedural justice and police legitimacy); 
Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 14 (considering the interplay between procedural justice and 
legitimacy). 
120 See Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with Problems of 
Democracy, 2016 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 617 (2016) (recognizing calls for constitutional 
policing); Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1700–02 (identifying democratic policing; arguing 
that democratic policing can mean a variety of things: “procedural regularity and the ‘rule of 
law’”; “certain substantive rights”; “popular participation in policing” through civilian 
review or community policing or control; or “service-style” policing); SKLANSKY, supra note 
67 (similar discussion); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1120–21 
(2000) (identifying “democratic and trustworthy” policing as that which focuses on greater 
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community policing, after broad criticism of earlier iterations of community 
policing,121 scholars have focused on adding more community perspectives and even 
shifting the power dynamic to the public to determine the focus of police.122  
A result of these guiding theoretical approaches has been procedural justice 
police training and community councils.123 The focus in the last twenty years has 
been in training officers to be professional and exercise appropriate force. In 2014, 
Ferguson police shot Michael Brown resulting in the Obama Administration 
establishing a policing task force that found that police had become more militant 
and less protective of the public.124 Other high profile shootings in 2016 and 2020 
have led scholars to critique police for perceived abusive practices, particularly 
 
transparency); Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional 
Law of Punishment, 111 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1437 (2017) (examining how fragmentation of 
power relates to democracy in punishment); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 85, at 
1830 (noting “a failure of democratic processes and accountability” underlying policing); 
Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 
1455, 1456 (2017) (advocating for linking together a reconstructivist theory of criminal 
justice and a democratic theory of government to “characterize a democratic society’s 
approach to criminal justice”); Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision 
for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 793 (2016) (examining the role of communities in “influenc[ing] the DOJ’s police-
reform consent decrees”); Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 NW. 
UNIV. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019) (arguing for applying administrative rulemaking procedures to 
policing agencies as a way to enhance democratic engagement in police rules); Christopher 
Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 91, 118 (2016) (taking a “new 
administrativist” viewpoint “that police [should be] accountable for their actions through the 
democratic process”). 
121 Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 1452–53 (advocating for “do[ing] more to ensure 
that multiple voices are heard” within the criminal legal system); Cf. Simonson, supra note 
23 (proposing copwatching as an agonistic form of public participation in policing); Akbar, 
supra note 15 (critiquing community policing). 
122 See Simonson, supra note 7 (noting a “growing emphasis within social movements 
[that is] reckoning with police violence by imagining new forms of governance and 
policymaking in which power is shifted to those who have been most harmed by mass 
criminalization and mass incarceration.”). 
123 Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 952 (2006) (arguing that greater “information and participatory rights” 
should be extended to both victims and “other members of the public” in the criminal 
process); Kleinfeld, supra note 120, at 1483 (arguing for a “‘We the People’ principle of 
criminal procedure hold[ing] that the administration and enforcement of criminal law should 
be by and of the people” and noting that the current system has “profoundly . . . drifted away 
from it”). Some have raised concerns about the limited impact of these solutions. Akbar, 
supra note 15, at 124–25 (arguing that democratization of policing is insufficient to address 
the systemic issues in modern policing); Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1802–03 (cautioning 
that “very little scholarly attention has been paid” to the effectiveness of many forms of 
civilian oversight). 
124 Ronald L. Davis, President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
Recommendations: From Print to Action, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (July 28, 2015). 
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targeted at minority defendants.125 The recommendations of this presidential 
taskforce, like the previous Wickersham and Kerner commissions were never 
implemented.126 Though this taskforce, unlike the Wickersham commission did not 
focus on police failure to solve major crimes, possibly assuming that this was not a 
problem since the last time it was broadly recognized was in the 1970s.127 While 
there has not been a national push to improve police crime solving, the stated priority 
of the largest U.S. police departments is preventing crime, and apprehending the 
person responsible for those crimes.128 For instance, Los Angeles police clearly 
restate the Peel principles from early policing: “[t]he test of police effectiveness is 
the absence of crime and the presence of public order.”129 However, the focus today 
of the leading policing scholarship does not include instrumentalist aims of 
preventing or solving crimes. 
 
125 Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (depicting police misconduct as “not accidental, incidental, or 
inevitable” but “systematic”); L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from 
Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2961 (2015) (discussing the phenomenon of 
police killing unarmed black men as bringing national attention to “the persistent problem of 
policing and racial violence”); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be 
Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 467 (1992) (summarizing the circumstances 
within our society that have led to the abuse and brutality of police and on some level the 
acceptance of such behavior); Feldman, supra note 20, at 90 (noting that “[s]tudies have 
shown that police officers use force against racial minorities at disproportionately high rates, 
and there is reason to believe much of this force is unjustified”). 
126 Charles H. Ramsey et al., Opinion, There Is a Playbook for Police Reform: We 
Helped Write It, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2020) (discussing the lack of implementation of Obama 
Commission recommendations). 
127 Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 85–99 (2015) 
(failing to mention solving crimes or improving clearance rates as recommendations or 
action items in the report). 
128 See, e.g., Mission Statement, DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, 
https://dallaspolice.net/abouts/missionstatement (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) (“The Police 
Department, in serving the people of Dallas, strives to reduce crime and provide a safe city 
by . . . [p]roviding preventive, investigative, and enforcement services[.]”); MPDC: Mission 
and Value Statement, METRO. POLICE DEP’T, https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/mpdc-mission-and-
value-
statement#:~:text=It%20is%20the%20mission%20of,the%20sanctity%20of%20human%2
0life. (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) (Washington, D.C.) (“It is the mission of the Metropolitan 
Police Department to . . . reduce crime and the fear of crime in the community.”); Mission, 
NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/mission.page (last visited Jan. 2, 
2021) (New York City) (“In partnership with the community, we pledge to . . . fight crime, 
both by preventing it and aggressively pursuing violators of the law.”); Adrian Diaz, Mission 
Statement and Priorities, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL, https://www.seattle.gov/police-
manual/general-policy-information/mission-statement-and-priorities (last visited Jan. 22, 
2021) (“The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime . . . .”). 
129 Management Principles of the LAPD, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T (last visited Nov. 
7, 2020). 
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While over time police have reduced abusive practices and increased arrests for 
minor crimes, not a lot otherwise has changed. Police are still working within the 
broad scope of public safety “police power” authority that states originally delegated 
to law enforcement, with their daily duties consisting of health, transportation and 
social functions. Though in name their focus has increasingly become crime control 
over the last fifty years, the reality has not matched the goals as police have solved 
generally the same proportion of serious crimes during this period.130 
The next section focuses on defining modern police and their function, 
including crime control. Part I.E. explores the key functions of police and other 
definitions relied on in this Article. This brief section does not appropriately dissect 
any of these terms as they all contain serious ambiguity and the definitions presented 
are subject to challenge. It does attempt to explain what this Article means when it 
refers to police “solving crimes.” 
 
E.  Defining Modern Police Function 
 
At the heart of the police myth and reforming police lies the question: what is 
the function of modern police? The first aspect of the police myth is that the primary 
function of police is crime control. The previous sections have discussed what police 
functions have typically been historically, but now it is important to understand what 
it is that police currently do? If it is not crime solving, then what is it? Understanding 
the police function is a crucial first step to understanding the police myth. And it 
provides insight into what public function will be lost by potentially reducing the 
role of police. Before endeavoring police reform, this Article carefully considers 
what key functions are expected of police.  
Starting at the beginning, what is meant by the “function” of the police? Is it 
what police understand their job to be, what the public currently understands their 
role to be, or what the public should understand their role to be? The first two 
questions are addressed here, though not in any sufficient matter, as there is a dearth 
of theoretical scholarship that explores these deep and open questions.131 It is also 
relevant here that very few policing functions are determined by outside bodies or 
the electorate, but most come internally from police.132 Given this lack of guidance, 
 
130 See supra note 39. 
131 A good start to answering these questions is the classic, GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, 
at 21 (“Anyone attempting to construct a workable definition of the police role will typically 
come away with old images shattered and with a new-found appreciation for the intricacies 
of police work.”); See supra note 18 for further discussion of the police role. 
132 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 85, at 1827 (“All police practices—such as 
use of drones or other surveillance equipment; SWAT, Tasers, and other means of force; 
checkpoint stops, administrative inspections, and other warrantless searches and seizures—
should be legislatively authorized, subject to public rulemaking, or adopted and evaluated 
through some alternative process that permits democratic input.”); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (noting that as 
the law continues to developed “both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the hands of 
police and prosecutors”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945
32 Draft forthcoming in 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. __ (2021))  
this Article settles on considering what the public and police have generally 
considered to be the core police function.  
To determine these core functions, this Part relies on public surveys that have 
largely remained consistent over the years, even with the variation of the poll taker. 
Simply stated, the public expects the police to prevent and solve crimes. According 
to surveys,133 the public understanding is that police solve major crimes. A recent 
public survey found that the top three functions of police according to the public 
were that police protect against crime (68%), investigate major violent crimes (78%) 
and investigate property crime and robbery (58%).134 In contrast, only 30% of 
respondents thought that enforcing drug laws should be a top priority and only 19% 
considered enforcing traffic laws to be a top priority.135 An even larger number of 
police (62%) see their role in society as protectors and enforcers of the law.136 The 
police view themselves as the front line against crime, which can lead to police 
complaints when they are forced to do other work.137 The consensus of the public 
and police is that police are focused on preventing and solving major crimes. 
How do we determine police key functions? This Article cannot evaluate all 
police functions here, though in contemplating policework from a criminal lens, the 
interest might naturally be where police could—or should—intersect with the legal 
system. In that vein, this Article is focused on identifying the proportion of serious 
“crimes” that police ultimately “solve.” Though to focus strictly on that would be to 
ignore a large part of the police function, so it is important to consider how police 
spend their time. In discussing police function, it is important to acknowledge that 
these propositions are highly ambiguous and contestable, and that further discussion 
and debate is needed on these important issues. 
At first glance, key police functions currently seem to be (and have historically 
been)—very broadly speaking—maintaining public order and preventing and 
solving crimes.138 Examples of such “peace” functions include aiding individuals 
who are in danger, facilitating the movement of people and vehicles, assisting those 
who cannot care for themselves, promoting and preserving civil order, resolving 
 
133 Morin et al., Police Views, Public Views, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/police-views-public-views/ 
[https://perma.cc/P56A-4WGZ]. 
134 See supra note 41. 
135 Id. 
136 In two expansive 2016 Pew Surveys of police and the public, 62% of officers say 
their primary role is to serve as both protectors and enforcers while 53% of the public would 
agree with this statement. Morin et al., supra note 133. The surveys “included a number of 
identically worded questions, which allowed for direct comparisons of how officers and the 
public see the role of the police in their communities.”  
137 WILSON, supra note 95, at ix (“Ten years ago [1967], the police were popularly 
portrayed as ‘crime fighters’ who ‘solved crimes’ by investigation and ‘prevented crimes by 
patrol.’ Police officers may privately have then known that this view was simplistic, if not 
false, but few pointed it out.”); Friedman, supra note 27, at 18. 
138 FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 74, 86–87; Kitai-Sangero, supra note 52, at 614 (“The 
main role of the police is to solve crimes. The public’s expectation of the police is to fulfill 
this role successfully.”). 
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conflict, and providing emergency services.139 Certainly there is ambiguity in all of 
these functions and open definitions. It may be valuable to consider whether police 
should in fact spend an overwhelming majority of their time on these broad public 
functions.140 The other key function of police—and arguably one that is strictly the 
job of police—is preventing and solving crimes. Specifically, this includes police 
identifying crime, identifying and apprehending offenders where appropriate, 
participating in criminal proceedings, protecting constitutional rights, identifying 
problems that are potentially serious law enforcement problems, and generally 
maintaining a feeling of security in the community.141 The area of most interest here 
are the latter functions of preventing and solving crime.142 Though for the purposes 
of this Article, police functions seem to include both preventing and solving crimes 
as well as broad public order functions—such as health, safety and transportation. 
In the following sections, Part I.E.1 considers common police and detective 
functions. Part I.E.2 dispels the first part of the police myth in discussing how police 
spend their time in training and in the field, demonstrating that little time is spent on 
crime control functions. In preparing to consider data on the second part of the police 
myth, the final two sections define “serious crime” (Part I.E.3) and “solve” (Part 




139 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 67; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 32; but see 
Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime 
Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 
1264 (noting that “[a]lthough law enforcement comprises only a small component of an 
officer's activities, reform-era officers considered fighting crime the ‘real police work,’ 
whereas the social service component of their function was ‘shit work’ and “morally 
degrading to them as . . . enforcers of the law”) (internal citation omitted). 
140 According to some studies, police may spend the largest number of hours dealing 
with public order matters—and around 20 percent of time or less on criminal matters. 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 24–25 (noting that studies report up to half of calls to police 
involve requests to help with personal and interpersonal matters, another study describes it 
as 83%, and yet another found “that only 16 percent of calls to police in Detroit were crime 
related. . . . [S]tudies report [a] large number of police hours devoted to handling accidents 
and illnesses, stray and injured animals, and intoxicated persons; dealing with family 
disturbances, fights among teen-age gangs, and noisy gatherings; taking reports on damage 
to property, traffic accidents, missing persons, . . . lost and found property” and controlling 
crowds and traffic). Some of these functions can bleed into the criminal arena. See also 
Woods, supra note 34, at 3–4 (describing “increasing momentum for rethinking police 
involvement in the traffic space”). 
While many scholars have articulated their vision for police reform, there is very little 
in terms of theoretical consensus (or even disagreement) on what the role of police should 
be. See supra notes 9–27. 
141 See Baughman, supra note 39, at 52 (noting the “principal functions” of police: 
“detecting crime and enforcing the law”). 
142 Id. at 55 (focusing “on the function of preventing and solving crime”). 
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1.  Police and Detective Functions 
 
What are the functions of police and detectives? Who is charged with solving 
crimes and who solves most crimes? Understanding the current state of policing is 
a critical piece of understanding our misperceptions about policing investigation 
functions and the police myth. 
Solving crimes falls under the basic police function of criminal investigation.143 
Criminal investigation involves collecting information about a suspect and bringing 
the person into custody and eventually working with prosecutors to charge a crime. 
Typically, criminal investigations are dealt with by detectives in a separate division 
than patrol officers.144 Detectives progress from the ranks of patrol officers to 
separate detective units, that later can become more specialized to solve certain 
crimes.145 Basic law enforcement training is around 15 weeks though it has increased 
slightly in recent years.146 Homicide detectives typically spend a minimum of three 
years on patrol, two years investigation and then possibly obtain further training for 
homicide investigation.147 Detectives are ultimately charged with crime solving, 
though their work involves police and members of the public.148 It is not commonly 
known that most crimes are solved by members of the public first, then by patrol 
officers, and then finally by detectives.149   
 
143 The definition of “solving crimes” used here will be further explored in Part I.E.4. 
144 See, e.g., Guenther, supra note 92 at Fig. 2-1 and 1-4 (providing an example of the 
Washington DC police department); David J. Bordua & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Law 
Enforcement, in USES OF SOCIOLOGY 293 (Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al. eds., 1697) (noting the 
hierarchical separation of roles within police departments).  
145 David L. Carter & Jeremy G. Carter, Effective Police Homicide Investigations: 
Evidence from Seven Cities with High Clearance Rates, 20 SAGE PUBL’NS: HOMICIDE STUD. 
150, 161 (2019). 
146 Brian A. Reaves, State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2013, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. 4 (July 2016) (noting that, by 2013, the average basic training had increased 
by approximately two weeks in comparison to the length of training observed in 2006). In 
Europe police training is often two years by comparison. See RUTGER BREGMAN, 
HUMANKIND cp. 16 (2020). 
147 Carter & Carter, supra note 145. 
148 GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 30, at 8–10. 
149 Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 605 (“Consequently, detectives invest more effort in 
collecting evidence for a prosecution than in trying to identify unknown criminals.”); Jan 
M. Chaiken et al., The Criminal Investigation Process: A Summary Report 3, 16 (June 
1976) (an extensive study of 153 police departments showed that the majority of a 
detective’s time is spent “reviewing reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate 
and interview victims”). But see Philip J. Cook et al., Why Do Gun Murders Have a Higher 
Clearance Rate Than Gunshot Assaults?, 18 CRIMIN. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 527 (2019) 
(finding that higher clearance rates for fatal gunshot assaults were higher than for nonfatal 
assaults was “entirely a result of arrests made after the first 2 days, which suggests that the 
more sustained effort in homicide cases is an important part of the difference”). But see 
THOMAS ABT, BLEEDING OUT: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN VIOLENCE--
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Little research exists on the effectiveness of investigative functions of police 
and how they impact crime solving.150 But what the policing literature makes clear 
is that a detective is most effective working with a team of police officers,151 as well 
as with close ties in a community,152 and when using broader available 
information.153 In addition, greater dedication of investigative resources plays a 
role.154 Although policing theory has changed in the last thirty years, the crime 
 
AND A BOLD NEW PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE STREETS (2019) (aiming to bridge the racial and 
socioeconomic divide by offering a plan to reduce homicides by over 50% in eight years). 
150 Carter & Carter, supra note 145 at 151 (quoting Janice L. Puckett & Richard J. 
Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis of a More 
Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RSCH. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 188 (2003)) (“[T]he 
present research remain[s] largely silent on the effects of the investigative actions . . . Much 
therefore remains to be learned about what detectives do and how what they do affects 
clearances.”). We should be careful since police over focusing on their duty to solve crimes 
may cause a disconnect between police and the public that could result in them becoming 
less effective at preventing crime. Livingston, supra note 92, at 631–32. 
151 Carter & Carter, supra note 145, at 164–68 (team approaches took advantage of 
information of several bodies and coordination between forensics and crime labs, corrections 
organizations, patrol and investigators all part of the same team, moving quickly within the 
first 48–72 hours were most effective); Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to 
Measure the Impact of Miranda on the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 114 n.137 (2000) (citing 
J.F. ELLIOTT & THOMAS J. SARDINO, CRIME CONTROL TEAM (1971) (finding that combining 
patrol and investigative officers into a team increased clearance)); Fiona Brookman, Edward 
R. Maguire & Mike Maguire, What Factors Influence Whether Homicide Cases Are Solved? 
Insights from Qualitative Research with Detectives in Great Britain and the United States, 
23 SAGE PUBL’NS: HOMICIDE STUD. 145, 160 (2019) (another important factor was having 
a large enough team dedicated for enough time, but not too large of a team). 
152 GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 30 (the separation of police and detectives in both 
space and status prevents information exchanges that could help with crime solving); Carter 
& Carter, supra note 145, at 171 (also considering relevant data is important for effective 
detective work); Katelyn Rowe, Examining the Value-Add of Non-Adversarial Processes in 
the Immediate Aftermath of Police Shootings, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 133, 141–42 (2018) 
(including community members to solve crimes as well as to resolve public safety concerns). 
153 Seth W. Fallik et al., Policing Through Social Media: A Qualitative Exploration, 
22(2) INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 208, 210 (2020) (noting that several incidental and 
retrospective case studies suggest that using social media can help discover criminal activity, 
identify people and gather evidence); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing 
the Cops?t, supra note 92, at 703 (interviews have also been identified as the most effective 
police investigative method). 
154 Cook et al., supra note 149, at 543 (“Given that fatal and nonfatal cases occur in similar 
circumstances, the greater volume of evidence collected in fatal cases was likely the direct 
result of extra investigative resources.” In addition, “[i]t seems that persistence paid off but 
that staying with an investigation that may take months was a luxury that only the homicide 
detectives could afford.”). 
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investigation process,155 and crime solving rates,156 have remained largely the 
same.157 For instance, almost 30% of police time is spent on patrol, even though 
studies show that that random motorized patrols are not effective in crime solving 
or prevention.158 Investigation scholars even assert that if changes in policing have 
caused crime to drop, it is unlikely to have resulted from improvements in criminal 
investigation.159 In sum, policing investigation and crime solving is largely the 
charge of detectives, though more crimes are actually solved by the public and 
ordinary police.   
 
2.  Police Function and Time 
 
There is very little data on how police spend their time. Though, the existing 
data on police training and allocation of time demonstrates that the police myth is 
inaccurate in asserting that a primary function of police is crime control.  
The day to day of policing has remarkably little to do with crime, despite public 
perception to the contrary.160 The vast majority of police time is spent on 
noncriminal functions—such as health, transportation and public order. Some 
estimates put public order (non-criminal functions) at 90% of police time.161 A 
 
155 FRANK HORVATH ET AL., NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER RAND 5 ( 
2001) (“The police criminal investigation process has remained relatively unaffected by the 
significant changes that have occurred in policing, the crime problem and technology in the 
past thirty years.”); Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 605 (“Detectives seriously examine a 
minority of reported crimes, dealing with most in less than a day. . . . The potential of crime 
scene forensics for solving crimes is undermined if the police agency’s evidence processing 
capabilities cannot effectively handle the demand. . . . [T]he full potential of forensic science 
in criminal investigations remains unrealized. Evidence is analyzed in only a small 
percentage of cases, and it occurs more commonly for case building after an arrest rather 
than as a means of identifying the offender. Long turnaround times are a problem, in 
particular, for less serious crimes.”). 
156 See infra Part II.C. for empirical support for this assertion.  
157 For instance, it would be difficult to argue that improvements in police investigations 
since 1990 caused violent crime to drop. Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 603. It is also 
unlikely that increasing minor crime arrests or broken windows efforts have caused the drop 
in violent crime, though this is more controversial. See BREGMAN, supra note 146. 
158 Kelling et al., supra note 92 (finding the overwhelming evidence patrolling had “no 
effect on crime, citizen fear of crime, community attitudes toward the police on the delivery 
of police service, police response time or traffic accidents”). 
159 See supra note 27. 
160 Friedman, supra note 27, at 22. Barry Friedman explains that some scholars have 
historically pushed back on the common wisdom that cops spent little of their time fighting 
crime. When looking at patrol officers, detectives, and community policing officers, they 
found that what some call “order maintenance” is really another method of dealing with 
crime. If you include this metric, some half of officer’s duties are crime related. Id.; Waldeck, 
supra note 139. 
161 Paul Robinson, Opinion, Why Police Should See the ‘Defund’ Movement as a 
Golden Opportunity, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2020, 8:00 AM). 
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recent survey of several cities who self-reported time spent by police revealed that 
only 4% of police time was spent working on violent crime.162 The bulk of police 
time was spent on calls about noncriminal matters (around 37%),163 with traffic 
concerns taking up the next biggest chunk of police time at 15%.164 Another 
substantial portion of police time is occupied by administrative reporting or personal 
time.165 Indeed one set of scholars found that the average officer spent one hour per 
week responding to crimes in progress.166 This trend only becomes more apparent 
and the ratio of time spent fighting crime to other duties becomes more lopsided as 
you move away from populated urban communities.167 Rural and small town officers 
often address utility problems, house checks for citizens on vacation, and clearing 
cows blocking traffic.168 In short, despite expectations that a primary police function 
consists of crime control, police spend a marginal amount of time addressing 
crime.169  
Police training is arguably geared towards self-defense, yet police spend most 
of their time on noncriminal functions. When it comes to crime control training, 
police are primarily trained with firearm competency and self-defense but very little 
on investigating or solving crime.170 Even detectives get most of their crime fighting 
 
162 Jeff Asher & Ben Horwitz, How Do the Police Actually Spend Their Time?, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 19, 2020) (considering time spent by officers in New Orleans, Montgomery 
County and Sacramento); In Baltimore, in 1999, Mayor Martin O’Malley reported that 
regular patrol officers spent less than 6% of their time dealing with serious crime. Friedman, 
supra note 27, at 22 (noting time was split between serious and minor crime like disorderly 
conduct, drug possession, drunkenness, and loitering). 
163 Asher & Horwitz, supra note 162(noting 37% in Montgomery County, Maryland, 
37% in New Orleans, and 32% in Sacramento). 
164 Id. (19% in Sacramento, 13% in Montgomery County, Maryland, and 15% in New 
Orleans). 
165 Friedman, supra note 27, at 23. 
166 Id. at 43 (“When it came to actually responding to crimes in progress, Greene and 
Klockars found that ‘the average officer spent one hour per week.’”). The available data on 
how police spend their time is limited and could benefit from additional research. 
167 Id. at 22; see also John Liederbach & James Frank, Policing Mayberry: The Work 
Routines of Small-Town and 
Rural Officers, 28 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 53, 63 tbl.1 (2003). 
168 Friedman, supra note 27, at 23. 
169 Id. at 26.  
170 Reaves, supra note 146, at 6 tbl.11 (recruits average only 40 hours on investigation; 
the Justice Department found that police officers typically receive about 111 hours on 
firearms skill and self-defense — but just 11 on cultural diversity and human relations, eight 
on basic community policing strategies, and eight on mediation and conflict management.); 
Friedman, supra note 27, at 10–21 (breaking down the categories of training for police 
officers illustrating the percentage of time spent on each respective topic); Myron W. Orfield, 
Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics 
Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1029, n.55 (1987) (providing a brief history of the 
development of training for the Chicago Police Training Academy noting that “[i]n the early 
1980s, the curriculum underwent further change. Training time was increased from 8-9 hours 
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skills on the job rather than from formal training.171 Most of police officer’s time is 
spent on non-crime emergencies. Yet police receive little training on health, 
mediation, social work, and non-law enforcement emergent situations.172 The police 
myth has affected police training most dramatically. If it became clear that police 
function only marginally involves crime, police might receive training that is more 
narrowly tailored to their daily functions. 
Given the tiny fraction of time police spend dealing with crime, the empirics 
on crime solving in Part II may not come as a surprise. It is also clear that although 
police and the public strongly believe that a primary police function is crime control, 
a closer look at the way police spend their time and their training belies this police 
myth. The next section considers how to define “serious crimes” for the purposes of 
judging police function in the second part of the police myth—that police solve 
crimes with regularity. 
 
3.  Defining Serious Crimes 
 
What counts as a crime? What should count as a crime?173 To avoid entering 
the foray of these debates,174 this Article relies on the accepted federal definition of 
 
to approximately 14 hours and was divided into three parts: (1) discussion of the present state 
of the law; (2) discussion of departmental policy; and (3) ‘hands-on’ experience”). 
171 Friedman, supra note 27, at 19 (noting “in-service” training requirements for 
detectives or tactical team members); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and 
Police Misconduct, 72 GEORGE WASH. L. REV. 453, 478–81, 514–16 (2004) (attributing 
significant misconduct of detectives to the on the job culture and field training where cops 
are often told to “forget everything [they] learned at the police academy” because that 
training was largely “irrelevant to the realities of policing, and that they will learn what they 
need to know on the street”); U.S. BUREAU LAB. & STATS., Police and Detectives (Sept. 1, 
2020) (outlining the requirements for police and detectives noting moderate on-the-job 
training is required). 
172 Reaves supra note 146, at 6 tbl.11 (The largest amount of police training time is 
spent on firearms, self-defense and health and fitness and eight hours on mediation skills or 
conflict management); Id. at 7 tbls. 8 & 9 (indicating that officers receive minimal training 
on mental health and social work topics such as cultural diversity/human relations, 
mediation/conflict management, problem solving approaches, and crimes against children). 
173 Some would argue there are too many crimes. See e.g., HARVEY A. SILVERLATE, 
THREE FELONIES A DAY 25 (2009) (arguing provocatively that law-abiding people are “in 
the eyes of federal prosecutors” committing “three federal felonies each day”). 
174 This legal definition of crime is used throughout this Article. See Ronald C. Kramer, 
Defining the Concept of Crime: A Humanistic Perspective, 12 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 469, 
470 (1985) (distinguishing between “social” and “legal” definitions of crime and noting the 
“‘legal’ conception of crime . . . defines it as behavior in violation of the criminal law and 
liable for sanctioning by criminal justice agencies under the political authority of the state”); 
Ronald C. Kramer, The Debate Over the Definition of Crime: Paradigms, Value Judgments, 
and Criminological Work, in ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CRIMINAL JUST. 33–58 (Frederick 
Elliston & Norman E. Bowie eds., 1982) (addressing the various definitions of crime); see 
also Baughman, supra note 39, at 55 (defining crime as “behavior prohibited by law and 
subject to criminal sanction under political authority of the state”). 
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a serious crime. It does not discuss all crimes but only focuses on serious crimes 
because of the wider agreement about the role for police in addressing those major 
crimes. Serious crimes in this Article include felonies of murder, rape, burglary, 
robbery, aggravated assault, (grand) larceny,175 arson, and motor vehicle theft. It is 
certainly important to acknowledge here a question of how much, or whether, these 
crimes should be punished, but recognize at a minimum, the importance of police 
involvement (or accountability at some level), given that consensus is likely greater 
on this point.176 For the purposes of this Article, a “serious crime” is one of the 
felonies listed above that is reported by an individual to the police. This is not the 
most inclusive count of how many “serious crimes” occur since a large percentage 
of serious crimes are not reported to police and this number is double what is 
reported. 177 But for clarity, this Article considers the proportion of serious crimes 
reported that police ultimately “solve,” acknowledging the profound ambiguity in 
all terms. 
 
4.  Defining “Solve” 
 
The next question is, how to determine whether a crime is “solved”? The 
definition for “solve” used here is subject to challenge. As discussed above, it is 
commonly understood that a central function of police is to solve crimes.178 What 
does it mean for a crime to be “solved”? What if the victim does not cooperate to 
have the perpetrator prosecuted? Such cases would lead to police not “solving” a 
crime through clearance, even if they may have found the perpetrator and be 
prepared to work with prosecutors.  
 As with the ambiguity in defining “crime,” there is similar ambiguity in 
defining what it means to “solve” a crime. A simple approach is to look at 
“clearance” as a proxy for solving crime. A clearance occurs when an individual is 
 
175 In 2019, the “average value of property taken during larceny-thefts was $1,162 per 
offense.” FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: LARCENY-THEFT, 2019 [hereinafter FBI, 
LARCENY-THEFT], https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-
pages/larceny-theft; Baughman, supra note 39, at 55 n.22 (articulating considerations about 
the inclusion of larceny in analyzing major crimes). Compare FBI, LARCENY-THEFT, supra 
note 175, with FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, BURGLARY, 2019, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/burglary 
(indicating that the average dollar amount for larceny may be significantly less than for 
burglary). 
176 See supra note 108 for further discussion. 
177 For more details on measuring the “true” rate of serious crimes that includes all 
crimes that occur some of which are not reported to police, see Baughman, supra note 39 
178 I acknowledge here that it is not clear to me that the key function of police is to solve 
crimes. It seems quite possible that the primary function of police is amorphous, varying by 
time and place. However, solving crimes is one key function, and one that the public values. 
See Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the Legitimate 
Investigative Sphere”, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 650 (articulating the amorphous role of the 
police because “the parameters of the police officer’s role have not been set exclusively by 
the legal rules, and perhaps not even principally”) (internal citation omitted). 
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arrested and turned over to prosecution for a crime. This is the point at which, the 
role of police becomes more limited. Detectives are often evaluated by clearance of 
crimes,179 and clearance rates are used to judge the effectiveness of police 
departments.180 Prior work has considered some of the problems with clearance 
rates,181 and clearance rates are certainly not the best way to determine whether 
police solve crimes. In fact, the correct determination of whether crimes are solved 
is more complicated and also considers victim crime reporting, arrest, conviction 
rates, and crime resolution rates.182 However, for this straightforward analysis, and 
because there is no data on crime resolution without arrest or clearance, this Article 
considers police solving crimes as the number of reported crimes cleared by 
police.183 The next section considers the serious crime solving by police and 
illustrates and defines the phenomenon of the police myth. 
 
II.  THE POLICE CRIME MYTH 
 
The police myth is based on a two-fold belief. The first is that policing’s core 
function is preventing and solving crime.184 And second is that crimes are solved by 
police.185 These two assumptions together comprise the police myth.  
The first aspect of the police myth is supported by the historical count in Part I 
that explains how from early American policing, the function of police has included 
crime solving. This role only grew from the 1960s forward as crime increased and 
the role of police in preventing and solving crimes was ingrained in the public and 
police psyche. The police myth is strengthened by a societal perception that police 
are heroes who apprehend criminals and make people safe.186 The police myth has 
 
179 Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 325–26 (2006). 
180 SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 149–50 (citing O. W. WILSON, POLICE PLANNING 103 
(1952)) (“[John] Griffin stated that the clearance rate is the most important indication of the 
efficiency of the police force as a whole. The clearance rate is also strongly endorsed as a 
control measure by the leading authority on police management and professionalization, 
O.W Wilson.”). 
181 See infra notes 228–21. 
182 Baughman, supra note 39.  
183 Considering arrest would give us nearly the same results, we settle on clearance as 
a more commonly used measure of police crime solving rates. See id. 
184 John L. Worrall, Public Perceptions of Police Efficacy and Image: The “Fuzziness” 
of Support for the Police, 24 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 47, 48 (Fall 1999) (police are charged to 
protect the innocent and prevent crime). 
185 In discussing “police” this Article also includes detectives who are a subset of police 
that can operate somewhat independently within in police department. See supra note 30. 
186 See supra note 11. Police have “superpowers” according to Paul Butler. Paul Butler, 
The System is Working the Way it is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1446 (2016); see also Don Krause & Mark Smith, Twitter as Mythmaker 
in Storytelling: The Emergence of Hero Status by the Boston Police Department in the 
Aftermath of the 2013 Marathon Bombing, 3(1) J. SOC. MEDIA SOC. 1, 10 (2014) (discussing 
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been buoyed by modern day presidents, film makers and television directors, along 
with judges and the general public.187 From Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton and 
Barack Obama and Donald Trump, political leaders valorize police for fighting 
crime.188 The Supreme Court, and other courts, have both praised and deferred to 
police in their role as guardians of law and order and public safety.189 The shared 
perception is that crime is controlled by police who capture criminals and 
prosecutors who bring them to justice.190 However, as demonstrated in the 
 
how “storytelling tweets have the potential to generate the hero archetype through the guise 
of a law enforcement agency.”); Mays, supra note 8; Worrall, supra note 184, at 47 (finding 
support for police due to perceptions of law enforcement’s ability to protect people and solve 
crimes); Id. (public support for police is in part due to perceptions of law enforcement’s 
ability to “protect people and solve crimes”).  
187 NEWBURN, supra note 8 (There is a “mythology” around criminal investigation that 
can be understood not only in the “glamour” of “catching criminals” that created a “good 
living for thousands of authors, filmmakers and television directors, but also in terms of both 
the real and the symbolic importance of successful criminal investigation in delivering one 
of the key promises of the modern centralized state, on which a significant portion of its 
legitimacy has rested: the promise of providing effective security of the state.”). When JFK 
praised police and dedicated May 15 as National Police Week in 1963, he assumed policing 
had been around since the beginning of the country, but it came a hundred years after the 
country’s founding. Waxman, supra note 67. About a quarter of top television programing 
involves shows about the police. MATTHEW HORACE & RON HARRIS, THE BLACK AND THE 
BLUE: A COP REVEALS THE CRIMES, RACISM, AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LAW 
ENFORCEMENT xv (2018); see also VICTOR E. KAPPELER & GARY W. POTTER, THE 
MYTHOLOGY OF CRIME & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28–31 (5th ed. 2017) (discussing media role in 
exaggerating public focus on crime). 
188 See infra note 289. 
189 See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 15, 16 
n.77 (2013) (conducting a review of 22 years of Supreme Court opinions and determining 
that the Court defers to the government 80% of the time and specifically to law enforcement 
55% of the time); see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(“The courts have respect for the intelligent law enforcement activities of the police, situated 
as they are in the front line of the campaign for law and order…. Responsible police are 
aware that a responsible procedure which accords to the police the latitude for intelligent law 
enforcement but withholds absolute discretion is the sound approach for securing the overall 
combination of law and justice that is the inspiration of a democratic society.”); see also 
United States v. Cortez, 965 F.3d 827, 834 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[I]n assessing reasonable 
suspicion we defer to a police officer's training and ability to discern innocent conduct from 
suspicious behavior.”); Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 535 F.3d 1243, 
1255 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tuggle, 284 F. App’x 218, 228 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(deferring to police officers’ “seasoned judgments” to ensure safety). 
190 NEWBURN, supra note 8 (“The basic message about crime given by western 
democratic governments during the twentieth century was that it could be controlled by 
catching criminals and processing them through this system.” “[T]he most prominent aim of 
criminal investigation has generally been that of ‘bringing offenders to justice[.]’”); But see 
David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in 
Contemporary Society, 36(4) BRITISH J. CRIMIN. 445, 451 (examining “the myth that the 
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discussion of Part I.E.2, this assumption is false. Although the public and police 
continue to believe that police function is largely crime control, the reality is that 
police spend only a tiny fraction of their time dealing with crime. 
The second aspect of the police myth is that crimes—particularly serious 
crimes—are solved by police. Police receive more training now than ever,191 and the 
technology involved in GPS tracking, fingerprint and geospatial monitoring have all 
improved immensely in the last thirty years.192 Though none of these factors have 
impacted the police myth. This Part conducts an independent review of national 
statistics on police crime solving. It reviews reported crime rates and clearance rates 
to determine whether police are solving crimes. It relies on data during a roughly 
thirty-year period between the years 1990 and 2019.193 Many of the details of these 
numbers or calculations are not articulated here, as they are not critical to this 
discussion.194 For the purposes of this Article, a simple discussion of reported crimes 
and the percentage of those that are cleared by police is sufficient.195 Reported 
crimes are those where an individual files a formal report with a police station.196 
Serious crimes considered here include violent crimes (murder and nonnegligent 
manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, 
 
sovereign state [through policing] is capable of providing security, law and order, and crime 
control”); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 110 (2001) (noting that after the 1980s, it became more common 
for government reports and police commissioners to admit that they were unable to control 
crime and that they could deal with the effect of it better than they could stop it; thus 
demonstrating that the “myth of the penal sovereign” and its “law and order powers” were 
dismantled). 
191 The average number of training hours required of new officers increased by 53 hours 
between 2007 and 2016. Compare Brian A. Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2007, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. 12 (Dec. 2010) (noting an average of 922 hours of total training hours for 
new recruits in 2007, including 613 academy and 309 field hours), with U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
Local Police Departments: Policies and Procedures, 2016 8 (Aug. 2020) (noting an average 
975 hours of total training hours for a new recruit in 2016, including 645 academy and 331 
field hours). 
192 FERGUSON, supra note 12. 
193 See Baughman, supra note 39, at 53 (considering data from 1990-2018. See Table 1 
in Appendix for how to calculate overall serious crime clearance rates). See FBI, 2019, supra 
note 39 (data for 2019 was not available at time of publication of How Effective, but became 
available in fall of 2020. Clearance numbers are very similar between 2018 and 2019. In 
2018, the violent clearance rate was 45.5% and the property rate was 17.6%. The overall 
clearance rate for serious crime – violent and property – was 21.64%. In 2019, the violent 
clearance rate was 45.5% and the property rate was 17.2%. The overall serious crime 
clearance rate was 21.52%).  
194 Tables and graphs describing these results are available by request of the author. 
195 FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: ABOUT CIUS, 2018 [hereinafter FBI, ABOUT] 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/about-cius 
(indicating that arrests are also tracked). 
196 After reporting to individual police departments, these crime statistics are collected 
by the FBI each year in the Uniform Crime Reports. Id. 
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larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson).197 Clearance rates are determined by 
comparing reported crimes to police with the number of individuals arrested and 
turned over to police for prosecution or cleared by exceptional means.198   
Before obtaining a picture of police crime solving rates for serious crimes, it is 
worth noting that a complete picture of crime is “likely bleaker” than shown by the 
current statistics on major crimes.199 National crime data does not track statistics on 
many serious offenses. Some of these include identity theft and credit card fraud, 
sexual exploitation, human trafficking, revenge porn and child exploitation.200 
Presumably, without tracking, police are worse off in solving internet crime than 
traditional major crimes.201 Nonetheless, this Article fails to consider all serious 
felony crimes, since so many serious crimes are not captured by national statistics.202 
Given the data available, the serious crimes listed above are considered here to 
establish a baseline for policing function. The next two sections define reported 
crimes and clearance rates. 
 
A.  Reported Crimes 
 
To understand police crime solving, first this Article turns to reported crimes, 
which are the number of crimes reported nationally to police.203 At the outset, this 
Article recognizes that about half of all serious crimes are reported to police.204 This 
is largely the trend for the last thirty years. Approximately 50% of violent crimes 
 
197 Id. 
198 Reported crimes are used to calculate several crime metrics including arrest and 
clearance rates. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA DECLARATION, 2018 tbl.25 
[hereinafter FBI: DATA DECLARATION]. 
199 Baughman, supra note 39, at 84. Although these crimes affect many individuals, 
they can be difficult to solve both because they are hard to detect and because some of these 
crimes are primarily enforced at the federal level. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 These offenses should be considered as unaccounted costs to victims and 
communities who suffer from these crimes. Id.; Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” 
Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1261–64 (2017) (harms 
resulting from revenge porn); Jennifer Lynch, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control 
Methods and Their Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
259, 263–64 (2005) (identifying the substantial economic losses associated with identity 
theft and recognizing the significant non-monetary harm associated with the offense); Daniel 
J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 
TEX. L. REV. 737, 756 (2018) (considering the various harms caused by data breaches); Chris 
Jay Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
97, 102–03 (2007) (identifying reputational harm and emotional distress because of identity 
theft). 
203 Although conviction rates and crime resolution rates are also critical to determining 
police effectiveness to stick with conventional measurements of police, we examine these 
two measures. See Baughman, supra note39, at 74. 
204 This is an estimate comparing NCVS and UCR numbers. See id. at 104 n. 293. 
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are reported to police and between 30-40% of property crimes in a given year.205 
This is not to put blame exclusively on police as individuals make the choice not to 
report crimes for a variety of reasons that will be discussed below but should be 
considered in this evaluation.206 It is presumed that the actual number of crimes 
committed is roughly double this amount—for both violent and property crimes—
though crime reporting for property crimes is lower than violent crimes.207 
Individuals refusing to report crimes to police is likely emblematic of police 
disaffection and the punishment-protection paradox, as discussed in Part III.  
 
B.  Clearance Rates 
 
Clearance rates demonstrate what percentage of crimes reported to police result 
in arrest and are turned over for prosecution.208 Clearance rates are not a great 
measure of police success since there is evidence that crimes with weak evidence 
were routinely cleared historically, with some improvement recently.209 While there 
are still likely major inaccuracies in clearance rates,210 in order to rely on a simple 
metric to determine crime solving, clearance rates will suffice. For the last thirty 
years, police have cleared 20% of all serious crimes, including murder, rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault, theft, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.211 Clearance 
 
205 See id. at 78. 
206 As far as reports to police, around 1 million violent crimes and 6 million property 
crimes were reported to police in 2019. FBI, 2019, supra note 39 (by 2019 there were 1.1 
million violent crimes (murder, rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault), 6.2 million 
property crimes (larceny-theft, burglary, motor-vehicle theft, excludes arson) and total 
reported crime was 7,275,783). Historically all these numbers have been higher, as crime 
rates have dropped over the last thirty years. See Baughman, supra note 39, at 113 tbl.1 (1.8 
million violent crimes and 12.6 million property crimes were reported in 1990. Total reported 
crimes were 14,475,630); see id. at 11 tbl.2 (in 2006 reported crimes included 1.2 million 
violent crimes and 8.8 million property crimes. Total crime reported was 10,092,450). 
207 Baughman, supra note 39, at 78.   
208 This Article relies on the FBI definition of clearance rates that also includes cases 
cleared by exceptional means. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: CLEARANCE, 2018 
(The typical method of determining the number of crimes cleared by police is using the UCR 
numbers. Under the UCR, the FBI will only count an offense as cleared for statistical 
purposes if it is either cleared by arrest or exceptional means). The FBI finds the percentage 
of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means by dividing the number of offenses cleared 
by the number of offenses reported. FBI, DATA DECLARATION, supra note 198. 
209 Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 604 (“[T]he high clearance rates early in this 58-
year time series could have been exaggerated and more recent clearance statistics might be 
more accurate.”). 
210 See supra notes 179–74 and accompanying text discussing underreporting of crime 
and the difficulty of police incentives with clearance rates. 
211 Baughman, supra note 39at 88–89 (noting that in 1990 the overall percent cleared 
was 21.25%, in 1995 and 1998, the clearance rates were similar at 21.17%, and 21.32%. In 
2004 and 2006, the overall percent cleared were 19.94%, and 19.26% respectively. In 2009 
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rates are very similar to arrest rates—all between 20% to 25%.212 In other words, 
police cleared almost as many crimes as they arrested for in most years.213 This is 
certainly a revelation to most people who would have never thought that on a good 
year, police solve less than a quarter of reported cases. Figure 1 breaks down the 
overall clearance rate for major crimes from 1990 to 2019.214 The percentage of 
major crimes where police clear a crime has not changed overall, though individual 





it was 22.04% and 2014 was 23.61%. The overall clearance rate, comparing total crimes 
reported to police with clearance rates in 2018 is 21.64%, meaning 78.36% of crimes are not 
cleared). In 2019, the percent cleared was 21.5%. See FBI, 2019, supra note 39 (see 
Baughman, supra note 39, at 113n.16 for how to calculate).  
212 Overall, arrest rates in the last thirty years range from a low of 16% in 1990 to about 
20-25% in most years. Baughman, supra note 39, at 85–86 (noting that in 1990, police 
arrested individuals for 15.98% of all reported crimes. For 1995 and 1998, the total percent 
arrested went up to 24.49%, and 25.72%, respectively. In 2004 it was 21.98% and 2006 was 
21.16%. In 2009, the total percent arrested went up slightly to 24.52%, and in 2014 it was 
23.76%. In 2018, the total percent arrested was 21.55%). FBI, 2019, supra note 39, at tbl.29 
(in 2019 the total percent arrest was 21.46%. See Baughman, supra note39, at 113n.7 for 
how to calculate). In 1990, police arrested individuals for 15.98% of all reported crimes. For 
1995 and 1998, the total percent arrested went up to 24.49%, and 25.72%, respectively. In 
2004 it was 21.98% and 2006 was 21.16%. In 2009, the total percent arrested went up slightly 
to 24.52%, and in 2014 it was 23.76%. In 2018, the total percent arrested was 21.55%). Id. 
(in 2019 the total percent arrest was 21.46%. See Baughman, supra note 39, at 113n.7 for 
how to calculate). 
213 “This could be due to misreported “clearance” due to improper definitions, 
misrepresentation or faulty counting.” Baughman, supra note 39, at 89 n.212. 
214 Id. at 88–89. Total percent cleared is made up of the clearance rates of major crimes. 
Those crimes are murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape/sexual assault, robbery, 
aggravated assault, larceny-theft, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. FBI, 2019, supra note 
39 (21.52% for 2019. See Baughman, supra note 39, at 113 n.16 for how to calculate). 
215 The most serious crime, murder, has a higher clearance rate – usually above 60% – 
and other far more common serious crimes, like motor vehicle theft and larceny, have 







1990 1995 1998 2004 2006 2009 2014 2018 2019
Figure 1 - Serious Crimes Cleared by Police, 1990 - 2019
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945
46 Draft forthcoming in 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. __ (2021))  
The next section puts the data on police reporting and clearance rates into 
context of the police myth. 
 
C.  Understanding the Police Myth 
 
The police myth is in part the societal belief that police solve crimes. However, 
in the classic sense of apprehending criminal defendants, police are failing—both in 
apprehending a large percentage of defendants but also in improving their ability to 
apprehend felony defendants over the last thirty years. Most individuals who commit 
serious offenses are never held accountable for the crimes they commit, and the 
majority of people who endure such crimes suffer with no state rejoinder or 
restitution. I recount clearance rates over time with some caution as I realize that 
clearance rates are not the entire story by any stretch and that the nature of crime 
and crime categories have changed over the time period I am reporting.216 This 
Article does not argue that police should arrest felony perpetrators in larger 
quantities, though this option is considered below. It simply makes the point that 
public and police perceptions are not met by the empirical realities of police 
reporting, clearance, and conviction data. This is not to say that because police are 
not arresting defendants, they are not preventing crime—and thus succeeding in one 
aspect of their crime control function.217 Though for any successful policing theory, 
the police myth must be accounted for by scholars grappling with the reality of 
police failure to solve crimes. This Article does not dispel the police myth in support 
of an instrumental argument that police are capable of solving most serious crimes, 
but simply aims to inform a more accurate consideration of the police function. 
Ultimately this Article seeks to understand the police function to inform both 
instrumental and theoretical discussions of policing.  
A fundamental error of the police myth is the societal belief that if a serious 
crime occurs, the police will likely solve it.218 This second aspect of the police 
 
216 I appreciate Rachel Harmon for helping me finetune this consideration and for 
pointing out that homicides shifting from domestic to gang homicides have complicated 
solving crimes and police success. 
217 Research is clear that police presence certainly has an effect in preventing crime, 
particularly property crime. Jonathan Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, Using Terror Alert 
Levels to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 48 J. L. & ECON. 267, 277 (2005) (finding 
“that an increase in police presence of about 50 percent leads to a statistically and 
economically significant decrease in the level of crime on the order of 15 percent”); But see 
John M. MacDonald et al., The Effect of Private Police on Crime: Evidence from a 
Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design, 179 J. R. STATIST. SOC. A (PART 3) 831, 844 
(2016) (clarifying that it is not clear whether private security guards who lack the authority 
to make arrests would have a similar deterrence effect). To what extent policing deters crime 
is another topic on which the research is not entirely clear. 
218 In some areas of the law, advocacy in recent years has focused on this issue. For 
instance, there is growing public recognition of police failure to solve sexual assault and 
domestic violence cases. See, e.g., Valeriya Safronova & Rebecca Halleck, These Rape 
Victims Had to Sue to Get the Police to Investigate, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019) 
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myth—that police are solving serious crime—is relatively straight forward to dispel 
with data. Police are not solving a large proportion of major crimes.219 As discussed 
above, the crime solving rate for police is around 20% for all crimes for the last 
thirty years.220 While for some categories, like murder, the clearance rates are around 
60%,221 for all other major categories of crimes, the results are far lower, often less 
than 25%.222 Police only clear a small fraction of the crimes that affect the most 
citizens – larceny, motor vehicle theft, burglary – between 10 and 20%.223 This is 
not to suggest that police should focus on minor crimes; of course we want police 
primarily focused on serious crimes. Nor do these broad statistics take into account 
that clearance disparities in minority communities tend to be worse than in other 
neighborhoods. What is not considered in these numbers is that police never find out 
about half of all serious crimes, as they remain unreported.224 In most of what they 
do learn of, they never clear the case (only about 20% of the time).225 Very few cases 
that are cleared result in convictions, close to only 4%.226 Figure 2 illustrates the 
overall crime reporting, clearance, and conviction numbers for a broader perspective 
of serious crimes.227 
 
(recognizing a number of lawsuits filed to attempt to force police to investigate sexual 
assault cases). 
219 Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–89. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 88–89 n.204–210.  
222 Id.  
223 FBI, 2019, supra note 39. In 2019, Larceny-theft, Motor-Vehicle Theft, and 
Burglary were cleared 18.40%, 13.80%, and 14.10% of the time respectively. About seven 
times as many individuals experience property crimes, such as burglary, larceny, and motor 
vehicle theft, as violent crimes. See supra notes 104–105. 
224 Baughman, supra note 39 at 98. Percentage was calculated taking FBI Number of 
Offenses Reported / NCVS Number Known = “Individual Reports a Crime.”. See FBI, 2019, 
supra note 39; RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., 
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2019 3–4 tbl.1&2 
(2020). 
225 Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–89; see also FBI, 2019, supra note 39. 
226 Baughman, supra note 39, at 115 tbl.2. Percentage was calculated taking the Number 
Convicted / FBI Number of Offenses Reported = “Arrested Person is Convicted.” See SEAN 
ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 
2006 3 tbl.1.1 (2009) (used for state conviction data); BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., FED. JUST. 
STATISTICS, 2006 22 tbl.4.2 (2009) (used for federal conviction data; number convicted is 
calculated by adding together state and federal conviction data).  
227 See supra notes 224–16.  
Crime Reporting: Baughman, supra note 39, at 98. Percentage was calculated taking: 
FBI Number of Offenses Reported / NCVS Number Known = “Individual Reports a Crime.” 
See FBI, 2019, supra note 39; MORGAN & TRUMAN, supra note 223. 
Clearance: Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–89; see also FBI, 2019, supra note 39. 
Conviction: Baughman, supra note 39, at 115 tbl.2. Percentage was calculated taking 
the Number Convicted / FBI Number of Offenses Reported = “Arrested Person is 
Convicted.” See ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 226; BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., supra note 
226. 
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Figure 2 demonstrates that most serious crimes are not solved by police 
clearance,228 or result in conviction if they are reported in the first place.229 In 
considering conviction rates, there is a failure to address roughly 85% of violent 
crimes and 97% of property crimes.230 While there are many explanatory and likely 
confounding explanations of this data, what we do know is that most reported serious 
crimes are not solved. And while the public expects police to solve crimes, police 
have not improved at solving crimes even with crime rates having gone down. Over 
the last thirty years, fewer than half of most serious crimes have been reported to 
police, fewer than 20% have resulted in an arrest or clearance, and fewer than 4% 
have ended in a conviction.231 Thus, dispelling the police myth, police apprehend 
very few of the individuals who commit crimes.  
The public and police perception is that police solve crime, though it is not a 
part of the scholarly or public policy discussion.232 Is it simply that the public expects 
police to prevent crimes, but recognizes that they are not able to solve them? The 
 
228 Baughman, supra note 39, at 89. 
229 Id. at 81.  
230 Id. at 115 tbl.2 (calculated taking the number convicted of violent crimes – 
murder/non-negligent manslaughter, rape/sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault – 
divided by the number reported for those same offenses. That gives the percent convicted. 
Next, take the percent convicted and subtract from 100% to get the percent not convicted. 
Repeat the same process for property crimes – larceny-theft, burglary, motor-vehicle theft.) 
Convicted of Violent Crimes = 186,630; Reported Violent Crimes = 1,240,985. 186,630 / 
1,240,985 = 15.04%, Percent Convicted of Violent Crimes. 100% - 15.04% = 84.96% 
Percent NOT Convicted of Violent Crimes. Convicted of Property Crimes = 226,396; 
Reported Property Crimes = 8,851,465. 226,396 / 8,851,465 = 2.56%, Percent Convicted of 
Property Crimes. 100% - 2.56% = 97.44% Percent NOT Convicted of Property Crimes.  
231 When considering the number of unreported crimes, the percentage reported to 
police is about half of all crimes, and arrest and clearance rates are at 10% and there is an 
overall conviction rate for major crimes at 2%. Baughman, supra note 39, at 115 tbl.2 
(identifying true clearance and conviction rates which take into account unreported crimes). 
Unreported crimes are also referred to as the “dark figure of crime” that considers the 
limitations of police reports. SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 247; see also Joseph G. Weis, 
Crime Statistics: Reporting Systems and Methods, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUST., 
VOL. 1 378–91 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 




0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Individual Reports a Crime
Police Clear a Crime
Arrested Person is Convicted
Figure 2 - Reporting, Clearance, and Conviction of Serious 
Crimes
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empirics certainly belie this possibility, and the scholarly and public policy 
discussion is not there.  
The police myth remains a “myth” because the general discussion of policing 
has largely ignored the police failure to solve crimes. Prior policing literature has 
tackled clearance rates,233 unresolved crime in minority communities,234 and 
demonstrated the lack of crime reporting among people of color.235 But there is very 
little focus on the perpetually low rate of clearance or conviction for crimes 
nationally.236 For instance, in the future goals and goals for the last twenty years of 
 
233 See e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. UNIV. L. 
REV. 278, 294 (1996–1997) (discussing issues with previous clearance rate research); Cassell 
& Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 92, at 706–08; Handcuffing the Cops?, 
supra note 92 1063–66 (using data to argue that “crime clearance rates fell sharply all over 
the country immediately after Miranda and have remained at these lower levels ever since”); 
Hyunseok Jang et al., Effect of Broken Windows Enforcement on Clearance Rates, 36 J. 
CRIM. JUST. 529, 536 (2008) (examining broken windows enforcement and clearance rates 
across different types of crime); Charles Wellford & James Cronin, Clearing up Homicide 
Clearance Rates, 243 NAT'L INST. JUST. J. 2, 6 (2000) (examining 215 different factors to 
determine their relationship with clearance rates in homicide cases); Graham C. Ousey & 
Matthew R. Lee, To Know the Unknown: The Decline in Homicide Clearance Rates, 1980–
2000, 35 CRIM JUST. REV. 141, 153 (2010) (finding that “measures of change in the broader 
socioeconomic and demographic structure of a city and changes in measures of drug market 
arrests are significantly related to changes in homicide clearance rates”). 
234 See generally JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 
(2015) (describing that a failure of police to solve black homicide has led to increased 
endemic violence); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 
MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1154 (2018) (explaining that “race-based underenforcement” has led to 
a lower clearance rate for homicides involving a black victim than homicides involving a 
white victim). 
235 Supra note  44 and accompanying text; see also Abraham Goldstein, Defining the 
Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L. REV. 515 (1982) (arguing that 
underreporting is substantially based on victims’ perceived or actual separation from the 
criminal justice process); Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape 
Victims’ Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1020, 1030 (1991) (arguing that underreporting of 
rape and sexual assault is often due to the additional invasion of privacy that victims 
experience after reporting the crime); Robinson & Darley, supra note 53, at tbl.1. 
236 While very few commentators have noticed low crime solving, German Lopez noted 
bleakly in 2017, “[i]f you murder someone in America, there’s a nearly 40 percent chance 
you’ll get away with it.” German Lopez, There’s a Nearly 40 Percent Chance You’ll Get 
Away with Murder in America, VOX (Sept. 24, 2018). See also Anthony Williams, Police 
Aren’t Getting Better at Solving Murders: Why is the Clearance Rate in U.S. Cities so Low?, 
CITYLAB (June 26, 2017, 10:29 AM) (Anthony Williams the former mayor of Washington 
D.C. laments that U.S. law enforcement is the worst in the Western world at solving crimes 
and cites clearance rate statistics like one-eighth of burglaries leading to arrest, or only one 
third for rape, and two thirds for murder); Martin Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of 
Murders In America Go Unresolved, NPR (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:04 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/395069137/open-cases-why-one-third-of-murders-in-
america-go-unresolved (“[i]f you’re murdered in America, there’s a 1 in 3 chance that the 
police won’t identify your killer”). 
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the police foundation, improving the proportion of crimes solved is not 
mentioned.237 The closest reference to the lack of crime solving is reference to a 
crime “funnel.”238 The idea of a crime funnel is that many crimes enter at the outset 
with a police report and very few are resolved with a defendant being arrested, then 
convicted, then imprisoned.239 The lack of crimes solved has not been connected to 
policing theory, training or function on any coordinated level. 
There is also a growing field of scholarship dedicated to addressing the rights 
of victims of crime.240 But this growing victims’ rights movement has not addressed 
the police myth in any way. It has not addressed low clearance or conviction rates at 
all, or the large group of individuals affected by unsolved crimes.241 The largest 
group of victims of crime are those who never reach the police to get help—almost 
 
237 See National Police Foundation: Recent History, POLICE FOUNDATION, 
https://www.policefoundation.org/about-the-police-foundation/history/recent-history/ (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
238 For an especially thorough example of a crime funnel see ELISE HANSELL ET AL., 
THE CRIME FUNNEL, ROSE INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOV. (2016); Robinson & 
Darley, supra note 53, at tbl. 1. 
239 LYNN ADDINGTON, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
AND KEY CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA USERS, DEP’T OF JUST. L. & SOC. 2 (2008) (“Most of us 
are familiar with elaborate diagrams of the criminal justice “funnel” depicting the channeling 
of crimes through the criminal justice system. But when numbers are attached to the diagram, 
it becomes clear that this is more of a sieve than a funnel. About 8 to 10 million felonies are 
reported to the police each year, and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) tells 
us that about as many go unreported.”). For discussion of criminal accountability and a full 
crime funnel that traces even more crimes from victim report to imprisonment, see 
Baughman, supra note 39. 
240 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Meg Garvin, Protecting Crime Victims in State Constitutions: 
The Example of the New Marsy’s Law for Florida, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99 
(1999). See generally  DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3–43 
(4th ed. 2018) (discussing modern victims’ rights movement). 
241 The victims’ rights movement is focused specifically on the rights of victims and 
the way in which they interact with the criminal justice system, rather than with the failure 
of police to solve crimes for victims. See generally, Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutions 
Implications of Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003) (discussing 
Constitutional complexities implicated when victims are granted rights during criminal 
trials); Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 39, 74 (2001) (addressing the challenges faced when involving victims of economic 
crimes in restitution decisions); Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, UTAH L. REV. 331 (1999) 
(analyzing the complex role of victims in adversarial criminal proceedings); Josephine 
Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117 (1984) (advocating for a 
more active role for victims in criminal trials); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s 
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985) (examining the role of victim’s rights procedures in the 
criminal process and their potential impact on crime prevention and other goals); Douglas E. 
Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1135 (2007) (detailing the incorporation of victim’s rights into the judicial 
process); Paul G. Cassell Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ 
Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479 (same). 
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double for some serious crimes. With reported serious crimes in 2019, the number 
of victims whose cases were never cleared was 5,709,766 victims (around 78.5%).242 
Yet the victims’ rights scholarship has never focused on the lack of crime solving, 
and the majority of the legal policing literature focuses on the issues arising from 
the small number of cases in which a crime victim is brought through the justice 
system.243 Likewise, the media has paid little attention to police crime solving as 
compared to other criminal justice topics. For instance, in the last ten years, there 
have been 56,000 articles in international newspapers discussing mass incarceration 
and only 60 articles discussing police clearance rates.244 There seems to be a 
disconnect between how the lack of crime solving might affect society, or 
policing.245 Thus, the persistence of the police myth has not only misled public 
perception but has had other important impacts discussed in the next section.  
 
III.  IMPACTS OF POLICE MYTHOLOGY 
 
This Article does not attempt to pinpoint exactly when the police myth came to 
fruition or why it exists. What is clear is that at some point Americans started to 
firmly believe that core police function comprised crime control, and that police 
solved serious crimes. This police mythology grew over time with the help of media 
and public figures, ignoring many years of empirical data that contradict 
assumptions that police largely focus on crime and generally solve it. Police have 
 
242 See Baughman, supra note 39, at 116 tbl.3; FBI, 2019, supra note 39 (7,275,783 (# 
reported) – 1,566,017 (# cleared) = 5,709,766 (estimated # of victims who received no 
resolution OR # not cleared)); 5,709,766 (# not cleared) / 7,275,783(# reported) = 78.5% 
(estimated percent not cleared). For a more complete picture, note that by using the estimated 
number of known crimes (NCVS plus FBI number for murder/non-negligent manslaughter) 
there were 14,845,545 known crimes in 2019, meaning reported and unreported, in the US. 
Using that number, the percent of victims with a resolution would be: 1,566,017(# cleared) 
/ 14,845,545 (# of known crimes) = 10.5% (victims WITH a resolution). Victims without a 
resolution: 100% - 10.5% = 89.5% (victims without a resolution, considering known crimes).    
243 Often the Victim’s Rights literature is focused on rights relevant after charging, 
including trial rights and sentencing rights. See Margaret Garvin & Douglas E. Beloof, Crime 
Victim Agency: Independent Lawyers for Sexual Assault Victims, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67 
(2015) (presenting a case for victim’s rights such as right to counsel, right to a speedy trial, 
right to discovery, right to make a victim impact statement before trial and a right to be 
informed of release or probation). 
244 Figures are based on an international search of all newspapers worldwide in Lexis-
Nexis from Sept. 2010 to Sept. 2020 exact phrase search: “overcrowded jail” - Worldwide: 
2758 U.S.: 1667; “overcrowded prison” - Worldwide: 5065 U.S.: 2502; “mass incarceration” 
- Worldwide: 56,107 U.S.: 47,167; “police clearance” - Worldwide: 7942 U.S.: 581; “crime 
clearance rate” - Worldwide: 316 U.S.: 155; “police clearance rate” - Worldwide: 60 U.S.: 
29. Certainly this search is not conclusive and likely missed articles, but the broader point 
likely stands. 
245 Alice Speri, Police Make More Than 10 Million Arrests a Year, but That Doesn’t 
Mean They’re Solving Crimes, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 31 2019, 10:32 AM) (“[A]ggressive 
enforcement [by police] doesn’t seem to do much to improve public safety or solve crime.”) 
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not improved at investigating and solving crimes for at least the last eighty years.246 
This is not to say that police have not been anxiously engaged in productive public 
work. Or that police have not improved in prevention of crimes, as crime has 
dropped, and some evidence demonstrates that police could have contributed to a 
national drop in crime.247 Police have historically always helped fulfill a broad swath 
of public order functions—health, welfare and transportation—while at the same 
time being asked to prevent and solve serious crimes. On top of all of these public 
order functions, there are thousands of minor criminal offenses and a growing 
criminal code that police are charged to enforce.248 Though this Article does not 
focus on explaining the cause of the police mythology, perhaps there is an 
unrecognized tradeoff with police focusing on public service and arresting mostly 
for minor crimes, leaving little time to solve serious crimes. Regardless of the causes 
of the police myth, the consequences are important to dissect. First, police function 
is obfuscated. Second, the police myth is a major cause of police disaffection. And 
finally, due to complex interconnected issues, the police myth creates a punishment-
protection paradox. These three impacts are discussed respectively in Part III.A, B 
and C. 
 
A.  Obfuscation of Police Function 
 
The police myth leads to an obfuscation of police role and an imparity between 
expectations and reality for crime control. Police are charged with solving crimes, 
but their actual function is much broader and more diffuse—and most of their focus 
is not on solving crimes. The public misunderstanding of policing and a mismatch 
between training, time spent, and expectations remains a problem in eliminating the 
false assumption that police solve crimes. Police have historically always had a 
 
246 See supra note 39 (finding that clearance rates since the 1940s have been below 
30%, and most recently around 20% overall for serious crimes). 
247 Baughman, supra note 39, at 103, 103 n.292 (confirming “that crime has decreased 
in America in the last thirty years” and positing that “[t]his could mean that police are more 
effective at preventing crime than solving crime, but more study is necessary on this issue”); 
Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 24 (noting “the sharp decline in police arrests” in 
“the last ten to fifteen years”); William J. Bratton, Crime is Down in New York City: Blame 
the Police, in POLICING: KEY READINGS 480 (Tim Newburn ed., 2005) (crediting “better, 
smarter and more assertive policing” for a crime decrease in New York City); Weisburd, 
supra note 11, at 670 (“twenty of twenty-five tests of hot spot[] policing show positive 
statistically significant findings” of crime prevention). 
248 Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 5 (“in most states criminal statutes are 
numerous and there are often more than enough options for criminal charging in every area”); 
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 
1105 (2017) (“The legislature . . . has continued to increase mandatory minimums in 
sentencing and provide an aggressive federal criminal code to give prosecutors more tools to 
use against criminal defendants.”). 
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multifaceted public role, that policing theory and the public have failed to 
recognize.249  
Police were borne, in part, out of a desire to control crime. Historically, the 
power delegated to police by the state has involved “public order” which includes 
preventing and addressing crime. Police core function—according to police and the 
public—in the last fifty years been to prevent crime, reduce crime, and apprehend 
criminals. As Paul Butler states, “[t]he first responsibility of the state is to protect its 
citizens. When people suffer harm from other individuals, the state is now failing 
that responsibility.”250 However, as this Article has made clear, at least in the last 
fifty years, police have not fulfilled this function. Though because the expectation 
is there, particularly among police themselves, the police myth leads police to hide 
the rate at which they are solving crimes. It is commonly known by clearance rate 
scholars that police departments underreport and misclassify crimes or focus on 
making minor arrests to pad arrest rates.251  
Another potential obfuscation resulting from the police myth has been that 
police have increased drug arrests in order to satisfy the public that they are solving 
crimes, when police have not improved at solving any serious crimes. Some 
evidence shows that police focus on increasing arrest numbers, no matter how minor, 
in an effort to demonstrate productivity.252 While transparency is lacking in this area, 
there are high profile examples of departments where police can only be promoted 
if they are compliant in increasing arrests and in applying fines.253 When police are 
encouraged to arrest in order to demonstrate productivity, the incentive becomes 
 
249 The public believes they understand what police do, but police overwhelmingly 
believe that the public does not actually understand what policing entails. Indeed 83% of 
Americans say they understand the risks and challenges of police work. Morin et al., supra 
note 133. But 86% of the police say the public does not fully comprehend the trials that 
officers face. Id. For instance, 83% of Americans believe that typical police officers fire their 
service weapon while on duty at least once in their career; when only 27% of police say they 
have ever fired their service weapon. Id. 
250 “Because, again, most people who suffered harm aren’t going to the state for a 
response.” The Crime Story Podcast with Kary Antholis, Interview: Paul Butler, on the 
Prison Abolition Movement, CRIME STORY (July 21, 2020); see also George Ciccariello-
Maher, Opinion, Police Departments Are Broken. Is It Time to Abolish Them All Together?, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 2, 2020, 10:41 AM) (opposing defunding police and noting that 
“[o]nce we do the math, we see that the police only “protect and serve” a small minority of the 
population, but this is nothing new.”). 
251 Baughman, supra note 39, at 62–63 (citing “intense pressure in certain police 
departments to pad or even falsify clearance numbers,” such as in New Orleans, Tulare, 
Biscayne Park, Los Angeles, and Chicago); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 32, at 
279–80 (noting that measuring police success through arrest rates can lead officers to be 
“overly . . .aggressive in using the arrest power”). 
252 HORACE & HARRIS, supra note 187, at 205 (former police chief arguing that police 
are focused on keeping arrests up “because arrests are a measure of productivity”). 
253 Id. at 224. 
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minor crime arrests including drug arrests.254 The evidence is pretty clear that with 
drug arrests, police are not reducing violent crime, or increasing public safety.255 
Drug enterprises operate more like other businesses and violent crime harms 
business.256 Despite the low relative danger posed by drugs as compared to violent 
crime, drug arrests top the list of nationwide arrests in most years, potentially 
because drug arrests are easier to use to boost arrest numbers.257 So despite the fact 
that the public expects police to focus on reducing serious crime,258 police have 
historically focused on drug arrests, possibly to appease the public demand for crime 
solving. 
An even more important contributor to police obfuscation of duty is that while 
charged with crime control, police have always also acted as public servants. Indeed, 
the very definition of the Constitutional “police power” encompasses so many civil 
functions—health, housing, transportation—that have nothing to do with solving 
crime. Although police are only a small piece of how states exercise “police power,” 
the broad exercise of “police power” by states has led to a broad delegation of 
authority to police. At the same time, there is a lack of transparency in what police 
typically do, how often they solve crimes, and little oversight on the lack of training 
they receive for the functions they perform. In this context, it makes sense that the 
police continue addressing traffic problems and noise and interpersonal complaints 
in people’s homes. People consider police the general number to call when anything 
 
254 See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 276 
(2015) (noting the increase in drug arrests from 1995–2012); see also ALEXANDRA 
NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM 
TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 2 (2018) (most arrests are 
misdemeanor arrests nationally); McLeod, supra note 1, at 1633 (hoping to eliminate low 
level criminal enforcement). 
255 Baughman, supra note 254, at 276–77 (finding that drug defendants—both 
possession and trafficking—are among the least violent defendants to release before trial). 
256 Indeed, the violence associated with drugs is overwhelmingly connected to a 
crackdown by a department on drug crimes and those in the drug trade rarely engage in 
violent crime. Id., at 234 (finding that drug defendants—both possession and trafficking—
are among the least violent defendants to release before trial). 
257 See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Arrest Data Analysis Tool (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (drug related offenses 
represent the largest individual category of offenses from 2000 to 2014). Drug crimes are 
consensual crimes. SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 248.  
258 MALCOM K. SPARROW, MEASURING PERFORMANCE IN A MODERN POLICE 
ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING BULLETIN, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (2015) 
NCJ 248476 at 2 (police are most measured by “[r]eductions in the number of serious crimes 
reported, most commonly presented as local comparisons against an immediately preceding 
time period”); Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and 
Evidence, 101 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167, 167, 184 (2018) (“Because of the extraordinary cost 
of most violent crimes and the comparatively minor cost of most property crimes, from a 
welfare perspective the central empirical issue . . . is not whether police affect crime, but the 
extent to which police reduce violent crime, particularly murder” and arguing that we are 
potentially not spending enough on policing given the returns we are receiving). 
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is wrong. Some may even prefer to have police in a catchall position that responds 
to various concerns, often unrelated to crime. Police help guide traffic. They disperse 
crowds. They mediate family disputes and serve the elderly, deal with noise 
complaints and common problems with animals. They are the front line with 
mentally ill and drug addicted. They are also the major defense against crime—
preventing it as well as solving crimes that occur. There is both confusion on what 
the function of police is and lack of clarity in their role. Or better yet, there is a lack 
of focus or vision on what the priorities of police should be since their role is 
ubiquitous as both the crime solving hero and servant of the community. And maybe, 
in expecting the police to be the all-encompassing public servant wielding state 
“police powers,” the public has unknowingly sacrificed the police crime control 
function. 
Arguably, any fault of police failure to solve crime results from obfuscation 
and lack of clarity in the police role. Under the modern police function, police are 
the only government actor charged with solving serious crimes. However, they are 
spending most of their time with public order functions that are broader—and 
arguably can be handled by other government or private actors. Police are trained to 
protect and deal with criminal defendants, when most of the time, their functions 
have little to do with crime. This incongruity in dual function has not been reconciled 
by legal policing scholars or commentators. The lack of clarity in the police function 
also results in a lack of accountability of police performance and inappropriate 
training. If the job of police is to solve crimes and deal with dangerous violent 
defendants, for instance, the public might expect that police are armed with military 
grade weapons and trained in self-defense. However, if their duty is to patrol the 
streets to randomly check in on community members, mediate family disputes, and 
assist people when requested, then it might make less sense that police are armed 
and ready to respond with violence. Community members might be less supportive 
of officers using violence to defend themselves and others more broadly if they 
understood that police are performing public service functions most of the time. In 
addition, there might be a larger push for a whole different training protocol for 
officers if there was an understanding that these counseling, mental health, and 
conflict resolution functions are performed most often. For detectives to solve major 
crimes, they need the public and patrol officers focused on helping provide 
information to help them solve crimes. If police are community mediators, they need 
training in counseling and deescalating violence.259 Indeed, routine social services 
are not necessarily best provided by police.260 Innovation throughout the country has 
 
259 Friedman, supra note 27, at 56. 
260 Monica Bell points out that “routing rehabilitation and social services through the 
police could perversely widen the carceral net and reify the ‘culture of control.’” Bell, supra 
note 7, at 2147. In addition, there are some functions related to investigating crime, such as 
crime labs, that require a different type of training than police receive and could benefit from 
being separated from policing. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, AUTOPSY OF A CRIME 
LAB: EXPOSING THE FLAWS IN FORENSICS (forthcoming 2021). 
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demonstrated that first responders need not be police officers.261 At the very least, 
understanding that police function is not what the public expects or what even police 
expect helps us understand the impacts of the police myth. And assuredly, a deep 
dive into the actual and desired functions of police, perhaps led by the community,262 
is critical to any potential police reform. 
 
B.  Police Disaffection 
 
The police myth creates police disaffection, particularly in communities with 
high crime rates. While in general public confidence in police remains high, 
members of communities of color are alienated from police because they have grown 
used to crime and police not solving it and because they often receive poor levels of 
police protection. 
Confidence in police is high among whites but much lower among people of 
color, particularly when it comes to confidence in crime solving. In general, public 
confidence in police has remained high as police are one of the top respected public 
institutions, though this confidence fell for the first time in 2020.263 A 2016 poll 
found that 76% of Americans had “a great deal” of respect for their local law 
 
261 Friedman, supra note 27, at 62–63. A solution might be a set of highly trained first 
responders who have capacity to use force when necessary but have sufficient training to 
respond in a variety of ways including intense mediation, social services, and solving 
problems without the force of law. Id. One North Carolina police department showed that 
repeat calls from “chronic problem homes” were eliminated when social workers intervened. 
Id. at 56. 
262 See Simonson, supra note 7. 
263 Megan Brenan, Amid Pandemic, Confidence in Key U.S. Institutions Surges, 
GALLUP (Aug. 12, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317135/amid-pandemic-confidence-
key-institutions-surges.aspx. (overall confidence in police falling to 47% for the first time in 
27 years in 2020). A 2018 Gallup poll found that the majority of Americans have a large 
amount of confidence in the police. Police were among the top three public institutions that 
gained a majority level of public confidence. The average level of American confidence in 
institutions since 1993 is 33%. Lydia Saad, Military, Small Business, Police Still Stir Most 
Confidence, GALLUP (Jun. 28, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/236243/military-small-
business-police-stir-confidence.aspx [https://perma.cc/9ADF-QH3W] (“[t]he military, small 
business and the police still receive high confidence ratings from a majority of Americans”). 
In 2018, Gallup conducted telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,520 adults living 
in the United States. Survey Method: “[T]he margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points 
at the 95% confidence level. All reported margins of sampling error include computed design 
effects for weighting. Each sample of national adults includes a minimum quota of 70% 
cellphone respondents and 30% landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by 
time zone within region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers are selected using random-
digit-dial methods.” Id. The question asks Americans whether they have a “great deal, quite 
a lot, some or very little confidence” in fifteen different institutions. The fifteen different 
institutions (in order from highest confidence from the American people to least confidence): 
the military, small business, the police, the church or organized religion, the presidency, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the medical system, banks, the public schools, organized labor, big 
business, newspapers, the criminal justice system, television news, and congress. 
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enforcement.264 Though there is wide disparity in how Americans of different racial 
backgrounds viewed police.265 A 2016 survey noted that “[w]hile 68% of white 
Americans have a favorable view of the police, only 40% of African Americans and 
59% of Hispanics have a favorable view.”266 People of color view police as less 
legitimate and trustworthy than more wealthy, white individuals.267 Indeed, 
confidence in the police has remained substantially lower for people of color.268 
People of color are half has likely to believe that police can solve crimes as white 
people.269 In addition to this perception of the police overall, racial disparities are 
also present in whether individuals think police are doing a good job.270 Public 
perception surveys seem to indicate that people of color do not have a high level of 
confidence in police competency and are much more likely to realize that police are 
unlikely to solve crimes. 
At the heart of these disparate views on police is that people in underserved 
communities—often communities of color—do not receive adequate protection 
from police. They often wait longer to have police respond to calls for help,271 have 
 
264 Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Respect for Police Surges, GALLUP (Oct. 24, 2016), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/196610/americans-respect-police-surges.aspx.  
265 Emily Ekins, Policing in America: Understanding Public Attitudes Toward the 
Police. Results from a National Survey, CATO INST. (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/policing-america. 
266 Id. 
267 TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 146–52 (2002) (demonstrating 
the gap between black and white perceptions of procedural fairness). People with higher 
incomes (over $30K) “are more likely to believe that police can solve crime.” Worrall, supra 
note 184, at 57 (emphasizing that income, race, and age are all significant factors in 
determining whether a person believes that police solve crimes). 
268 Recent studies show that while sixty percent of white respondents express “some” 
or “a lot” of confidence in police, only eighteen percent of black respondents would say the 
same. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of 
Force, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH. 35 (2016). Literature has also shown that African 
American communities—particularly poor ones—have less trust in police than others in the 
United States. See Bell, supra note 7, at 2072 (“Structural disadvantage yields a broader 
cultural structure of mistrust.”). 
269 Worrall, supra note 184, at 57–59 (“Race is the most pervasive predictor of 
confidence in the ability of the police to solve crime[]” and urban residence compounds the 
effect.); In a 2016 Pew Survey, 79% of blacks overall say there are signs of serious problems 
between law enforcement and the black community. Morin et al., supra note 133. 
270 One study found that while six in ten white Americans considered their local police 
to be competent only four in ten African Americans agreed. Ekins, supra note 265. 
271 Bell, supra note 7, at 2114 (residents of disadvantaged communities tend to receive 
a slower law enforcement response); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, 
VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 34 (1999) (“When called, [police] may 
not respond [to inner-city communities], which is one reason many residents feel they must 
be prepared to take extraordinary measures to defend themselves and their loved ones[.]”). 
See also Rod K. Brunson, Opinion, Protests Focus on Over-Policing. But Under-Policing is 
Also Deadly., WASH. POST (June 12, 2020) (“Residents of distressed urban neighborhoods 
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the lowest numbers of crimes solved,272 and have inadequate protection against 
crime.273 And the more crime occurs and is not solved in a particular neighborhood, 
the more likely its members are to distrust police.274 Not just because of the 
commonly thought reasons—police misconduct, gang violence, snitch culture, but 
because these citizens have seen repeatedly that police are not there to help them.275 
This is a neglected piece of the police puzzle. The fact that police are not solving 
major crimes with any regularity has an impact on those who are not served. The 
more unresolved crimes and victims, the more these communities suffer from police 
disaffection.276 If community members believe police are listening to them, they are 
 
have complained about ineffective policing for centuries, including officers’ . . . slow 
response times[.]”). 
272 LEOVY, supra note 234; Wesley Lowery et al., An Unequal Justice, WASH. POST 
(July 25, 2018) (stating that “almost three-quarters” of unsolved murders in the decade prior 
to 2018 were black). 
273 Note that in a 2016 Pew Survey, “Blacks are significantly more likely than whites 
to see their local police as mainly enforcers (39% vs. 26%)” rather than protectors. Morin et 
al., supra note 133; See also LEOVY, supra note 234 (depicting the “oppressive and 
inadequate” criminal justice system); Bell, supra note 7, at 2117 (“[S]everal forces 
converged in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s that shifted the problem from one of utter neglect 
to the current problem of overpolicing and underprotection.”); Brunson, supra note 271 
(“[U]nder-policing also leaves residents feeling perpetually underserved and unsafe. 
Residents of distressed urban neighborhoods have complained about ineffective policing for 
centuries[.]”). 
274 See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People 
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 263 (2008) 
(considering trust as one facet of police legitimacy and “demonstrating that people are more 
cooperative with the police when they believe that police performance in fighting crime is 
more effective”). But see Meares, supra note 17, at 1363–64, 1366 n.58 (noting that trust of 
police is implicated by individuals’ personal interactions with police and solving crime alone 
does not create trust; a strong focus on crime reduction can lead to “overly aggressive law 
enforcement strategies [that] can . . . do lasting damage to public trust”). Ineffective policing 
seems to breed further inefficiency. Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 14 (examining procedural 
justice and the role of community perception). 
275 See e.g. WEBSTER & WILLIAMS, supra note 13 (discussing the need for “a profound 
change in the relationship between the police department and the communities” and arguing 
for reform wherein “[t]he police department must become involved in a working partnership 
with the people . . . .”); Coates, supra note 55. See e.g. WEBSTER & WILLIAMS, supra note 
13 (discussing the need for “a profound change in the relationship between the police 
department and the communities” and arguing for reform wherein “[t]he police department 
must become involved in a working partnership with the people . . . .”); Coates, supra note 
55; Akbar, supra note 15, at 133 (noting that policing in the twentieth century was shaped 
by “the longer arc of enslavement, Jim Crow, and settler colonialism”). 
276 See supra notes 43–45, 47 and accompanying text; infra notes 280–75, 286–80 and 
accompanying text. 
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more likely to cooperate with police, which would improve crime solving,277 as the 
public are the most likely group to solve crimes.278 
The causes of the lack of confidence in police are likely varied. Many scholars 
have documented distrustful and tense relationships between blacks and law 
enforcement over the last fifty years, and beyond.279 One contributor to disaffection 
with police is procedural injustice—or being unfairly treated by police.280 People 
also fail to report to police because of poor treatment by police in the reporting 
process.281 It is difficult to disentangle the tension and disaffection of people of color 
and police to determine the causes and effects. However, a part of this equation is 
likely the police myth which results in people of color suffering disproportionately 
as victims of unresolved serious crime. Certainly, communities of color are 
responding rationally to police failure to solve crimes. Police are less likely to solve 
serious crimes in communities of color, therefore these communities have less 
confidence that the police will solve such crimes. The public perception surveys in 
this context mirror reality. And one study demonstrates that public views of police 
are directly linked with how effectively officers solve crime and how well police 
 
277 Frank Rudy Cooper, Cop Fragility and Blue Lives Matter, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 621, 
622 (2020) (suggesting that police hold “mediated listening sessions” to build trust in police 
since “racial minority communities will only give police the cooperation they need if they 
perceive the police to be listening to them.”). As one community resident who lost a son to 
violence stated, the way forward needs to include building better relationships with police. 
“If they’re right, we work with them.’” Julie Wernau & Erin Ailworth, Push to Defund the 
Police Faces Headwinds in Some Poor, Black Neighborhoods, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2020 
7:55 AM ET). 
278 See Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12 for discussion. 
279 John Hagan & Celesta Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal 
Injustice in America, 88 AM. J. SOC. 329, 343 (1982) (analyzing the impact of race on the 
perception of criminal justice through regression analysis and finding that race plays a 
“persistent and often striking influence” particularly with police and perception of bias by 
courts); Bell, supra note 7, at 2126, 2128, 2139 (suggesting that tense relationships can be 
addressed by addressing concentrated poverty racial inequality partly through suing local 
police for patterns of violating constitutional rights).  
280 See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990) (introducing the concept 
of procedural justice which is concerned with police legitimacy and authority); Bell, supra 
note 7, at 2104 (watching others be treated poorly by police can lead to vicarious 
marginalization, indeed partners of formerly incarcerated men are less likely to vote and a 
study that shows that other behaviors and world views change when a partner is 
incarcerated).  
281 “I live in a major, highly integrated urban area with a miserable police force. I’m a 
college educated, financially secure, middle-aged white male. I DO NOT REPORT CRIMES 
to the police. Trying to report a crime is a horrible experience where you’re made to feel like 
you’re a criminal yourself. . . . That’s why crimes are not reported. There’s no point. And as 
my Black friends say, calling the cops always makes things worse..” Ed Brown, Comment 
to Shima Baughman, Police Solve Just 2% of All Major Crimes, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 
20, 2020, 8:18 AM EDT), https://theconversation.com/police-solve-just-2-of-all-major-
crimes-143878. 
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interact with the public.282 According to policing scholars Tom Tyler and Jeff Fagan, 
public perceptions of police are positive “when the public views the police as 
effective in controlling crime and maintaining social order.”283 Monica Bell also 
explains that structural exclusion has resulted in the black community due to 
receiving lower quality policing.284 Distrust and disaffection have gone hand in hand 
as a result of the police myth in communities of color. 
With the notable exceptions above, the legal academy has failed to appreciate 
that certain communities have been talking about the police myth for some time. 
Indeed, communities of color suffer most acutely since crime solving is lowest in 
those populations.285 Public Enemy’s, “911 is a Joke” rap from 1990 quite literally 
complains that the police “only come when they wanna” or “don’t come at all.”286 
Indeed, the lack of crime solving has led to profound disengagement with the police 
and any notion that the police have or ever will serve and protect Black people.287 
 
282 Kristina Murphy & Julie Barkworth, Victim Willingness to Report Crime to Police: 
Does Procedural Justice or Outcome Matter Most?, 9 VICTIM & OFFENDERS: AN INT’L J. OF 
EVIDENCE-BASED RSCH., POL’Y & PRAC. 178, 194, 198 (2014) (finding that for some victims, 
“whether the police are seen to be effective in dealing with crime plays a more dominant 
role” when deciding whether or not to report future crime). 
283 Tyler & Fagan, supra note 274, at 267. 
284 Bell, supra note 7, at 2114 (explaining that structural exclusion involves “policies 
that may appear facially race- and class-neutral distribute policing resources so that African 
Americans and residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods tend to receive lower-quality 
policing than whites” and a slower response); see ANDERSON, supra note 271 (noting the 
failure of police to respond and “the profound sense of alienation from mainstream society 
and its institutions felt by many poor inner-city black people”); see also Nirej S. Sekhon, 
Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 1171 (2012) (discussing the unchecked 
discretion of police departments that results in the paradox of under-policing and under-
protecting racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities while over-enforcing 
in those same communities).  
285 LEOVY, supra note 234 (noting the disproportionate failure of the criminal justice 
system to solve black homicide). However, broken windows policing created federal 
incentives to police urban high-crime neighborhoods. Bell, supra note 7, at 2117–18 (“Yet 
several forces converged in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s that shifted the problem from one 
of utter neglect to the current problem of overpolicing and underprotection.”); see also 
Brunson, supra note 271 (“But a great deal of scholarship has demonstrated that under-
policing also leaves residents feeling perpetually underserved and unsafe. Residents of 
distressed urban neighborhoods have complained about ineffective policing for centuries, 
including officers’ rudeness, slow response times and lack of empathy for crime victims.”). 
286 “Going, going, gone / Now I dialed 911 a long time ago / Don't you see how late 
they're reacting / They only come and they come when they wanna / So get the morgue truck 
and embalm the goner / They don't care cause they stay paid anyway / They treat you like an 
ace they can't be betrayed” PUBLIC ENEMY, 911 IS A JOKE (Def Jam Recordings 1990). 
287 Cassell, supra note 49, at 52–53 (discussing delegitimization of police and noting 
“changes in public perceptions of police” that recognize a systemic problem of “police 
killings of African-American men” and decreasing confidence in police); see Brunson, supra 
note 271 (“Some residents of high-crime neighborhoods have long concluded that police are 
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According to a DOJ Study, those victimized by crime are significantly less likely to 
approve of police.288 The results of disaffection with police is a self-perpetuating 
cycle of nonreporting—indeed as police solve less crime, individuals are less likely 
to turn to police which creates a problematic cycle.289 When individuals are not held 
accountable for crimes, this can lead to a lack of public security and can threaten 
law and order.290  
The problem with police disaffection is that it has always been a problem 
among underserved communities. As discussed in Part I, the history of policing is 
rife with violence, racial inequity, and a persistent inability to solve even a quarter 
of major crimes. In fact, police suffered from low clearance rates from as far back 
as clearance rates have been recorded. And it may actually be that police have gotten 
worse at solving crimes.291 Given this reality, there is no “reform” or “restoration” 
of police. In fact, America has never had an effective—crime solving—police force. 
And police have never enjoyed broadscale legitimacy with minorities or disfavored 
populations throughout their history. To this end, the police myth is more of a myth 
among advantaged groups who may never have realized that police were not solving 
serious crimes with regularity. So arguably, police have never had universal public 
legitimacy and unpacking the police myth might exacerbate the problem of police 
 
either incapable of keeping them safe or unwilling to do so”); “The inability of the criminal 
legal process to deliver meaningful justice in the aftermath of severe interpersonal harm, and 
its overemphasis on the enforcement of laws against conduct that ought not to be 
criminalized, will not be corrected by police training or by making officers more respectful 
of those they police.” McLeod, supra note 1, at 1644. See, e.g., Aamer Madhani, Unsolved 
Murders: Chicago, Other Big Cities Struggle; Murder Rate a “National Disaster,” USA 
TODAY (Aug. 10, 2018, 3:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/08/10/u-s-
homicide-clearance-rate-crisis/951681002/ [https://perma.cc/32WSNCX6] (drawing 
attention to the “national disaster” of unsolved murders in large cities).  
288 Cheryl Maxson et al., Factors That Influence Public Opinion of the Police, U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUST. 1, 6 (2003). 
289 SPARROW, supra note 258, at 20–21 (arguing that not only does a focus on reducing 
crime rates “produce[] too narrow a focus,” but it also “invites manipulation of statistics and 
other forms of corruption”; noting the focus on reported crime overlooks broader unreported 
crimes and urging police to conduct victimization surveys to better understand crime); see 
Braga, supra note 15 (arguing that stronger relationships between law enforcement and the 
communities they serve would result in greater access to information for police); Meares, 
supra note 17 (supporting President Obama’s assertion that the most important developments 
in law enforcement are greater trust and legitimacy); Kahan, supra note 17 (examining 
community policing initiatives aimed at improving relationships between law enforcement 
and communities); Rachel Abanonu, De-Escalating Police-Citizen Encounters, 27 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 239, 241 (2018) (finding that “public awareness and education about 
constitutional rights during police encounters” can lessen confrontations between police and 
the public); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2245 
(2001) (recognizing the value of community outreach in building “monitoring, compliance, 
and enforcement structures with the active participation of citizens of color”). 
290 SPARROW, supra note 258. 
291 See supra note 39.  
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disaffection. The failure of police to prevent and solve crimes—or the police myth—
is likely to play a major role in police disaffection. 
 
C.  Punishment-Protection Paradox 
 
Another impact of the police myth is what is termed here, “the punishment-
protection paradox.” Individuals refuse to report crime because of the threat of 
“punishment” from different avenues. First, it poses a threat to them to report a 
crime, both with community members, because of incarceration, as well as their 
potential fear of police abuse.292 The “punishment” is also a real deterrent in 
reporting because when crimes are solved, they are solved by arrest or incarceration 
that adds to disaffection and marginalization from the community.293 But then there 
is the “protection paradox.” People in communities of color understand the police 
 
292 Abuse is the second most common type of police misconduct. MIKKI KENDALL, 
HOOD FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE WOMEN THAT A MOVEMENT FORGOT 51–62 (2020) 
(examining police perpetration of sexual assault and rape); Kanya Bennett, Say Her Name: 
Recognizing Police Brutality Against Black Women, ACLU (June 14, 2018, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/say-her-name-
recognizing-police-brutality-against-black (“Sexual abuse is the second most reported form 
of police misconduct after use of excessive force.”). Victims may fail to report “because they 
do not believe that it will be responded to appropriately or that anything will be done about 
it.” Baughman, supra note 39, at 77; see also Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and 
Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81(5) AM. SOC. REV. 857, 857 (2016) 
(“High-profile cases of police violence—disproportionately experienced by black men—
may present a serious threat to public safety if they lower citizen crime reporting. Using an 
interrupted time series design, this study analyzes how one of Milwaukee’s most publicized 
cases of police violence against an unarmed black man, the beating of Frank Jude, affected 
police-related 911 calls. Controlling for crime, prior call patterns, and several neighborhood 
characteristics, we find that residents of Milwaukee’s neighborhoods, especially residents of 
black neighborhoods, were far less likely to report crime after Jude’s beating was broadcast. 
The effect lasted for over a year and resulted in a total net loss of approximately 22,200 calls 
for service.”). For discussion of another paradox of punishment, see also Jeffery Fagan & 
Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment 
in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 173 (2008) (“The failure of crime rates 
to decline commensurately with increases in the rate and severity of punishment reveals a 
paradox of punishment: recent experiments have shown that among persons of color, 
especially those who are poor or reside in poor neighborhoods, harsher punishment has 
produced iatrogenic or counterdeterrent effects.”). 
293 Michael Pinard, Race Decriminalization and Criminal Legal System Reform, 95 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ON. 119, 120 (2020) (“It is common knowledge that Black communities have 
borne the brunt of mass incarceration, mass convictions, and every other aspect of the 
criminal legal system.”). But also, of all unsolved murders in the decade prior to 2018, the 
vast majority (“almost three-quarters”) were black. Lowery et al., supra note 272; Heather 
Mac Donald, Breakdown: The Unwinding of Law and Order in Our Cities Has Happened 
with Stunning Speed, CITY J. (July 1, 2020), https://www.city-journal.org/ferguson-effect-
inner-cities (“So far this year, 78 percent of all homicide victims in Chicago are black, though 
blacks are less than a third of the population.”). 
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myth all too well. They know from experience of years of ineffective policing that 
police are not typically solving crimes.294 The lack of police intervention when a 
community member is a victim of serious crime is perceived as a problem of police 
refusing to keep the community safe or being unable to do so. With the lack of 
protection is the justified belief of underserved communities that police cannot and 
will not assist them; and reporting to the police is futile. Jay, a young person in a 
high crime New York neighborhood says it well. “Anything could happen to me, 
and the cops, they’re not going to be there to save me.”295 And indeed studies show 
that a lack of police responsiveness is related to increases in obtaining a firearm for 
protection and potentially gang activity.296 Also, in the few cases police intervene, 
this may result in more negative interactions and fear of police,297 which might make 
people even less likely to approach police to solve crimes,298 and encourages more 
self-help.299 Even when police do arrest and sometimes incarcerate members of a 
community, this can create marginalization for all who are involved and an 
 
294 Brunson, supra note 271 (raising concerns about the lack of effective policing that 
“leaves residents feeling perpetually underserved and unsafe”). 
295 Id. (Jay, a young person, had been shot twice and decided to carry a weapon 
everywhere he went); see also JAMES FORMAN, LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 35 (2017) (recognizing “the simultaneous over- and under-
policing of crime” in African American communities); Rod K. Brunson, If the Police Weren’t 
There, WASH. POST, June 14, 2020, at B1 (underpolicing leaves residents “perpetually 
underserved and unsafe”); Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, W. Va., 961 F.3d 661, 671 
(4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing a “desperate need” for more and different policing). 
296 “These data confirm that lower levels of police legitimacy are significantly related 
to a higher probability of acquiring a firearm for protection. I consider the ways that gang 
membership, legal changes in Chicago, and gun behaviors are related to protective gun 
ownership, as well as how community policing and procedural justice can improve 
perceptions of police and enhance their legitimacy, potentially reducing the incentives to 
engage in violent, extralegal ‘self-help’ with a firearm.” Michael Sierra-Arévalo, Legal 
Cynicism and Protective Gun Ownership Among Active Offenders in Chicago, COGENT SOC. 





297 Many individuals in high crime communities do not feel safe around police officers 
and only a small number feel that police were responsive to community concerns. See e.g., 
Nancy La Vigne et al., How Do People in High-Crime, Low-Income Communities View the 
Police? URB. INST. 10–13 (Feb. 2017), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88476/how_do_people_in_high-
crime_view_the_police.pdf (only 37.8% of residents reported feeling safe around police 
officers, and just 28.3% believed that police are “responsive to community concerns”). 
298 There is a racial gap in reporting between white and black people. See Baughman, 
supra note 39, at 51 n.13 (identifying prior literature addressing lack of crime reporting). 
299 Indeed, due to police abandonment, marginalized communities have resorted to 
“self-help,” by relying on family members or friends, which can lead to an increase in 
violence. Bell, supra note 7, at 2116.  
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encouragement by others not to snitch and turn in a member of the community to 
the police.  
The major problem of the punishment-protection paradox—identified by 
investigation literature—but ignored by legal policing scholars—is that the vast 
majority of serious crimes are solved by the public. Without the public commitment 
in underserved communities to help police solve crimes, there is a perpetuating cycle 
of the punishment paradox: the less people confide in police, the fewer crimes are 
solved, the more disaffection from police which furthers the inability of police to 
solve crimes and gain trust through increased competency.300 With this fear and lack 
of recognition of the harms of under-policing and structural marginalization of poor 
communities of color, the police myth is allowed to perpetuate and individuals 
continue mistrusting the police. The harms caused by not solving murders of loved 
ones, rapes of daughters and sons, and burglaries of the homes of innocents are 
unaccounted for. As a result, police not stopping violence in black neighborhoods 
may actually increase crime.301 And overwhelmingly, despite police abuse, black 
communities want policing and protection,302 as communities of color feel 
devastated by crime more acutely than other communities.303 And because so many 
poor communities are devastated by crime, the effects are broad and echoing.  
The punishment-paradox that this Article grapples with results in the realization 
that solving the police myth by making a larger percentage of arrests may not be the 
 
300 See supra Part III.B; notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
301 See David Kennedy & Jon Ben-Menachem, Moving Toward an American Police-
Community Reconciliation Framework, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Tamara Rice Lave & Eric J. Miller eds., Cambridge University Press, 
2019). 
302 See Bell, supra note 7, at 2119–23; YOUGOV, THE ECONOMIST/YOUGOV POLL: JUNE 
14–16, 2020 - 1500 US ADULT CITIZENS 44 (2020), 
https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/vgqowgynze/econTabReport.pdf (indicating that 55% of 
African Americans oppose abolishing the police with 23% unsure on their stance and 22% 
in favor of abolishing the police); Jacob Gershman, Some States are Pushing Laws to Restrict 
Police Behavior, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2020, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-states-are-pushing-laws-to-restrict-police-behavior-
11597829401; Wernau & Ailworth, supra note 277 (reporting that only 22% of Black 
respondents supported the idea of abolishing the police, the poll found, compared with 20% 
of Latinos and 12% of white respondents and “don’t see how defunding the police is going 
to help anything”); Heather Gillers & Andrea Fuller, Cities Weigh Cutting Police Budgets 
and Discover How Hard That Is, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2020 3:38 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cities-weigh-cutting-police-budgets-and-discover-how-hard-
that-is-11597261079 (noting that some Black and Hispanic leaders have urged leaders to 
hold off before slashing police budgets and defunding police). 
303 Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and 
Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1228–29 (2000) 
(noting that “blacks are more likely than the general population to view police brutality and 
harassment as a problem, they are also much more likely to perceive crime as a serious 
problem. Thus, blacks suffer from a ‘dual frustration’—being fearful of both the police and 
criminals.”).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945
 CRIME AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF POLICE 65 
answer. If we solve the police myth by increasing arrest rates, we are potentially 
lessening the rate of police crime solving due to further alienation of communities 
from police. When police imprison large numbers of community members, there is 
a real marginalization of members of the community. If we ignore serious crime 
however, this also leads to increased distrust in police.304 The good news is that the 
vast majority of individuals in high-crime neighborhoods report they are willing to 
obey and report crime.305 Indeed, communities of color want to improve public 
safety yet they lack trust in law enforcement to improve it.306 Legal policing 
scholarship needs to explore whether there is a middle ground where the community 
trusts police to resolve crimes, potentially without resorting to punitive methods like 
arrest and incarceration. Experimentation in this regard among cities would be 
helpful in paving a new path for policing.  
While there have been negative impacts of the police myth—including 
obfuscation of police role, police disaffection and the punishment-protection 
paradox, the next section explores what societal gains have potentially resulted from 
the police myth. 
 
D.  In Defense of the Police Myth 
 
This Article has explored three negative impacts of the police myth. However, 
it is important to consider whether the police myth serves any public purpose. Could 
it be providing a sense of security, albeit false? When an individual goes to bed at 
night, when he hears a suspicious noise outside, he is reassured by the fact that the 
police are only a phone call away. Would understanding how unlikely it is for police 
to intervene effectively create greater insecurity? Also, if it were widely 
acknowledged that police were not solving crimes, would crime increase? Simply 
for the deterrent effect, is it wise to keep the police myth in circulation as long as 
possible? 
While fear based on the police myth is natural, ignoring it may not be the 
answer. The police myth can lead to a lack of public safety which threatens law and 
order and may reduce reporting rates. Informing people about the police myth may 
discourage more people from reporting crimes.307 Currently, only half of crimes are 
 
304 Tyler & Fagan, supra note 274 
305 “The Urban Institute surveyed residents of high-crime neighborhoods in six 
American cities and found that 74.3% believed that all laws should be strictly obeyed, 70.8% 
reported willingness to report a crime, and 63.5% would provide information to the police 
about a suspect.” Vigne et al., supra note 297. 
306 See Kennedy & Ben-Menachem, supra note 301, at 556 (“The fundamental 
realization at play here is that it’s possible for communities of color to simultaneously desire 
improved public safety while also not trusting law enforcement agencies to implement it. 
Instead, such communities are imbued with what scholars call “legal cynicism” a lack of 
confidence in the law and its agents.”). 
307 See SPARROW, supra note 258, at 2 (noting that police are most measured by 
“[r]eductions in the number of serious crimes reported, most commonly presented as local 
comparisons against an immediately preceding time period”). 
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reported to police, and the most common reason is that people (correctly) believe 
police cannot or refuse to do anything about the problem.308 The police myth can 
also threaten law and order. Although an attack on the myth that police are regularly 
solving crime might be viewed by some as an invitation to attempt more criminality 
with the promise of going unnoticed, the reality is that these threats already exist, 
and continuing to neglect them is not good policy.  
One argument in defense of the police myth is that police have never been great 
at solving crime, so there is no sense in disrupting the status quo. Without a focus 
on the police myth, crime trends over the last thirty years—crime reporting, arrest 
and clearance rates—show that police have made no improvement.309 And no 
training or new theoretical framework has really helped improve the police myth 
over the last thirty years.310 Some research shows that crime levels may not even 
relate to policing but indelible factors such as income, levels of employment, 
education, and population heterogeneity.311 It is possible that crime solving rates 
may always be disappointingly low. 
Crime solving rates are also low because crime is very difficult to solve, though 
police priorities also matter.312 One reality of the police myth is that crime is 
incredibly difficult to solve, and the most difficult crimes to solve are unfortunately 
the ones that create the most harm—murder and rape.313 For instance, it is extremely 
difficult to solve a murder when the public refuses to assist police in determining the 
relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.314 Property crimes are even 
 
308 Baughman, supra note 39, at 107–08; ADDINGTON, supra note 239 (arguing that 
“police are precisely in the middle of [an] extraordinarily leaky sieve” that includes “not just 
leaks” but has “lapses of justice” that cost police legitimacy “when they fail to bring the vast 
majority of serious offenders to justice”). 
309 See Baughman, supra note 39, at 53 (establishing that “police are much less effective 
than we might think at solving all major crimes and have not significantly improved in the 
last thirty years”). 
310 Friedman, supra note 27, at 50. 
311 SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 270; but cf. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, What 
Caused the 2016 Chicago Homicide Spike? An Empirical Examination of the “ACLU Effect” 
and the Role of Stop and Frisks in Preventing Gun Violence, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1581 
(arguing that changes in stop and frisks can affect homicide rates). 
312 WILSON, supra note 95, at vii (explaining that in 1968 that it was difficult for police 
to solve crimes and “impossible to prevent crimes,” and that “police outputs are hard to 
measure” and police are more likely to be “judged not by crime statistics but by the frequency 
of scandals, charges of corruption or abuse and political controversies” which makes the 
practice “defensive rather than service-oriented” policing). 
313 See WILSON, supra note 95, at 59 (“Many serious crimes—murder, forcible rape—
are of [such a] character” as to make it “often difficult or impossible” for police to address); 
ANDY KOOPMANS, CRIME AND CRIMINALS 35 (2003) (“It is not that real life police are 
incompetent, but these crimes (murder and rape) are very difficult to solve.”). Even when 
crimes are known, absence of forensics can make them difficult to solve. 
314 See Baughman, supra note 39, at 61 (noting the impact of “variables such as police 
workload, firearm use, distant victim-offender relationship, and low visibility/exposure 
incident time” on clearance rates). 
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more of an enigma given challenges with both fingerprint,315 and DNA 
technology,316 and due to the lack of coordination within police departments.317 A 
contributing factor according to some scholars is the rights revolution in the 1960s 
that made police investigation for serious crimes more difficult.318 Though, pre-
1960s clearance rates may not support this argument since police clearance rates 
have historically always been low. 
A key question before formulating any sort of path forward, is whether it is 
possible for police to improve at solving crimes. If it is possible, it is worth 
addressing the police myth and attempting to improve police crime solving. From a 
police perspective, the explanation for failure to solve crimes includes “too many 
crimes, a lack of time, witness cooperation problems, and charge reluctance by 
prosecutors.”319 None of these arguments are determinative. The argument that there 
are too many crimes may be true, but crime rates have reduced substantially in the 
last thirty years and police have remained consistent in clearance of crime. It may 
be that there will always be more crime than police can solve. Crime rates have 
actually shrunk since the 1990s,320 but police arrest rates have remained steady since 
1995 (between 20%-25%), showing that police have not changed in their ability to 
solve crimes.321 Additionally the percentage of officers per individual in the U.S. has 
remained steady with the population, so if there are too few officers, that has always 
been the case.322 Reluctance by prosecutors to charge crimes also lacks much 
support, as prosecutors are charging at disproportionately higher rates than police 
 
315 See supra notes 12, 192 and accompanying text. 
316 See supra notes 12, 155 and accompanying text. 
317 Many who appreciate privacy and civil liberties appreciate this lack of centralized 
police coordination and would not change it. See Baughman, supra note 248. 
318 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216 (2011) 
(discussing the Warren Court’s rights revolution and arguing that the court’s decisions 
“helped usher in the harsh politics of crime that characterized the twentieth century’s last 
decades”); SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 203, 215 (arguing that police see the exclusionary 
rule’s purpose as making their job more difficult in apprehending and detecting criminal 
defendants); Schulhofer, supra note 233, at 2 (arguing that “national clearance-rate data . . . 
offer no reason to think that Miranda hinders . . . law enforcement effort[s]”); Cassell & 
Fowles, supra note 85, Still Handcuffing the Cops?, at 706–08 (disputing the claim that 
“Miranda had no noticeable effect on crime clearance rates” and finding that “in fact, crime 
clearance rates fell sharply all over the country immediately after Miranda and have 
remained at these lower levels ever since”). 
319 Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 605–06. 
320 See supra note 206 
321 Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 5 (observing that “in the last ten years or 
more the number of crimes committed have decreased, the number of arrests per year have 
decreased consistently”). See also supra note 206. 
322 See infra note 363; DUREN BANKS ET AL., supra note 116, at 2 (“The annual national 
estimate of sworn officers per 1,000 U.S. residents ranged from 2.23 in 1992 to 2.51 in 
2008.”). 
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are arresting in recent years.323 There is hope that police can improve in solving 
crime as the police investigation literature has acknowledged for some time that 
police spend minimal time solving crime. A potential first step might include a 
renewed public and police focus on solving serious crimes, with a larger allocation 
of time and focus to this end.324 Policing scholars also claim that police would be 
more effective at solving and preventing crimes if they better understood underlying 
crime patterns and worked closer with communities.325 With greater focus on 
improving serious crime solving, police could reduce the impact of the police myth. 
A final argument in defense of the police myth is that solving more serious 
crime will increase crime and incarceration rates, but this does not have to be the 
case. While solving serious crimes is worthwhile, punishment is not required to 
obtain lawful behavior and the police myth actually reduces incarceration rates. 
Research shows that people do not need punishment to obey the law. Tom Tyler and 
others have shown that people do not obey the law due to threat or even the level of 
certainty of punishment but for other reasons.326 Arrest, conviction and incarceration 
is actually more likely to harm defendants and cause future crime.327 Accordingly, 
even with the lack of police solving crimes, serious crime levels have gone down 
substantially each year in the last thirty years.328 And a potential benefit of police 
not solving crimes may actually be lower incarceration rates. Indeed, without the 
police myth we would presumably have much higher incarceration rates if police 
arrested a larger proportion of the more than the 14 million felony and misdemeanor 
crimes committed each year.329 There are other ways to achieve accountability for 
 
323 Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 26 (“Prosecutors are charging more cases 
proportionately than police are, and . . . are contributing more to mass incarceration than 
police.”). 
324 Investigation scholars claim that detectives might be passive in waiting for 
information to come to them or rely on technology as a crutch rather than actively solving 
crimes. Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 606, 610 (“Detectives sometimes fall victim to the 
current ‘quick fix,’ a trap that typically involves detectives waiting for something to 
happen—a witness to walk in, the Crime Stoppers phone to ring, the DNA results to come 
back.”; indeed “[m]ost recommendations for improving criminal investigations have 
involved efforts to increase evidence collection or forensic testing.”). 
325 Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 612; see also supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
326 See generally TYLER, supra note 280 (positing that people obey the law because 
they believe it is legitimate); BREGMAN, supra note 146. 
327 David Roodman, The Impact of Incarceration on Crime, OPEN PHILANTHROPY 
PROJECT (Sept. 2017) (synthesizing studies on the effect of incarceration on subsequent 
offending). 
328 Baughman, supra note 39, at 102; see also Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 
5 (“[I]n the last ten years or more the numbers of crimes committed have decreased, the 
number of arrests per year have decreased consistently, and while people are still serving 
long sentences, some federal sentences have been reduced.”). 
329 MORGAN & TRUMAN, supra note 224; FBI, 2019, supra note 39 (There were an 
estimated 14,845,545 crimes committed in 2019. The number comes from the number of 
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crime than increasing arrest rates.330 And refusing to arrest some individuals may 
not cause the anarchy critics might fear given it is not very different to the reality of 
the current system.331 Understanding the police myth may eventually force the public 
to accept criminal behavior and understand that policing and incarceration cannot 
stop it and other paths should be pursued. The next section provides a few insights 
on how to move forward with policing theory and function after understanding the 
police myth. 
 
E.  Path Towards Change 
 
Change in policing begins with recognition of the police myth and with that 
recognition, reframing of the functions of police. Adopting a correct theoretical 
framework for policing is critical,332 though equally important is formulating a 
baseline understanding of the function of police and the goals of policing. No 
policing theory historically has ever focused on or impacted the rate at which police 
solve crimes.333 No overarching police theory will change community relationships 
with police if police credibility continues to be challenged by the police myth. And 
if goals for police are not determined—focus resources on stopping serious violent 
crimes rather than on minor incidents, for instance—police might continue to arrest 
 
rape/sexual assaults, robberies, aggravated assaults, burglaries, thefts, and motor vehicle 
thefts estimated by the NCVS as well as the number of murders and non-negligent 
manslaughters reported by the FBI.)  
330 See Baughman, supra note 39, at 95 (noting the lack of data on “crimes resolved 
without arrest”). 
331 As Mariame Kaba so poignantly stated “What is it, the numbers that I heard recently 
where that a thousand people getting raped, that out of that number, I think it's something 
like 200 people report. And from the 200 people that report, 20 are moved forward to a 
prosecutor. And out of those 20 convictions, less than five people. And out of those 
convictions, only maybe one ends up behind bars in a sexual assault. Out of a thousand cases. 
So when people tell me, ‘What are we going to do with all the rapists?’ I'm like, what are we 
doing with them now? They live everywhere. They're in your community, they're on TV 
being outed every single day.” Why Is This Happening? Thinking About How to Abolish 
Prisons with Mariame Kaba, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019, 10:58 AM). Paul Butler says that 
the state is failing to protect citizens: “So if there were approaches that helped better than the 
punishment approach, I think that more people would avail themselves of an official 
government response because they would know that would help them heal.” The Crime Story 
Podcast with Kary Antholis, supra note250. 
“So, when we listen to victims, we learn that many if not most, don’t ask for the cops 
to come, the guy to be locked up, the guy to be put under the jail. What they often hope is 
that the response will be such that the person who caused the harm won’t harm anybody else, 
and he’ll understand the injury that he caused. And to the extent that he’s able, he makes up 
the injury, to the extent that, that’s possible.” Id. 
332 Bell, supra note 7, at 2065 (“In the world of police governance and practice, perhaps 
more than in other spheres, theory matters for determining what police departments and 
officers do on the ground.”). 
333 See supra Part I.A-C (historical periods of policing). 
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large numbers of individuals for minor crimes.334 The theory behind policing is 
critical, but equally fundamental is the question of the function of police. Three steps 
towards better reframing the functions of police are below. This brief section 
certainly does not map out the steps towards resolving the police myth, or reforming 
police theory or even articulating what the function of police should be. It is intended 
as a start in a conversation that will be taken up by legal policing theory and policing 
investigation scholars. 
First, a thoughtful consideration of the police myth is necessary, along with 
police function and structure. A wholesale consideration of the derivation of police 
authority from the Constitutional “police power” is in order. While police have 
continued to exercise power over health, safety and transportation issues—it may be 
that these duties would be best divided. There needs to be broad public 
understanding of the police role and a consideration of whether their focus should 
be on solving more crimes. Reimagining police may mean that police are no longer 
considered crime fighting heroes. The public should recognize that most people are 
not held accountable for crimes and that police fail to solve most crimes. This 
examination may require a more realistic look at what police are able to do and what 
communities want their role to be. If public polls over the years are an accurate 
indication, communities want police focused on preventing and solving serious 
violent crimes.335 Though it could be the case that the public prefer police as broader 
catch-all government actors, and want police to respond to health and public order 
concerns as well as fight serious crime. Policing scholars are not currently focused 
on improving crime solving, particularly in addressing the resulting harm for 
communities of color. In fact, criminal investigation is one of the least researched 
areas in policing.336 Reimagining policing function starts with recognition of the 
police myth; and second, a movement towards accepting or potentially exploring 
how police can increase effectiveness in solving serious crimes, which has proven 
in some contexts to be successful.337 An increased focus on solving crimes is not so 
 
334 See Meares, supra note 43, at 616 (“Policing of low-level offenses in poor, minority, 
and high-crime communities was potentially not as effective as we might have thought . . . 
[and] such policing potentially is very costly to communities in need of a strong and 
responsive relationship to law enforcement.”). 
335 Communities of color have a complicated relationship with police, though in general 
want protection from crime. Wernau & Ailworth, supra note 277 (quoting a member of an 
underserved community discussing the need for police to protect communities of color, 
saying “I’m the last person who would be a police cheerleader, because I’ve had my own 
run-ins with them,” but adding, “What are you going to do when they’re not there to protect 
you?”); Police are viewed as an attractive amenity in a neighborhood or a nuisance depending 
on the view of a particular person and their experience with law enforcement see Monica C. 
Bell, Located Institutions: Neighborhood Frames, Residential Preferences, and the Case of 
Policing, 125 AM. J. SOC. 917, 917 (2020). 
336 See Westera et al., supra note 27.  
337 Phillip J, Cook et al., Why Do Gun Murders Have a Higher Clearance Rate than 
Gunshot Assaults?, CRIMIN. AND PUB. POL’Y (“When additional investigative effort is 
expended, law enforcement improves its success in gaining the cooperation of key witnesses 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945
 CRIME AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF POLICE 71 
simple as moving a traffic cop to a detective position; it may require hiring 
specialists for resource-intensive investigative functions.338 
Understanding the police myth eventually requires the public to grapple with 
the fact that they collectively demand police spend a lot of time on public order 
functions that can potentially be conducted in a more cost-effective manner by those 
trained in counseling, or medical provision. Improving police performance in crime 
solving may require dividing policing function to allow police to focus on preventing 
and solving crime.339 It may be more effective for citizen volunteers to help with 
neighborhood distress calls or possibly minor crime mediation. Traffic control could 
deal with all traffic issues, including controlling flow of traffic. Emergency health 
and social services rather than police could deal with drug issues—the largest 
percentage of misdemeanor arrests—and mental health, which are perpetual 
problems for police.340 Indeed, social workers could address community disruptions 
without the use of force and with police as back up if violence is possible.341 Even 
domestic violence disputes, that are some of the trickiest calls for officers, may be 
resolved more successfully by police with the help of social workers.342 This could 
free patrol officers to assist detectives in solving serious crimes. Reforming the 
police function does not have to increase arrest rates for less serious crimes, as many 
of these could be more appropriately resolved by mediation or restitution or other 
 
and increases the amount of forensic evidence collected and analyzed. In turn, the capacity 
of the police to hold violent gun offenders accountable, deliver justice to victims, and prevent 
future gun attacks is enhances.”). 
338See GARRETT, supra note 257. 
339 See also Bell, supra note 7, at 2147–48. 
340 There is no easy solution for mental health problems. Jonathan Foiles, We Can’t Just 
Replace Cops with Social Workers, SLATE (July 1, 2020, 11:46 AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/07/social-workers-cant-replace-cops.html (discussing 
that people trained with self-defense do not need to respond to mental health problems but 
sometimes it is hard to determine whether a mental health emergency is the problem and 
there are other problems in policing that would not be solved with the use of social workers). 
341 Friedman, supra note 27, at 21, 37 (noting that despite being asked to respond to 
call and provide “social work solutions,” “[w]here [police] get the least training by far is in 
the categories of mediation and social work, and in dealing with non-law enforcement 
emergent situations”). 
342 See Richmond’s Second Responders: Partnering with Police Against Domestic 
Violence, POLICE FOUND. REPS. 2 (Mar. 2005), https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Greenspan-et-al.-2005-Richmond%E2%80%99s-Second-
Responders-.pdf (finding that domestic violence victims “experienced less abuse,” “received 
more social services,” and “received more services from police” when social workers as well 
as police responded, compared to those who only “received a conventional police response”). 
The CAHOOTS Oregon program integrates crisis intervention and has been effective at 
responding to large quantities of calls, providing medical services, and responding to 
“personal welfare safety checks,” at a significant annual cost savings. Candice Bernd, 
Community Groups Work to Provide Emergency Medical Alternatives, Separate from Police, 
in WHO DO YOU SERVE, WHO DO YOU PROTECT? POLICE VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 158 (Maya Schenwar at al. eds., 2016) (saving Eugene Police 
department 4.5 million annually and more than 1 million in ER and EMS diversion savings). 
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means with cooperation of the victim. A smaller, well-trained crime solving force 
could potentially emerge to focus on serious violent and property crimes.  
Second, careful data collection with audits and meaningful incorporation of 
community perspectives could reduce police disaffection.343 Democratizing police 
recognizes the initial insight of the constitutional founders that each locality suffers 
from different problems that should be addressed locally. To adequately consider 
local problems, data on victims crime reports, police crime reports, police arrest, 
searches or abusive practices, clearance, conviction and crime resolution rates 
should be collected and available in local communities.344 All of these are not 
discussed in detail this Article,345 but given the discussion in Part III.B on 
disaffection with the community, it is important to consider police effectiveness in 
solving crime and treatment of community members.346 Periodic community audits 
can check police by reviewing arrest and search data considering the potential of 
racial profiling and abusive practices. Community representatives should be able to 
review crime reporting data to provide feedback on how police can improve to gain 
public trust. Community members can review crimes solved to provide input on 
what the focus of police should be, and to hold police accountable for a failure to 
solve serious crimes in a community. In shifting of power to communities, as 
Simonson has suggested, communities can be empowered to focus police on finding 
alternative ways to address minor crimes, for instance.347 Community boards should 
also have the ability to hold police accountable for misconduct in a community, or 
for failing to respond to victims of crimes. In some communities this might come as 
an independent community audit of police and others a community counsel or even 
reparations for abusive policing practices.348 To succeed in this more singular focus 
on serious crimes, police need to integrate in communities and increase informal 
 
343 See Bell, supra note 7, at 2143, 2144–45 (suggesting bringing police and black 
communities together for “deliberative participation in policing”) (suggesting data collection 
including police work videos and transparency through cop watching); PATRICK SHARKEY, 
UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL OF CITY LIFE, AND THE NEXT 
WAR ON VIOLENCE 168–79 (2018) (discussing neighborhood organizations who fought with 
police to not arrest as many people, and provide needed services instead). 
344 A requisite amount of reconciliation will be necessary. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, 
DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY 
AMERICA 83 (2011). 
345 Baughman, supra note 39, at 66 (discussing 7 critical data points for judging policing 
including crime resolution rates and reporting of crime). 
346 Simonson, supra note 23, at 393 (employing the community to watch police to avoid 
misconduct). 
347 See Simonson, supra note 7. 
348 In some senses the lawsuits in Ferguson have served as an example of this. See 
HORACE & HARRIS, supra note 187, at 126–27 (suggesting that greater “citizen involvement 
and community interaction” is one “needed change[]” in policing). All of this would involve 
dealing with police union prevention of police reform. 
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contacts and decrease minor crime interactions to gain trust among citizens.349 And 
while it might be tempting to argue that low crime solving rates require a response 
of increased criminalization and punishment, this may not be the answer. Without 
removing the unnecessary “punishment” from policing, the alienation of 
communities of color will persist. Police, in collaboration with communities of 
color, can work towards repairing relationships.350 Improving these relationships 
could help decrease the impacts of the punishment-protection paradox. 
Finally, reworking pay, budgets and training, and police incentive structures 
could help improve the police myth. The wage structure in some communities where 
officers are paid less to work in urban high crime communities should be 
evaluated.351 Some communities should consider higher pay to recruit better officers 
or more officers in high crime areas,352 like what some localities do in education.353 
Some studies show that increasing police budgets and spending on increased 
research and development do not increase the proportion of crimes solved.354 So 
while hiring and retaining better officers may help improve abusive practices, it may 
not address disaffection or the police myth. The ratio of officers per population has 
 
349 Maxson et al., supra note 288, at ii (positing that police officers can “increase 
residents’ approval of their job performance by participating in community meetings, 
increasing officers’ visibility in neighborhoods, and talking with citizens” which also lessons 
the negative impact of arrests or questioning by police). 
350 See Kennedy & Ben-Menachem, supra note 301, at 576 (“Today, law enforcement 
stands face- to- face with a historic opportunity: police leaders can take affirmative steps to 
repair relationships with members of communities who have been harmed and alienated by 
criminal justice institutions, and in doing so, move toward an inclusive, reimagined vision 
of public safety. Reconciliation work can be a tool to connect the police to a history and lived 
experience that they may neither understand nor sufficiently respect.”). 
351 Bell, supra note 7, at 2131, 2133–34, 2155 (noting that state laws and police policies 
may place the least effective police in high-poverty communities and that secondary 
employment arrangements where police provide security for high income neighborhoods can 
also lead to inequities); Rushin & Michalski, supra note 6, at 298–99 (identifying unequal 
funding for communities of color and less officers where highest crime rates exist). 
352 Bell, supra note 7, at 2136; Kaste, supra note 236 (noting that solving crimes, 
especially homicides, “costs money” and “each case takes a lot of man-hours”); Williams, 
supra note 236 (“Cases are more likely to get cleared if more detectives are working.”). 
353 Rushin & Michalski, supra note 6, at 320–27 (allowing police departments to have 
a similar amount of resources per capita, allocated based on underlying crime rates). 
354 SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 243, 270 (“Criminal investigators solve a very small 
percentage of crimes, smaller than clearance rates suggest, and increased time for criminal 
investigations seems to yield little in the way of increased productivity or felony 
convictions.” In fact, more police, or asking police to be more aggressive has not increased 
public safety either, though if police were to disappear entirely, there would be more crime.); 
HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 2 (increased spending on police does not make communities safer 
if this is spent on policing and incarceration rather than more “effective safety initiatives”); 
Bruce L. Benson & David W. Rasmussen, Deterrence and Public Policy: Trade-Offs in the 
Allocation of Police Resources, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 77, 78 (1998) (increasing police 
budgets does not necessarily increase deterrence of reported crimes because policy makers 
“do not necessarily allocate new resources to deter those crimes”). 
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largely remained unchanged in the last thirty years,355 and while the public is 
generally against increasing police numbers, police overall feel they are unequipped 
to protect communities.356 Though investigation literature indicates that hiring more 
police does not necessarily result in less crime or increase the proportion of crimes 
solved.357 However in potentially reducing the numbers of police, there should be a 
consideration of the crime prevention function of police presence. Some targeted 
policing strategies have reduced violent crime rates.358 And many scholars have 
 
355 The ratio of police to the U.S population has not dramatically changed between 1992 
and 2019, ranging between 2.2 and 2.51 sworn officers per 1,000 residents. See BANKS ET 
AL., supra note 116, at 2 tbl.1; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 
2013, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/police-employee-
data/police-employee-data; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 
2014, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/police-employee-
data/main; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 2015, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/police-employee-
data/police-employee-data; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 
2016, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/police-
employees; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 2017, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/police-
employee-data; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 2018, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/police-
employee-data; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 2019, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/police-
employee-data.Note, the FBI’s Crime Data Explorer produces a graph on “Ratio of Police 
Officers to Population.” https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/officers/national/united-
states/pe. The graph also ranges between 2.0 and 2.5, however it is per 100,000 rather than 
per 1,000 as the FBI reports in the Uniform Crime Reports. At this point it is unclear why 
there is such a large discrepancy. This Article chose to use the rate per 1,000 reported by the 
FBI each year on its webpage about police employee data as it is the rate they have used for 
years. 
356 The U.S. has 35% less police than other countries. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S COUNCIL 
OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 45 fig.32 (Apr. 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/CEA%2BCri
minal%2BJustice%2BReport.pdf (noting that the U.S. has more prison guards but less police 
than the average of the world). In a 2016 Pew survey, 86% of officers say their department 
does not have enough police to adequately patrol their community, though 57% of the public 
wants no change in the size of the local police force. Morin et al., supra note 133; Chalfin & 
McCrary, supra note 258, at 167 (claiming that the United States currently employs a 
suboptimal number of police officers). 
357 Puckett & Lundman, supra note 150, at 183 (finding that “detective experience and 
detective workload have no effects on homicide clearances”); SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 
270 (noting that once a certain threshold of police department size has been reached, long 
ago met in most major cities, neither more police nor more money helps much). 
358 See Rushin & Michalski, supra note 6, at 300–01 (“First, a handful of studies have 
found that police staffing rates likely have an impact on overall crime rates, particularly 
violent crime rates . . . [and] subsequent studies have generally found that increases in police 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945
 CRIME AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF POLICE 75 
shown that the mere existence of police in a neighborhood is effective in preventing 
crime,359 mostly property crime.360 As far as training, police time spent and training 
often do not reflect the “priorities” of police departments to solve violent crimes.361 
With a focus on police function, policing may shift towards allocating more time 
and resources towards solving the most serious crimes and less resources on minor 
crimes. Indeed, to target police efforts towards crime solving, officers should be 
incentivized to solve serious crimes while disincentivized against inaccurate 
punishment through appropriate reprimands.362 The incentives to increase arrest 
 
staffing likely do decrease crime rates. Second, a robust body of research suggests that 
specific policing strategies designed to disrupt situational incentives of would-be criminals 
can actually reduce, rather than merely displace, crime. . . . And third, some studies have 
found that regulation of police may inadvertently impair [police] ability to use crime-fighting 
strategies, thereby increasing crime.”); see also Braga et al., supra note 11, at 634–35 (“hot-
spot policing strategies likely produce small but statistically significant reductions in certain 
crime rates, while the use of problem-oriented policing strategies contributes to even larger 
decreases in crime”); Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. 
REV. 721, 768 (2017) (DOJ regulation of police departments may inadvertently result in an 
increase in certain crime rates, as police officers adjust to new oversight and training). 
359 See Klick & Tabarrok, supra note 217. 
360 See id. at 275 (using a series of “high-alert days” in Washington D.C. following 
terrorist threats, the study illustrated “very large effects” of police presence on “auto thefts 
and theft from autos” but no such response for “violent crimes”); Mirko Draca et al., Panic 
on the Streets of London: Police, Crime, and the July 2005 Terror Attacks, 101 AM. ECON. 
REV. 2157, 2158 (2011) (showing that a 30 percent increase in police force following a 
bombing in London led to “crime [falling] significantly” and that “when police deployments 
returned to their pre-attack levels . . . the crime rate rapidly returned to its pre-attack level”); 
William N. Evans & Emily G. Owens, COPS and Crime, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 181, 183 (2007) 
(using the federal Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) program that increased 
police force generally to determine that “additional officers granted through the COPS 
program produce[d] statistically significant drops in burglaries, auto thefts, robberies, and 
aggravated assaults”). The evidence that private security has the same effect is mixed. 
Compare, Paul Liu, Measuring the Effectiveness of Private Security Patrols in Lower 
Rockridge and Temescal (Nov. 11, 2014), 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/18ClYNh9sotEKS8b1DqFlDJloW27AFPyx5skTJ10u
vOg/edit (claiming a private security patrol lowered “burglary and robbery in Lower 
Rockridge” by an estimated 35.2%), and Leah Brooks, Volunteering to be Taxed: Business 
Improvement Districts and the Extra-governmental Provision of Public Safety, 92 J. PUB. 
ECON. 388, 402 (2008) (showing that business improvement districts that invest in private 
security show “sizable” drops in crime in surrounding areas, while “the evidence with respect 
to enforcement was substantially more mixed”), with MacDonald et al., supra note 217, at 
842 (using the 200% “effective increase in police presence” by the Penn Police verses the 
Philadelphia Police to estimate a “60% … reduction in crime”). 
361 See supra Part I.E.2. and accompanying text. 
362 If there is too much pressure to improve clearance, police might not spend enough 
time making sure that the arrest is appropriate, but when officers suffer when mistakes are 
made, they might more carefully investigate to avoid errors. See Jordan Adamson & Lucas 
Rentschler, How Policing Incentives Affect Crime, Measurement, and Justice, SSRN 11–13, 
17 (Aug. 10, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628595. 
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numbers could be replaced with incentives to solve serious violent crimes, and using 
alternative means to resolve less serious crimes.363 With appropriate policing 
structure and incentives, police have greater incentives not to arrest for minor or 




The movement for black lives has forced a societal reckoning about the 
fractured relationship between police and disaffected communities, and has given 
traction to removing,365 or reducing police funding nationwide.366 American policing 
costs $115 billion per year.367 It is worth reevaluating this number in terms of the 
public service received,368 as this Article makes clear that solving serious crimes 
 
363 Bell, supra note 7, at 2125 (describing a Baltimore officer who would meet his arrest 
expectations by going to poor communities of color to avoid “trouble” for arresting the 
“wrong person” with influence); see PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 
(2017) (discussing the importance of training in criminal investigation and prioritizing 
serious violent crime and community safety, rather than arrest and incarceration). 
364 Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–90 (showing that the percentage of drug arrests has 
stayed consistent over most years while arrests for violent crimes has decreased); Baughman, 
supra note 254, at 295 (discussing the relation between drugs and violence and the high 
prison rates for drug offenses compared to the much lower rates for violent crimes). It is 
possible that plea bargaining affects this police data and analysis. Prosecutors often find it 
harder to charge and prove violent crimes than consensual drug crimes, where a witness 
might testify to such a crime or a wire-tap might prove the transaction. 
365 See Akbar, supra note 15. 
366 See supra note 5, at 47. See also Anna Lowrey, Defund the Police, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 5, 2020) (“The country needs to shift financing away from surveillance and 
punishment, and toward fostering equitable, healthy, and safe communities.”); Conor 
Friedersdorf, Unbundling the Police in Venice Beach, California: You Shouldn’t Have to 
Call 911 for Problems Related to Homelessness, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 2020) (arguing that 
people should not have to call police regarding people who are homeless); Giovanni 
Russonello, Have Americans Warmed to Calls to ‘Defund the Police’?, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/us/politics/polling-defund-the-police.html 
(“Recent polling suggests that many Americans have come to understand the phrase as a 
call not to simply eliminate the keepers of the peace, but to reinvest a portion of their funding 
in other programs and crime prevention techniques.”); What Policing Costs: A Look at 
Spending in America’s Biggest Cities, VERA INST., https://www.vera.org/publications/what-
policing-costs-in-americas-biggest-cities (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (announcing that “now 
is the time to spend less on policing” in order to create safer communities for black people). 




40%20years (last visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
368 See Harmon, supra note 48, at 806 (noting that police receive “60 hours of firearms 
training, 36 hours of emergency vehicle operations, 44 hours of self-defense training, and 12 
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only constitutes a tiny fraction of the modern police function.369 Despite the police 
myth—the strong public belief that a primary police function is crime control and 
that police solve crime with regularity—this Article demonstrates that police only 
solve serious crimes about 20% of the time. While the police defunding and abolition 
movement are both gaining support, critics exclaim that this is highly impractical. 
Scholars assert that reducing the role of police would lead to increased crime and 
officer safety concerns.370 None of these discussions take into account the police 
myth. If police are neither allocating a large portion of their time to preventing or 
solving crime, or otherwise solving major crimes, would defunding police actually 
impact crime?371 If this is the moment to consider police reform, a meaningful 
consideration of police purpose and function is necessary. Legal policing scholars—
both theoretical and investigation—must consider the mismatch between public 
expectations of police function and the reality of the police myth. 
 
hours in using nonlethal weapons, but only 8 hours of ethics and integrity training and 8 
hours of mediation or conflict management training”). Friedman, supra note 27, at 44 
(“Crimefighting actually is a very small part of what police do every day, and their actual 
work requires an entirely different range of skills, among them: mediation skills . . . [and] 
social work skills[.]” “Yet, police are barely trained in any of this[.]”). 
369 Overwhelmingly, even with crime functions, police use their power and resources 
to make arrests for disorderly conduct, drugs, and other misdemeanor offenses. Morgan, 
supra note 50, at 21 (discussing police arrets for minor offenses like disorderly conduct in 
an attempt to improve public order); Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of 
Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 839–41 (2018) (discussing the disproportionate 
number of misdemeanor cases in the United States and issues of the current bail system for 
these cases); Baughman, supra note 254 (discussing the misconceptions of the war on drugs 
and the resulting increase of prison population in the United States). 
370 See Rushin & Michalski, supra note 6, at 277, 285, 318 (arguing that defunding the 
police could have “unintended consequences” such as increased crime rates, hampered 
efforts to control officer misconduct, reduced officer safety, and over ticketing, among other 
things). 
371 There is an argument by scholars that more police mean less violent crime. Matthew 
Yglesias, The Case for Hiring More Police Officers, VOX (Feb. 13, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/13/18193661/hire-police-officers-crime-
criminal-justice-reform-booker-harris; see also Cassell, supra note 49 (positing that 
diversion of police resources from typical law enforcement activities caused an increase in 
homicides). 
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